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Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan

Opinion
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v ANGEL MORENO, JR., Defendant-Appellant.

Chief Justice:

Justices:

Robert P. Young, Jr. Michael F. Cavanagh Marilyn Kelly Stephen J. Markman Diane M. Hathaway Mary Beth Kelly Brian K. Zahra

FILED APRIL 20, 2012 STATE OF MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT

No. 141837

BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH HATHAWAY, J. In this case, we review whether defendant was properly charged with resisting and obstructing a police officer under MCL 750.81d after defendant struggled with officers who had entered his home unlawfully. To resolve this issue, we must address whether MCL 750.81d abrogates the common-law right to resist illegal police conduct, including unlawful arrests and unlawful entries into constitutionally protected areas. We conclude that the statute did not abrogate this right.

While the Legislature has the authority to modify the common law, it must do so by speaking in "no uncertain terms."1 Neither the language of MCL 750.81d nor the legislative history of this statute indicates with certainty that the Legislature intended to abrogate the common-law right to resist unlawful arrests or other invasions of private rights. We cannot presume that the Legislature intended to abrogate this right.

Therefore, we overrule People v Ventura, 262 Mich App 370; 686 NW2d 748 (2004), to the extent that it held that the Legislature affirmatively chose to modify the traditional common-law rule that a person may resist an unlawful arrest. Because the Court of Appeals in this case relied on Ventura and extended its holding to the context of illegal entries of the home, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this matter to the trial court. On remand, we instruct the trial court to grant defendant's motion to quash the charges on the basis of its ruling that the officers' conduct was unlawful. I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY This case arises from a physical struggle that occurred between defendant and two Holland police officers when the officers sought to enter defendant's home without a warrant. As a result of the struggle, defendant was charged with resisting and obstructing a police officer and resisting and obstructing a police officer causing injury in violation of MCL 750.81d (1) and (2). On the morning of the incident, Officer Troy DeWys and Officer Matthew Hamberg were searching for Shane Adams. Adams had several outstanding warrants.
1

Hoerstman Gen Contracting, Inc v Hahn, 474 Mich 66, 74; 711 NW2d 340 (2006).

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Defendant's house was in the immediate vicinity of where Adams's vehicle was parked, so the officers knocked on defendant's front and back doors to inquire about Adams. While outside the house, Officer DeWys heard voices and people running inside the house. He identified himself as a police officer and stated that he wanted to ascertain the identities of the people inside the house. Officer Hamberg looked through a basement window and could see empty bottles of alcohol and people trying to hide. Approximately 15 minutes after the officers had knocked on the doors, Mandy McCarry opened the front door. Officer DeWys smelled "intoxicants and burnt

marijuana." McCarry admitted that underage persons were consuming alcohol inside the house, but Officer DeWys told her that he was not interested in writing "a bunch of minor in possession tickets." Officer DeWys told McCarry that he just wanted to identify who was inside the house. Officer DeWys asked McCarry if she knew the owner of the vehicle parked in the street. McCarry asked the officers if they were looking for Adams and stated that he was not inside the house. McCarry told the officers that they could not come inside the house without a warrant. Officer DeWys then informed McCarry that the officers were entering the house to "secure it" while they waited for a warrant. At that time, defendant came to the front door and demanded that the officers obtain a warrant before entering his house. Defendant then attempted to close the door, but Officer Hamberg put his shoulder against the door to prevent defendant from closing it. A struggle ensued between defendant and the officers. Ultimately, the officers pulled defendant from his doorway, physically subdued him, and arrested him. Officer DeWys suffered a torn hamstring and bruised elbow in the struggle. 3

