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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS


LAVERNE E. QUINLAN, Plaintiff/Counterdefendant Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v ELIAS ASSOCIATES, L.L.C., Defendant/Counterplaintiff Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

UNPUBLISHED February 1, 2000

No. 211027 Livingston Circuit Court LC No. 95 14575 CK

Before: Murphy, P.J., and Gage and Wilder, JJ. PER CURIAM. Plaintiff, lessee, appeals as of right the trial court's summary disposition denying her immediate foreclosure of a lien on commercial property owned by defendant, lessor, and denying her statutory interest on the judgment. Defendant cross-appeals the trial court's partial grant of summary disposition in favor of plaintiff on her breach of covenant of quiet enjoyment claim. We affirm. This Court reviews summary disposition rulings de novo to determine whether the prevailing party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Spiek v Dep't of Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998); Marx v Dep't of Commerce, 220 Mich App 66, 70; 558 NW2d 460 (1996). A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) may be granted when, except with regard to damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. This Court must consider all the documentary evidence available and, affording the benefit of reasonable doubt to the nonmovant, determine whether a record might be developed which would leave open an issue upon which reasonable minds could differ. Bertrand v Alan Ford, Inc, 449 Mich 606, 617-618; 537 NW2d 185 (1995); Farm Bureau Mut Ins Co of Michigan v Stark , 437 Mich 175, 184-185; 468 NW2d 498 (1991). Plaintiff first claims that the trial court erred by refusing to allow her to immediately foreclose the lien she held on defendant's property, and by refusing to immediately enter judgment in her favor in the amount of $172,052.07, plus costs and interest, contrary to its oral ruling on the record. We disagree.

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At the hearing on plaintiff's motion for summary disposition, the trial court determined that plaintiff had a lien in the amount of $172,052.07 on defendant's property, and then orally ruled that plaintiff "has now the right of foreclosure." However, the trial court reserved its final ruling until it heard arguments on the parties' cross-motions for summary disposition on defendant's countercomplaint, at which time it would issue an opinion and order on all the issues in the case. The trial court subsequently issued a final order stating that if defendant failed to repay the $172,052.07 owed plaintiff within a reasonable time after expiration of the parties' lease (not to exceed sixty days), plaintiff was entitled to foreclose the lien, and move for entry of a money judgment. To the extent that the court's final, written order altered its earlier oral ruling, we find no error. It is well settled that a court speaks through written judgments and orders rather than oral statements or opinions. Tiedman v Tiedman, 400 Mich 571, 576; 255 NW2d 632 (1977); Stackhouse v Stackhouse, 193 Mich App 437, 439; 484 NW2d 723 (1992). Thus, the trial court's written order reflects the final decision in this case, and any contrary oral statements made by the trial court are not controlling. Moreover, we find that the trial court properly concluded that, under the terms of the parties' lease agreement, plaintiff did not have an immediate right of foreclosure on the lien and was not entitled to a money judgment. Contracts which are unambiguous are not open to construction and must be enforced as written. G & A Inc v Nahra, 204 Mich App 329, 330; 514 NW2d 225 (1994). A court's role is to effectuate the intent of the parties to a lease as it is set forth in the agreement. Detroit Trust Co v Howenstein, 273 Mich 309, 313; 262 NW 920 (1935); Sprik v Regents of The University of Michigan, 43 Mich App 178, 186; 204 NW2d 62 (1972), aff'd 390 Mich 84 (1973). The parties' unambiguous lease agreement provides no right of immediate foreclosure. Pursuant to the plain language in

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Michigan Law