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STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v BRIAN DEANGLO SANDERS, Defendant-Appellant.

UNPUBLISHED September 27, 2011

No. 295429 Muskegon Circuit Court LC No. 08-057331-FH

Before: O'CONNELL, P.J., and METER and BECKERING, JJ. PER CURIAM. Defendant appeals as of right his jury trial conviction of possession with intent to deliver more than 50 grams, but less than 450 grams, of cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iii). Defendant was sentenced as an habitual offender, fourth offense, MCL 769.12, to 22 to 40 years in prison. We affirm. On December 11, 2008, Detective Sergeant Andrew Fias, the head of the West Michigan Enforcement Team (WEMET), following a tip from a confidential informant that defendant was going to travel out of Muskegon that day to purchase a substantial quantity of cocaine, directed other detectives to begin surveillance on defendant. Defendant engaged in numerous errand-like activities, including stopping at a known drug house, stopping at several gas stations and a bar, and making several trips to a convenience store. Defendant also appeared at a car wash at the exact same time as a known drug dealer. Defendant then got on the highway and headed toward Grand Rapids; at times, he exceeded the speed limit. Michigan State Police Trooper Casey Trucks pulled defendant over. A patdown of defendant revealed that he had several thousand dollars on his person. Detective Sergeant Fias requested that defendant be kept in the patrol car for an interview. Although defendant was not under arrest, Trooper Trucks handcuffed defendant pursuant to Michigan State Police policy, because there was no barrier between the front seat and backseat of the patrol car. Defendant gave consent to search his vehicle, which uncovered a total of approximately 75 grams of cocaine, as well as a digital scale with defendant's fingerprint on it. I. MOTION TO SUPPRESS Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the stop and search of his vehicle. We review a trial court's findings of fact in a suppression hearing for clear error and its ultimate decision on a motion to suppress de -1-

novo. People v Hyde, 285 Mich App 428, 438; 775 NW2d 833 (2009). The stop of defendant's vehicle implicates his right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. See People v Steele, ___ Mich App ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2011) (Docket No. 299641, issued April 14, 2011), slip op at 3. The Fourth Amendment search and seizure restrictions protect citizens against unlawful brief investigative detentions. See People v James Green, 260 Mich App 392, 396; 677 NW2d 363 (2004), overruled on other grounds, People v Anstey, 476 Mich 436; 719 NW2d 579 (2006). However, in Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1, 21, 30-31; 88 S Ct 1868; 20 L Ed 2d 889 (1968), the United States Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment permits police to make a brief investigative stop (a "Terry stop") and detention of a person if the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. The police may also make a Terry stop and brief detention of a person who is in a motor vehicle if the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person is engaged in criminal activity. People v Oliver, 464 Mich 184, 192; 627 NW2d 297 (2001). In determining reasonableness, the court must consider whether the facts known to the officer at the time of the stop would warrant an officer of reasonable precaution to suspect criminal activity. Terry, 392 US at 21-22. "The reasonableness of an officer's suspicion is determined case by case on the basis of the totality of all the facts and circumstances." People v LoCicero (After Remand), 453 Mich 496, 501-502; 556 NW2d 498 (1996). "[I]n determining whether the totality of the circumstances provides reasonable suspicion to support an investigatory stop, those circumstances must be viewed `as understood and interpreted by law enforcement officers, not legal scholars . . . '" Oliver, 464 Mich at 192, quoting People v Nelson, 443 Mich 626, 632; 505 NW2d 266 (1993). An officer's conclusion must be drawn from reasonable inferences based on the facts in light of his training and experience. Terry, 392 US at 27. The United States Supreme Court has said that deference should be given to the experience of law enforcement officers and their assessments of criminal modes and patterns. United States v Arvizu, 534 [US] 266, 273; 122 S Ct 744; 151 L Ed 2d 740 (2002); Oliver, 464 Mich App 196, 200. [Steele, ___ Mich App at ___, slip op at 3-4.] In this case, it was permissible for the police to conduct a Terry stop and briefly detain defendant, who was in a motor vehicle, because they had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that defendant was engaged in criminal activity. See id. at 3. "There is no bright line rule to test whether the suspicion giving rise to an investigatory stop was reasonable, articulable, and particular." Nelson, 443 Mich at 635. However, "[c]ommon sense and everyday life experiences predominate over uncompromising standards." Id. at 635-636. Here, the trial court found that the police received a tip from a reliable confidential informant that defendant, a known drug