Defendant was charged with assaulting, resisting, or obstructing a police officer, MCL 750.81d(1), and assaulting, resisting, or obstructing a police officer causing injury, MCL 750.81d(2). Defendant was bound over for trial. He moved to quash the charges, arguing that the officers' entry into his home was unlawful. The trial court concluded that the officers had unlawfully entered defendant's home, specifically ruling that there were no exigent circumstances that would have provided an exception to the warrant requirement. Nevertheless, the trial court concluded that a "lawful" action by an officer is not a requirement of MCL 750.81d and, therefore, denied defendant's motion to quash the charges. Defendant appealed as of right. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision in an unpublished opinion per curiam.2 The Court of Appeals relied on Ventura for the proposition that the lawfulness of police conduct is no longer an element of the offenses of resisting and obstructing because MCL 750.81d abrogated the common-law right to resist an unlawful arrest.3 Therefore, the Court of Appeals concluded that the officers' conduct in forcibly entering defendant's home did not have to be lawful in order for defendant to be charged under MCL 750.81d.4 application for leave to appeal.5 This Court granted defendant's

People v Moreno, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued June 10, 2010 (Docket No. 294840).
3 4 5

2

Id. at 7-8. Id. at 7. People v Moreno, 488 Mich 1010 (2010).

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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW This case involves the interpretation and application of a statute, which is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo.6 III. ANALYSIS A. THE LANGUAGE OF MCL 750.81d DOES NOT SUPPORT ABROGATION The issue before this Court is whether a person present in his or her own home can resist a police officer who unlawfully and forcibly enters the home or whether MCL 750.81d prohibits resisting unlawful actions by a police officer. Specifically, we must decide whether the Legislature intended to abrogate the common-law right to resist an unlawful arrest with its 2002 enactment of MCL 750.81d. MCL 750.81d states in pertinent part: (1) Except as provided in subsections (2), (3), and (4), an individual who assaults, batters, wounds, resists, obstructs, opposes, or endangers a person who the individual knows or has reason to know is performing his or her duties is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 2 years or a fine of not more than $2,000.00, or both. (2) An individual who assaults, batters, wounds, resists, obstructs, opposes, or endangers a person who the individual knows or has reason to know is performing his or her duties causing a bodily injury requiring medical attention or medical care to that person is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 4 years or a fine of not more than $5,000.00, or both. (3) An individual who assaults, batters, wounds, resists, obstructs, opposes, or endangers a person who the individual knows or has reason to know is performing his or her duties causing a serious impairment of a body function of that person is guilty of a felony punishable by People v Lee, 489 Mich 289, 295; 803 NW2d 165 (2011); Miller-Davis Co v Ahrens Constr, Inc, 489 Mich 355, 361; 802 NW2d 33 (2011).
6

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imprisonment for not more than 15 years or a fine of not more than $10,000.00, or both. (4) An individual who assaults, batters, wounds, resists, obstructs, opposes, or endangers a person who the individual knows or has reason to know is performing his or her duties causing the death of that person is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 20 years or a fine of not more than $20,000.00, or both. * * * (7) As used in this section: (a) "Obstruct" includes the use or threatened use of physical interference or force or a knowing failure to comply with a lawful command. When interpreting statues, this Court must "ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature."7 The words used in the statute are the most reliable indicator of the Legislature's intent and should be interpreted on the basis of their ordinary meaning and the context within which they are used in the statute.8 In interpreting a statute, this Court avoids constructions that would render any part of the statute surplusage or nugatory.9 In addition to these basic rules of statutory interpretation, this Court must also adhere to the traditional rules concerning abrogation of the common law. The common law remains in force unless it is modified.10 We must presume that the Legislature

7 8 9

People v Koonce, 466 Mich 515, 518; 648 NW2d 153 (2002). People v Morey, 461 Mich 325, 330; 603 NW2d 250 (1999).

People v McGraw, 484 Mich 120, 126; 771 NW2d 655 (2009), citing Baker v Gen Motors Corp, 409 Mich 639, 665; 297 NW2d 387 (1980). Wold Architects & Engineers v Strat, 474 Mich 223, 233; 713 NW2d 750 (2006).

