Preview:

STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS


PEOPLE OF THE CITY OF RIVERVIEW, Plaintiff-Appellant, v JAYNE MARIE WALTERS, Defendant-Appellant.

FOR PUBLICATION May 10, 2005 9:00 a.m. No. 251493 Wayne Circuit Court LC No. 01-500019 Official Reported Version

Before: Wilder, P.J., and Sawyer and White, JJ. PER CURIAM. Defendant was charged with possession of drug paraphernalia in violation of a municipal ordinance. The district court denied defendant's motions to quash the search warrant and to suppress her statement to the police. On appeal, the circuit court reversed the district court's order. The prosecution appeals by leave granted the order of the circuit court. We reverse and remand. I On January 5, 2000, Detective Joseph Jakubus, with the Michigan State Police narcotics division, received an anonymous tip regarding narcotics activity at defendant's home in Riverview. The tipster stated that the tipster's child came home from defendant's residence smelling of marijuana. On January 17, 2000, and January 24, 2000, the police conducted "trash pulls" of garbage placed outside defendant's home. On both occasions, the trash pulls revealed marijuana stems, seeds, and "roaches," as well as mail correspondence with defendant's name and address. On January 24, 2000, ten hooded and armed officers executed a search warrant at defendant's home. Defendant was handcuffed and told to lie face down on the floor. During that process, defendant chipped a tooth and broke the top portion of her denture. When the officer in charge asked where the cocaine was kept, defendant stated that there was no cocaine, but that, in the bottom drawer of her nightstand, there was a tin can containing marijuana stems, seeds, and rolling papers. These items later tested for marijuana and defendant was charged with possession of drug paraphernalia.

-1-


Defendant moved to quash the search warrant and suppress her statement, arguing that the search warrant was not based on a finding of sufficient probable cause. In denying defendant's motion to quash the search warrant, the district court stated: Well, for the purpose of this hearing, the Court has to give the People's testimony a certain amount of credence. It has to look at the evidence in the light most favorable to the People, and that is the . . . starting point. And I would tend to agree with defense counsel that absent any other evidence but this--a tip, that would not justify a search warrant. But we have [evidence], allegedly from a trash pull and--and the Court has to give credence to that testimony, shows burnt roaches and seeds, and . . . similar evidence of marijuana use. So, [the evidence] would give credence to the anonymous tip that there was some marijuana being smoked on the premises; and that's really what the justification for the search warrant was that I can see. So I . . . feel that the People had met their burden for the purpose of establishing that the search warrant was . . . valid, and the . . . affidavit was forthcoming. The trial court also refused to suppress defendant's statement. In rejecting defendant's argument that her statement was coerced and involuntary, the trial court concluded that the statement was spontaneous because of the brevity of the encounter, the confusion about whether she made the statement to both or one of the officers, and her testimony that she made the statement to prevent further damage to her home. Pursuant to an agreement to plead no contest, defendant filed for unopposed leave to appeal to the circuit court, arguing that the district court improperly attributed greater credibility to the police witness and that the court used the improper evidentiary standard when it stated that the evidence should be viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution. After reviewing the parties' briefs, the circuit court disagreed and affirmed the district court's decision in an opinion dated January 25, 2002.1 The circuit court determined that the trial court properly weighed the testimony of the witnesses, that there was probable cause for the search warrant, and that defendant's statement was voluntary because the officer's inquiry regarding the location of drugs was a "general inquiry to everyone in the group"2 and not directed at defendant. The circuit court also noted that, under the "inevitable discovery rule," the tin box would have been discovered in defendant's nightstand without defendant's statement. Defendant filed a motion for rehearing and reconsideration, but before defendant's motion could be heard, the presiding judge

1

During the time the appeal was pending in circuit court, the period during which defendant's conditional plea was under advisement expired, and, pursuant to the plea agreement, the district court dismissed the charges against defendant on January 26, 2002. The prosecution filed a motion in circuit court requesting that defendant's appeal be dismissed as moot. Defendant opposed the motion, arguing that she was entitled to have her record completely expunged and to reimbursement of costs.

Defendant's husband and nephew were also in the room with defendant while the search warrant was executed.

