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STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS

PATRICK A. HOFFMEYER and KIMBERLY A. HOFFMEYER, Plaintiffs/Counter-DefendantsAppellants, v LON A. INGRAM and BONNY INGRAM, Defendants/Counter-PlaintiffsAppellees.

UNPUBLISHED November 15, 2011

No. 299868 Tuscola Circuit Court LC No. 08-024879-CZ

Before: TALBOT, P.J., and FITZGERALD and MARKEY, JJ. PER CURIAM. Patrick A. Hoffmeyer and Kimberly A. Hoffmeyer (hereinafter "the Hoffmeyers") appeal as of right the trial court's finding of no cause of action in favor of Lon A. Ingram and Bonny Ingram (hereinafter "the Ingrams") regarding the Hoffmeyers' claim for conversion of their personal property. We affirm. On March 8, 2001, the Ingrams and the Hoffmeyers entered into a land contract for commercial real property. Over time the Hoffmeyers made improvements to the interior of the building on the property and purchased various items, including a bar and related items. On July 10, 2007, the Ingrams served a forfeiture notice on the Hoffmeyers because they were in default on the land contract. On July 30, 2007, the Hoffmeyers and the Ingrams signed an amendment to the land contract. The amendment indicated that "[a]ll of the purchase money interest and taxes shall, however, be fully paid on or before November 30, 2007." The amendment also included a provision indicating that at the time of the execution, the Hoffmeyers would assign the land contract to the Ingrams by executing a quit claim deed, and the Ingrams would execute a warranty deed to the Hoffmeyers. Both documents were to be held in escrow by the Ingrams' attorney. If the balance owed by the Hoffmeyers was not paid by November 30, 2007, then the Hoffmeyers would remove the sound system and big screen television, and vacate the premises. The Ingrams could then record the quit claim deed, terminating the Hoffmeyers' interest in the property. If, however, the balance owed by the Hoffmeyers was paid in full by November 30, 2007, then the warranty deed executed by the Ingrams would be recorded and supplied to the Hoffmeyers. The Hoffmeyers did not make any of the required payments to the -1-

Ingrams and none of their personal property was removed from the premises by the November 30, 2007, deadline. On December 23, 2007, Lon Ingram informed Patrick Hoffmeyer that he would be changing the locks on the building. Patrick Hoffmeyer then came to the property and there was an encounter with Lon Ingram during which Patrick Hoffmeyer took the new keys to the building. The police were called and Patrick Hoffmeyer was told by the police to return the keys and vacate the premises or else he would be arrested. Patrick Hoffmeyer complied, and the Hoffmeyers did not take any of their personal property from the premises on that date. The next contact the Hoffmeyers had with the Ingrams occurred in approximately February 2008, when Kimberly Hoffmeyer was contacted by Lon Ingram who advised her that he believed that he had sold the building. Kimberly Hoffmeyer alleges that she asked Lon Ingram if she could get her personal property off of the premises, but was denied access. On March 6, 2008, the Hoffmeyers' attorney sent a letter to Lon Ingram demanding the return of the Hoffmeyers' personal property. The letter included a list of all of the personal property that the Hoffmeyers claimed was on the premises. The real property was sold on March 7, 2008. The personal property contained on the premises at the time of sale had been accumulated by the Hoffmeyers from the onset of the land contract through 2007. The Hoffmeyers filed a complaint against the Ingrams for conversion of their personal property due to the Ingrams' failure to return the Hoffmeyers' personal property after demands had been made. The Ingrams asserted that the Hoffmeyers had ample opportunity to remove their personal items from the premises before and after it was sold, and denied that the value of the personal property exceeded $25,000. The Ingrams filed a counterclaim against the Hoffmeyers for breach of contract. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that there was no cause of action against the Ingrams. The court ruled that there was no evidence that the Ingrams wrongfully exercised dominion or control over the Hoffmeyers' personal property. The court found that the Hoffmeyers did not show that they made a reasonable attempt to recover their property. The court also ruled that there was no cause of action against the Hoffmeyers with respect to the counterclaim. On appeal, the Hoffmeyers argue that the trial court created a new element for a claim of conversion by requiring that they show a reasonable attempt to recover their property. The Hoffmeyers contend that requiring a plaintiff to make a reasonable attempt to recover their property in order to show that their right to possession has been refused would be futile and is not required when proving conversion. The Hoffmeyers assert that proving a claim of conversion simply requires the showing that they owned the property and that the Ingrams significantly interfered with their ownership of the property. We disagree.

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The Hoffmeyers were not required to make objections in the trial court to preserve their issues for appeal, as "[n]o exception need be taken to a finding or decision" of the trial court.1 This Court reviews "[t]he trial court's legal conclusions . . . de novo."2 There is both common law and statutory conversion. Common law conversion is defined as "any distinct act of dominion wrongfully exerted over another's personal property. It occurs at the point that such wrongful dominion is asserted."3 Under the common law, conversion may be committed by: (a) intentionally dispossessing another of a chattel, (b) intentionally destroying or altering a chattel in the actor's possession, (c) using a chattel in the actor's possession without authority so to use it, (d) receiving a chattel pursuant to a sale, lease, pledge, gift or other transaction intending to acquire for himself or for another a proprietary interest in it, (e) disposing of a chattel by a sale, lease, pledge, gift or other transaction intending to transfer a proprietary interest in it, (f) misdelivering a chattel, or (g) refusing to surrender a chattel on demand.4 A plaintiff must show "that a reasonable attempt has been made to recover their property in order to establish that their right to possession has been refused. Once this refusal is established they may recover the value of the lost or damaged goods determined as of the time of the conversion."5 "If there is a refusal of the right to possession a conversion has occurred and no further demand is necessary."6 "[L]iability for conversion does not arise . . . if the actor is privileged to dispose of the chattel."7

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MCR 2.517(A)(7). Essexville v Carrollton Concrete Mix, Inc, 259 Mich App 257, 265; 673 NW2d 815 (2003). Trail Clinic, PC v Bloch, 114 Mich App 700, 705; 319 NW2d 638 (1982).

Thoma v Tracy Motor Sales, Inc, 360 Mich 434, 438; 104 NW2d 360 (1960), citing 1 Restatement Torts, 1d,

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