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Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan 48909 _____________________________________________________________________________________________
C hief Justice Justices

Maura D. Cor rigan

Opinion
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v BRIAN JAMES STONE,
Defendant-Appellant.
___________________________________ BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH
CAVANAGH, J.
This criminal statutes prosecution requires us under to the

Michael F. Cavanagh Elizabeth A. Weaver Marilyn Kelly Clifford W. Taylor Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman

____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

FILED JANUARY 30, 2001


No. 114227


Michigan
whether a


eavesdropping

decide

conversation held on a cordless telephone is a "private
conversation" as that term is used in the statutes. We


conclude that, although current technology may allow cordless
telephone conversations to be intercepted, such conversations
nonetheless can be private conversations under the


eavesdropping statutes.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment


of the Court of Appeals.
I
The facts underlying this case occurred while the divorce
of defendant Brian Stone from Joanne Stone was pending.
During their marriage, the Stones lived next door to Ronald
Pavlik. In 1995, defendant became estranged from his wife and
moved out of the couple's home, though Joanne continued to
live there. After defendant moved from the couple's home,


Pavlik told defendant that he owned a police scanner, and that
he could listen to, and had been recording, calls Joanne made
on her cordless telephone. Defendant asked for the tapes, and
told Pavlik to "keep on top of things, tape and find out what
was going on."
Joanne suspected that her calls were being monitored
because certain people had information about her that they
should not have had. investigator told In one instance, a friend of the court
Joanne that defendant had told the


investigator that he had a tape recording proving that Joanne
was pregnant and planning to leave the state. According to


Joanne, she had only mentioned these matters in a telephone
conversation with a friend. Because of her suspicions, in


1996, Joanne contacted the State Police.
After interviewing several people, the police obtained
search warrants for both defendant's and Pavlik's residences.


2


Between the two homes, they found approximately fifteen tapes
containing recordings of Joanne's telephone conversations with
her family, her friends, and her attorney.
Defendant was charged under the eavesdropping statutes
and was bound over for trial. He brought a motion to quash


the information, which the circuit court granted because it
believed that a person conversing on a cordless telephone
could not reasonably expect her conversation to be a "private
conversation." The people appealed, and the Court of Appeals


reversed, reasoning that the circuit court erred by relying on
the concept of a reasonable expectation of privacy. 234 Mich


App 117; 593 NW2d 680 (1999). Initially, this Court held this
case in abeyance, pending our resolution of Dickerson v
Raphael, 461 Mich 851 (1999). Thereafter, we granted leave to
appeal. 461 Mich 996 (2000).
II
Because this case arrives here on defendant's motion to
quash the information, we must review the magistrate's


decision to bind defendant over for trial.

A magistrate has


a duty to bind over a defendant for trial if it appears that
a felony has been committed and there is probable cause to
believe that the defendant committed that felony. MCL 766.13;
MSA 28.931. Absent an abuse of discretion, reviewing courts
People v


should not disturb a magistrate's determination. 3


Doss, 406 Mich 90, 101; 276 NW2d 9 (1979).

In the instant


case, defendant argues that the magistrate's decision to bind
him over was an abuse of discretion because his alleged
conduct does not fit within the scope of the eavesdropping
statutes. Determining the scope of a criminal statute is a
matter of statutory interpretation, subject to de novo review.
People v Denio, 454 Mich 691, 698; 564 NW2d 13 (1997).
A. THE EAVESDROPPING STATUTES
Defendant was charged under MCL 750.539c; MSA 28.807(3),
which provides:
Any person who is present or who is not
present during a private conversation and who
wilfully uses any device to eavesdrop upon the
conversation without the consent of all parties
thereto, or who knowingly aids, employs, or
procures another person to do the same in violation
of this section, is guilty of a felony punishable
by imprisonment in a state prison for not more than
2 years or by a fine of not more than $2,000.00, or
both.
The statutes define "eavesdrop" as "to overhear, record,
amplify or transmit any part of the private discourse of
others without the permission of all persons engaged in the
discourse." MCL 750.539a(2); MSA 28.807(1)(2). In the


present case, the facts as alleged indicate that Joanne
Stone's cordless telephone conversations were wilfully


recorded by Ronald Pavlik, without her consent, at defendant's
prompting. Because this case involves such alleged wilful
the statutory 4
prohibition against wilful


"record[ing],"

"overhear[ing]" is not before us. before us is whether defendant on

Instead, the question
is correct not be that the


conversations

eavesdropped

could

"private


conversations" because they were held on a cordless telephone.
B. THE MEANING
OF

"PRIVATE CONVERSATION "


To answer this question, we must first define "private
conversation." Determining this phrase's meaning requires us


to construe the eavesdropping statutes, and the primary goal
of statutory construction is to give effect to the


Legislature's intent. NW2d 250 (1999). with the

People v Morey, 461 Mich 325, 330; 603


To ascertain that intent, this Court begins
language. When that language is


statute's

unambiguous, no further judicial construction is required or
permitted, because the Legislature is presumed Id.
to have


intended the meaning it plainly expressed.