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"know[s] of the existence of the common law when it acts."11 Accordingly, this Court has explained that "[t]he abrogative effect of a statutory scheme is a question of legislative intent"12 and that "legislative amendment of the common law is not lightly presumed."13 While the Legislature has the authority to modify the common law, it must do so by speaking in "`no uncertain terms.'"14 Moreover, this Court has held that "statutes in derogation of the common law must be strictly construed" and shall "not be extended by implication to abrogate established rules of common law."15 In this case, we must be mindful of the rules regarding abrogation of the common law when determining whether the Legislature, in enacting MCL 780.81d, intended to abrogate the common-law right to resist unlawful police conduct. Defendant was charged with resisting and obstructing a police officer in violation of MCL 750.81d. In Michigan, obstructing a police officer has been recognized as a common-law crime, as well as an offense governed by statute.16 In addition, the right to resist unlawful arrests, and other unlawful invasions of private rights, is well established

Id. at 234; see also Dawe v Dr Reuven Bar-Levav & Assoc, PC, 485 Mich 20, 28; 780 NW2d 272 (2010) (quoting Wold Architects).
12 13 14 15

11

Dawe, 485 Mich at 28. Wold Architects, 474 Mich at 233. Dawe, 485 Mich at 28, quoting Hoerstman, 474 Mich at 74.

Rusinek v Schultz, Snyder & Steele Lumber Co, 411 Mich 502, 508; 309 NW2d 163 (1981) (citation omitted).
16

People v Krum, 374 Mich 356, 361-362; 132 NW2d 69 (1965).

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in our state's common law.17 In explaining the common-law right to resist an unlawful arrest, this Court has stated that "one may use such reasonable force as is necessary to prevent an illegal attachment and to resist an illegal arrest" and that "the basis for such preventive or resistive action is the illegality of an officer's action, to which [a] defendant immediately reacts."18 In Ventura, the Court of Appeals compared the prior version of the resisting-arrest statute, MCL 750.479, to the current version, MCL 750.81d. The prior version stated in pertinent part: Any person who shall knowingly and willfully . . . obstruct, resist, oppose, assault, beat or wound . . . any . . . person or persons authorized by law to maintain and preserve the peace, in their lawful acts, attempts and efforts to maintain, preserve and keep the peace, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor . . . . [MCL 750.479, as enacted by 1931 PA 328.] Noting that the prior version, MCL 750.479, included a reference to the lawfulness of an officer's actions, the Court of Appeals in Ventura then turned to the language of MCL 750.81d.19 The Court stated that it could not find any similar reference to lawfulness in MCL 750.81d.20 The Court also noted that other jurisdictions have found the right to

Id.; People v Clements, 68 Mich 655, 658; 36 NW 792 (1888) (recognizing the right to reasonably resist an attempted illegal seizure of property by the sheriff and noting that "[n]o officer can be legally authorized to invade private rights in any such manner"); People v MacLeod, 254 Mich App 222, 226; 656 NW2d 844 (2002) (holding that the lawfulness of the arrest was an element of the prior resisting-and-obstructing statute).
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17

Krum, 374 Mich at 361. Ventura, 262 Mich App at 374-375. Id. at 375.

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resist an unlawful arrest to be "outmoded in our contemporary society."21 The Court concluded that the Legislature had made an "obvious affirmative choice to modify the traditional common-law rule that a person may resist an unlawful arrest."22 We disagree. We hold that MCL 750.81d did not abrogate the right to resist unlawful police conduct and that Ventura was wrongly decided. A fundamental principle of statutory construction is that common-law meanings apply unless the Legislature has directed otherwise.23 If the Legislature intended to abrogate the common-law right to resist unlawful conduct by an officer, it had to do so by speaking in "`no uncertain terms.'"24 Significantly, nowhere in MCL 750.81d does the Legislature state that the right to resist unlawful conduct by an officer no longer exists.25

21 22 23

Id. at 376 (citation and quotation marks omitted). Id. at 376-377.

People v Young, 418 Mich 1, 15; 340 NW2d 805 (1983); see also Const 1963, art 3,

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