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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS


PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v CHUCK WILLIAM BACON, Defendant-Appellant.

UNPUBLISHED June 10, 2008

No. 274242 Wayne Circuit Court LC No. 06-005895-01

Before: Talbot, P.J., and Zahra and Meter, JJ. PER CURIAM. Defendant appeals as of right from his jury trial convictions of second-degree murder, MCL 750.317, assault with intent to murder, MCL 750.83, felon in possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b. The trial court sentenced defendant, as a fourth-offense habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to 60 to 90 years' imprisonment for his second-degree murder conviction, 60 to 90 years' imprisonment for his assault with intent to murder conviction, three to five years' imprisonment for his felon in possession of a firearm conviction, and two years' imprisonment for his felony-firearm conviction. We affirm. This case arose out of a neighborhood shooting. On the night of April 9, 2006, Cardaro Larkins, Darrieus Spikes, and James Singleton were near Singleton's house on James Street "chilling and rapping." Larkins was leaving for the military the next day. Around 11:30 p.m., Chuck Bacon, Sr., defendant's father and an acquaintance of the Larkins family, drove up and invited Larkins, Spikes, and Singleton to a warehouse he owned, which was used as a recording studio and after-hours club. The boys accompanied defendant's father, who let them into the studio and drove off. By 12:20 or 12:30 a.m., on April 10, 2006, the boys realized defendant's father had left and decided to steal some recording equipment from the studio. After leaving with some items, Larkins and Spikes returned to the studio to lock the studio gate and close the front door. Singleton, however, returned home. After Larkins and Spikes returned to the studio, a Ford Crown Victoria pulled up and defendant got out of the car to go inside the studio. Defendant claimed that he had just returned from performing a rap session at a club and had returned to the studio to clean up. Defendant noticed that the studio gate and doors were open when he arrived and that the studio had been ransacked. As soon as defendant went into the studio, Spikes and Larkins ran away in different directions. Spikes last saw Larkins running near Woodlawn Street. According to Spikes, -1-


defendant followed Spikes in the Crown Victoria, got out of the car, and fired two shots at Spikes. Spikes claimed that he was unarmed during this incident and fired no shots. Spikes ran back to his neighborhood where he had agreed to meet Larkins, but Larkins did not arrive. Around 1:00 a.m., police found Larkins lying on his back in a field near Woodlawn Street. Larkins had been fatally shot in the forehead. The next morning, Spikes provided police with one of defendant's rap videos he had taken from the studio. In contrast to this version of events, defendant claimed that after leaving the studio, he followed Larkins and the two got into a fistfight before Larkins ran away from him and toward a field. At this point, Spikes approached and fired four shots at defendant. Defendant retrieved a "thirty-eight," returned fire, and drove away. Defendant then picked up Lateece Turner and Indea Knox and brought them back to the studio for sex around 2:30 a.m. The women stayed with defendant at the studio until 10:00 or 11:00 a.m. Turner later provided a statement to police in which she indicated that defendant informed her that before picking her up, he shot at someone who was stealing equipment from the studio. Although Turner affirmed this statement at an investigative subpoena hearing, she testified at trial that this version of events was not true. Instead, Turner claimed at trial that defendant had told her that he "tussled" with the person who broke into the studio and then returned fire after someone shot at him. Knox also provided a statement at an investigative subpoena hearing. Knox indicated that defendant told her, "I had to do what I had to do," with regard to the break-in. In addition, Knox testified at the investigative subpoena hearing that she was fearful of "Chuck's family or his boys," that "everyone know[s] [defendant] did it[,]" and that "it was out that [Knox and Turner] were with [defendant] during the shooting." At trial, Knox denied making these statements and claimed that she only learned from other people in the neighborhood that someone involved in the studio break-in had been shot. Larkins's mother, Yolanda Wilson, testified at trial that sometime after the shooting, defendant waved a gun at her and said, "[I] can't be touched." Wilson drove away, but defendant allegedly followed her in his car and tried to run her off the road. Defendant argues that he was denied his right to due process of law because the statements of Turner and Knox that incriminated defendant were obtained as a result of police intimidation. Because defendant did not object to this issue below, this issue is unpreserved, and we review for plain error affecting substantial rights. See People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130, reh den 461 Mich 1205 (1999). To be entitled to relief, defendant must show the existence of a clear or obvious error that affected the outcome of the lower court proceedings. Id. In addition, to warrant reversal, the error must have resulted in the conviction of an innocent defendant or must have seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. Id. at 763-764. A successful attempt by the prosecution to intimidate a witness violates a defendant's right to due process of law. See People v Canter, 197 Mich App 550, 569; 496 NW2d 336 (1992), and People v Stacy, 193 Mich App 19, 25; 484 NW2d 675 (1992). "Threats from law enforcement officers may be attributed to the prosecution." Stacy, supra at 25.

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At trial, Turner and Knox claimed that they had previously provided statements to the police linking defendant to the murder because the police intimidated them. Specifically, Turner testified at trial that the police told her that her statement was not good enough and threatened to take away her children and send her to jail. Similarly, Knox testified that the police threatened that she would go to jail if she did not provide a statement incriminating defendant. However, although Turner testified at trial that her testimony at the investigative subpoena hearing was not true, she then contradicted herself and admitted at trial that she was truthful with the police even after they threatened to take away her children. Similarly, Knox admitted that she had testified under oath at the investigative subpoena hearing that her statement to the police was the truth. Given that both Turner and Knox provided evidence that their previous incriminating statements were truthful, we find no plain error requiring reversal with respect to this issue. Carines, supra at 763-764. The jury heard the testimony about the alleged intimidation and also heard the denials by the police; as the trier of fact, it could reach its own conclusions about the weight to be afforded to Turner's and Knox's various statements. We note that in arguing that Knox's statement to police was obtained as the result of police intimidation, defendant points out that Lance Newman, the officer in charge of the case, treated Knox in a friendly manner, bought her food, and commented on her underwear after she provided her statement. In making these arguments, defendant appears to insinuate impropriety rather than intimidation. However, when these assertions are placed in their proper context, it is clear there was no impropriety. Despite the fact that Knox provided no explanation at trial for these assertions about Newman's behavior, Newman explained that he had purchased food for Knox and Turner because the women had no food, having slept in their vehicle the night before the investigative subpoena hearing, and claimed they were homeless. Also, regarding Knox's underwear, Newman noted that he had questioned whether Knox's risqu

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