2

-2-


was elected to another court and the case was reassigned. A successor circuit judge granted defendant's motion for reconsideration. Conducting a review de novo of the record, the circuit court determined that in denying defendant's motion to quash, the district court utilized the incorrect standard in assessing the police officer's testimony as more credible. Citing United States v Matlock, 415 US 164; 94 S Ct 988; 39 L Ed 2d 242 (1974), and Nix v Williams, 467 US 431; 104 S Ct 2501; 81 L Ed 2d 377 (1984), the successor circuit judge concluded that the district court "should have reviewed the evidence by 'a preponderance of the evidence[.]'" In addition, the successor circuit judge determined that the search warrant was not supported by probable cause and that defendant's statement was involuntary as the result of coercion. Therefore, the successor circuit judge vacated the original order and entered an order suppressing defendant's statement and quashing the search warrant. The prosecution sought leave to appeal in this Court. This Court granted leave to appeal to consider the issues raised in the application and "the issue whether the successor circuit judge had authority under the court rules to reconsider the initial circuit court opinion and order affirming the dismissal of defendant's motion to suppress."3 II The prosecution first argues that the court rules do not permit a circuit court sitting as an appellate court to entertain and decide a motion for reconsideration. The prosecution contends that defendant improperly received the benefit of two appeals as of right when the circuit court considered and granted her motion for reconsideration, and that under the court rule defendant's remedy was to seek leave to appeal in this Court. We disagree. The interpretation of court rules is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo. People v Fosnaugh, 248 Mich App 444, 449; 639 NW2d 587 (2001). The same principles of statutory interpretation govern when interpreting and applying a court rule. Haliw v Sterling Hts, 471 Mich 700, 704-705; 691 NW2d 753 (2005), citing Grievance Administrator v Underwood, 462 Mich 188, 193; 612 NW2d 116 (2000). Therefore, our analysis begins with the language of the court rule. Haliw, supra at 705. Appeals from a district court are governed by MCR 7.100 et seq., and these rules are silent regarding motions for rehearing or reconsideration. MCR 6.001 et seq., the rules regarding criminal procedure, are also silent regarding motions for rehearing or reconsideration. However, MCR 6.001(D) provides, in part, that unless a rule of criminal procedure or statute otherwise applies, the rules of civil procedure are applicable in criminal cases. MCR 2.001 provides in relevant part that the rules of civil procedure apply in civil proceedings "except where the limited jurisdiction of a court makes a rule inherently inapplicable or where a rule applicable to a specific court or a specific type of proceeding provides a different procedure." Thus, consistently with the doctrine of in pari materia, we read these court rules together, and, where the rules of criminal procedure are silent, we apply the rules of civil procedure to criminal appeals from district court, unless the rule at issue is "inherently inapplicable."

3

Unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered March 2, 2004 (Docket No. 251493).

-3-


Regarding motions for rehearing or reconsideration, MCR 2.119(F) provides: (1) Unless another rule provides a different procedure for reconsideration of a decision (see MCR 2.604[A], 2.612), a motion for rehearing or reconsideration of the decision on a motion must be served and filed not later than 14 days after the entry of an order disposing of the motion. (2) No response to the motion may be filed, and there is no oral argument, unless the court otherwise directs. (3) Generally, and without restricting the discretion of the court, a motion for rehearing or reconsideration which merely presents the same issues ruled on by the court, either expressly or by reasonable implication, will not be granted. The moving party must demonstrate a palpable error by which the court and the parties have been misled and show that a different disposition of the motion must result from correction of the error. [Emphasis added.] Thus, in our judgment, the fact that MCR 7.100 does not expressly provide for motions for reconsideration is not dispositive of the issue. Instead, MCR 2.001 and MCR 2.119(F) plainly indicate that MCR 2.119(F) would not apply to circuit court review of district court decisions if it is shown that the circuit court's appellate jurisdiction is so limited to render MCR 2.119(F) inherently inapplicable,4 or the party demonstrates that the court rules provides an alternative procedure. See also MCR 6.001(D)(the rules of civil procedure are applicable to criminal cases where there is no criminal procedure or rule that applies, unless there is an express statement that the civil rules do not apply under the circumstances at issue). In this case, there is no real dispute that MCR 7.100 et seq. does not provide an alternative procedure, thus, for the prosecution to prevail, it must show that the circuit court's jurisdiction is so limited as to render MCR 2.119(F) inapplicable. To make this showing, the prosecution relies on MCR 7.101(A)(2). Under this rule, "[a]n order or judgment of a trial court reviewable in the circuit court may be reviewed only by an appeal." We conclude that the prosecution's reliance is misplaced. Our review of the plain language of MCR 7.101(A)(2) does not preclude a circuit court's ability to hear a motion for reconsideration. An "appeal" is defined as [a] "resort to a superior (i.e., appellate) court to review the decision of an inferior (i.e., trial) court or administrative agency. A complaint to a higher tribunal of an error or injustice committed by a lower tribunal, in which the error or injustice is sought to be corrected or reversed." [People v Jones, 467 Mich 301, 305; 651 NW2d 906 (2002), quoting Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed).]

4

Circuit court jurisdiction to review inferior courts decisions is derived from Const1963, art 6,

Download PEOPLE OF CITY OF RIVERVIEW V JAYNE MARIE WALTERS.pdf

Michigan Law