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STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v CHRISTOPHER JEROME BOYD, Defendant-Appellant.

UNPUBLISHED September 29, 2011

No. 298769 Oakland Circuit Court LC No. 2009-228798-FC

Before: M.J. KELLY, P.J., and OWENS and BORRELLO, JJ. PER CURIAM. Defendant appeals of right from his conviction following a jury trial of interfering with an electronic communication in violation of MCL 750.540(4).1 Defendant was sentenced to one year of probation and 215 days in jail, with 215 days jail credit. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the conviction and sentence of defendant. Defendant and his wife went to a hotel to discuss issues involving their marriage. The two were separated at the time, and defendant's wife, the victim in this case, had traveled from Canada with the couple's son. According to defendant, he had suggested that the two meet at the Red Roof Inn in Madison Heights to talk about their marriage. While there, the two argued and according to the victim, as she attempted to leave, defendant blocked her exit. When the victim's cell phone rang, defendant grabbed the victim and the two struggled over the cell phone. According to the victim, defendant began punching her and dragged her across the room by her hair. As she tried to retreat into the bathroom to call the police, defendant took her cell phone from her hand. After the defendant ordered the victim to remove her clothes, she testified that she attempted to use the hotel phone but defendant pulled the phone cord out of the wall. In his brief on appeal, defendant concedes that he admitted to pulling the landline from the wall. On appeal, defendant argues that his conviction should be reversed based on his claim that MCL 750.540(4) is unconstitutionally vague. A statute is presumed constitutional, People v

Defendant was found not guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the first degree (CSC I), MCL 750.520b(1)(f) (force or coercion causing personal injury), and criminal sexual conduct in the third degree (CSC 3), 750.520d(1)(b) (force or coercion).

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Malone, 287 Mich App 648, 658; 792 NW2d 7 (2010), and the party challenging the statute has the burden to prove its invalidity, People v Thomas, 201 Mich App 111, 117; 505 NW2d 873 (1993). A criminal statute is unconstitutionally vague if "it does not provide fair notice of the conduct proscribed" or "it confers on the trier of fact unstructured and unlimited discretion to determine whether an offense has been committed," or it impinges on First Amendment freedoms. People v Vronko, 228 Mich App 649, 652; 579 NW2d 138 (1998). We review de novo constitutional challenges, People v McCuller, 479 Mich 672, 681; 739 NW2d 563 (2007), and questions of statutory interpretation, People v Anstey, 476 Mich 436, 442; 719 NW2d 579 (2006). The proper inquiry is whether "the statute is vague as applied to the conduct allegedly proscribed in this case." Vronko, 228 Mich App at 652. We find that the statute at issue is not vague as applied to defendant's admitted conduct in this case. MCL 750.540(4) provides as follows: A person shall not willfully and maliciously prevent, obstruct, or delay by any means the sending, conveyance, or delivery of any authorized communication, by or through any telegraph or telephone line, cable, wire, or any electronic medium of communication, including the internet or a computer, computer program, computer system, or computer network. "The `void for vagueness' doctrine is derived from the constitutional guarantee that a state may not deprive a person of life, liberty or property without due process of law." State Treasurer v Wilson (On Remand), 150 Mich App 78, 80; 388 NW2d 312 (1986), citing US Const, Am XIV; Const 1963, art 1,

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