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dealer,1 was going to travel out of town to purchase drugs. In the hours leading up to his departure, defendant engaged in numerous errand-like activities, including stopping at a known drug house and appearing at a car wash at the exact same time as another known drug dealer. These findings of fact were supported by the record and were not clearly erroneous. See Hyde, 285 Mich App at 438. Considering the totality of the circumstances, and giving deference to Detective Sergeant Fias' experience and his "assessments of criminal modes and patterns[,]"2 the facts conveyed by Detective Sergeant Fias to Trooper Trucks at the time of the stop "formed a solid basis upon which [the police] had a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify the Terry stop." Steele, ___ Mich App at ___, slip op p 3-4. "A person may be detained on reasonable suspicion in an investigatory stop as long as the police are diligently pursuing a means of investigation that is likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly." People v Dunbar, 264 Mich App 240, 246; 690 NW2d 476 (2004), overruled in part on other grounds by People v Jackson, 483 Mich 271; 769 NW2d 630 (2009). "Here, the police detained defendant in order to ascertain whether he [was] involved in a drug transaction." Id. Also, "[t]here was no evidence presented to indicate that defendant was under arrest." Id. Indeed, Trooper Trucks specifically told defendant he was not under arrest and explained why defendant was being handcuffed. And this Court has noted that "an officer . . . handcuffing a defendant does not transform a stop into an arrest." Id. at 246 n 7. Defendant also argues that the circumstances surrounding the stop and detention vitiate his consent. "An investigatory stop . . . is not so inherently coercive that it renders involuntary consent given during the stop." People v Williams, 472 Mich 308, 318; 696 NW2d 636 (2005). However, "[c]onsent must be freely and voluntarily given in order to be valid," id., which presents "a question of fact based on an assessment of the totality of the circumstances," People v Borchard-Ruhland, 460 Mich 278, 294; 597 NW2d 1 (1999). "The presence of coercion or duress normally militates against a finding of voluntariness." Id. In this case, the record reveals no coercion on the part of Trooper Trucks or duress on the part of defendant at the time he gave consent to search his vehicle. See People v Acoff, 220 Mich App 396, 399-400; 559 NW2d 103 (1996) (stating that consent given while in police custody is not necessarily involuntary). In light of the totality of the circumstances, it appears that defendant's consent was freely and voluntarily given, and the trial court did not clearly err in making that finding. In sum, the trial court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress because the stop of defendant's vehicle was justified where, considering the totality of the circumstances, the police had a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot, and the search of defendant's vehicle was justified where defendant provided valid consent.

WEMET had been investigating defendant for a two- to three-month period prior to the incident in question and had made purchases of cocaine and crack cocaine from him through a confidential source, including in early December 2008.
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Detective Sergeant Fias observed that defendant's conduct was consistent with a drug dealer who is either picking up money from houses that he had previously supplied or dropping off drugs for sale.

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II. TESTIMONY OF DETECTIVE SERGEANT FIAS Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by permitting Detective Sergeant Fias to testify after the prosecution failed to provide the information required by MCR 6.201(A)(3), and failing to provide an effective remedy for the discovery violation. "A trial court's decision regarding discovery is reviewed for [an] abuse of discretion." People v Phillips, 468 Mich 583, 587; 663 NW2d 463 (2003). MCR 6.201(A)(3) provides that "a party upon request must provide all other parties . . . the curriculum vitae of an expert the party may call at trial and either a report by the expert or a written description of the substance of the proposed testimony of the expert, the expert's opinion, and the underlying basis of that opinion." It is undisputed that the prosecution did not provide defendant with Detective Sergeant Fias' resum

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