Here, the plain language of the eavesdropping statutes
does not define "private conversation." This Court may


consult dictionaries to discern the meaning of statutorily
undefined terms. Id. However, recourse to dictionary


definitions is unnecessary when the Legislature's intent can
be determined from reading the statute itself. Renown Stove


Co v Unemployment Compensation Comm, 328 Mich 436, 440; 44
NW2d 1 (1950).


5


Despite

the

Legislature

failing

to

define

"private


conversation" in the eavesdropping statutes, its intent can be
determined from the eavesdropping statutes themselves. This


is because the Legislature did define the term "private
place." A "private place" is "a place where one may


reasonably expect to be safe from casual or hostile intrusion
or surveillance." MCL 750.539a(1); MSA 28.807(1)(1). By


reading the statutes, the Legislature's intent that private
places are places where a person can reasonably expect privacy
becomes clear. Applying the same concepts the Legislature


used to define those places that are private, we can define
those conversations that are private. Thus, "private


conversation" means a conversation that a person reasonably
expects to be free from casual or hostile intrusion or


surveillance.

Additionally, this conclusion is supported by


this Court's decision in Dickerson v Raphael, in which we
stated that whether a conversation is private depends on
whether the person conversing "intended and reasonably


expected that the conversation was private." Dickerson, supra
at 851.
Although this definition of "private conversation"


facially resembles standards that the United States Supreme
Court has used in Fourth Amendment cases, those standards
developed in the context of law enforcement activity seeking
6


to detect criminal behavior.

See

Katz v United States, 389


US 347, 360; 88 S Ct 507; 19 L Ed 2d 576 (1967) (Harlan, J.).
However, our definition of "private conversation" emanates
from our eavesdropping statutes, which, by their own terms, do
not apply to law enforcement personnel acting within their
lawful authority. MCL 750.539g(a); MSA 28.807(7)(a). Because
of these differences, we do not rely on the Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, and do not incorporate it into our statute.
Rather, we rely only on the eavesdropping statutes' language
to define the term "private conversation."
C. PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS
ON

CORDLESS TELEPHONES


Defendant invites this Court to hold that, as a matter of
law, a conversation held on a cordless telephone cannot be a
private conversation. He relies on language in the Court of


Appeals decision in Dickerson v Raphael, 222 Mich App 185,
194; 564 NW2d 85 (1997), rev'd 461 Mich 851 (1999), to argue
that a cordless telephone works by sending a radio-like signal
from the telephone's handset to its base, and that users of
cordless telephones know that these signals can be intercepted
by devices including other cordless telephones and police
scanners. This knowledge, he concludes, "renders unreasonable
an expectation of privacy" in a cordless telephone


conversation.

Id.


7


We

decline

defendant's

invitation

because

such

an


interpretation would negate an express protection in the
eavesdropping statutes. Specifically, MCL 750.539c; MSA


28.807(3) protects private conversations against eavesdropping
accomplished through the wilful use of "any device." This


protection indicates that the Legislature considered that a
conversation can be private, yet can also be susceptible to
eavesdropping through any device. Otherwise, it would have


had no need to protect private conversations against such an
intrusion. Indeed, were defendant correct that a conversation
that a person knows is susceptible to eavesdropping through
any device is not private, then the statutory protection
against eavesdropping accomplished through any device would be
null. This is because any a conversation would, susceptible of to
that


eavesdropping

with

device

because

characteristic, fall outside the protected class of private
conversations, protected from leaving no "private with conversation" device. to be


eavesdropping

any

Whenever


possible, courts must give effect to every word, phrase, and
clause in a statute. Morey, supra at 330. effect to the statutory protection Therefore, to give
eavesdropping


against

accomplished through "any device," we must reject defendant's
position.


8


Further, although a person who talks on a cordless
telephone may know that technology makes it possible for
others to overhear the conversation, that person also can
presume that others will obey the criminal law. See Papadimas
v Mykonos Lounge, 176 Mich App 40, 47; 439 NW2d 280 (1989);
Prosser & Keeton, Torts (5th ed)

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