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Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan

Opinion
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff -Appellee, v CLEVELAND WILLIAMS, Defendant -Appellant. _______________________________ BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH CORRIGAN, J.

Chief Justice:

Justices:

Clifford W. Taylor

Michael F. Cavanagh Elizabeth A. Weaver Marilyn Kelly Maura D. Corrigan Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman

FILED JUNE 14, 2006

No. 126956

The 180-day rule, codified in MCL 780.131, provides that a prison inmate who has a pending criminal charge must be tried within 180 days after the Department of Corrections delivers to the prosecutor notice of the inmate's imprisonment and requests disposition of the pending charge. In People v Smith, 438 Mich 715, 717-718 (Levin, J.), 719 (Boyle, J.); 475 NW2d 333 (1991), this Court held that the 180-day rule does not apply when the pending charge provides for mandatory consecutive sentencing. In the instant case, the trial court initially dismissed the charges against defendant on the basis of a violation of the 180-day

rule, but the Court of Appeals vacated the order of dismissal and remanded so the trial court could address the application of the rule in Smith, supra. On remand, the trial court, relying on the rule in Smith, supra, found no violation of the 180day rule. The Court of Appeals thereafter dismissed the appeal and remanded for trial. We overrule Smith, supra, and its progeny to the extent that they are inconsistent with the plain language of the 180-day-rule statute, which contains no exception for charges subject to consecutive sentencing. This decision is to be given limited retroactive effect, applying to those cases pending on appeal in which this issue has been raised and preserved. See People v Cornell, 466 Mich 335, 367; 646 NW2d 127 (2002). However, we affirm the lower courts' decision that the 180-day-rule statute was not violated because defendant was tried within 180 days of the date that the prosecutor received actual notice that defendant was in prison awaiting disposition of his pending armed robbery charge. I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY In 1998, after defendant's conviction of larceny from the person, MCL 750.357, he was sentenced to a one- to fifteen-year term of imprisonment. On May 7, 2000, while on parole for this conviction, defendant visited his son at the home of his son's mother, Adrian Harper. During this visit, defendant allegedly

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threatened Harper with a knife and stole money from her purse. He then stole Harper's car keys and drove away in her car. On May 23, 2000, defendant was arrested and returned to the custody of the Michigan Department of Corrections. On the Wayne County Prosecutor's

recommendation, the magistrate signed an arrest warrant and complaint for armed robbery, MCL 750.529, on June 2, 2000. On June 18, 2001, the Detroit Police Department took defendant into their custody for arraignment on the warrant. After a June 28, 2001, preliminary examination, defendant was bound over for trial on the armed robbery charge. On July 12, 2001, the Department of

Corrections sent a written notice of defendant's incarceration to the prosecutor, requesting disposition of the pending warrant. The prosecutor's office received this notice on July 16, 2001. On July 19, 2001, an information charged defendant with armed robbery. When the parties appeared for trial on January 9, 2002, defendant first moved to dismiss the charge, asserting violations of the 180-day rule and his right to a speedy trial. The trial court granted defendant's motion to dismiss. On the prosecution's appeal, the Court of Appeals peremptorily vacated the trial court's order of dismissal and remanded the matter to the trial court to address the application of People v Chavies, 234 Mich App 274, 280-281; 593 NW2d 655 (1999). People v Williams, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered June 9, 2003 (Docket No. 239662). Chavies relied on Smith in holding that the

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180-day rule does not apply to persons who commit a crime while on parole because that person is subject to mandatory consecutive sentences. The Court of Appeals also ordered the trial court to make findings and discuss the application of the speedy trial factors articulated in Barker v Wingo, 407 US 514; 92 S Ct 2182; 33 L Ed 2d 101 (1972). On remand, the trial court followed Chavies, supra, concluding that defendant was subject to mandatory consecutive sentencing for the pending armed robbery charge. Regarding the speedy trial issue, the court ruled that the charge against defendant should not have been dismissed because defendant had not insisted on a speedy trial and was unable to show prejudice. Upon receiving the trial court's findings, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal and remanded the case to the circuit court for trial. Unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered July 9, 2004 (Docket No. 239662). We ordered the clerk to schedule oral argument on whether to grant the defendant's application for leave to appeal or take other peremptory action. 472 Mich 872 (2005). II. STANDARD OF REVIEW This case involves the interpretation of MCL 780.131. We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo. People v Stewart, 472 Mich 624, 631; 698 NW2d 340 (2005). Our primary purpose in construing statutes is "to discern and give effect to the Legislature's intent." People v Morey, 461 Mich 325, 330; 603

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NW2d 250 (1999). "We begin by examining the plain language of the statute; where that language is unambiguous, we presume that the Legislature intended the meaning clearly expressed--no further judicial construction is required or permitted, and the statute must be enforced as written." Id. Whether defendant was denied his right to a speedy trial is an issue of constitutional law, which we also review de novo. People v Hickman, 470 Mich 602, 605; 684 NW2d 267 (2004). We generally review a trial court's factual findings for clear error. MCR 2.613(C); People v Knight, 473 Mich 324, 338; 701 NW2d 715 (2005). III. ANALYSIS A. The Statutory 180-Day Rule As a preliminary matter, before determining whether the 180-day rule was violated, we must first address whether defendant is entitled to assert the rights granted under the 180-day-rule statute although he faces mandatory consecutive sentencing on the pending charge. Because Smith, supra, would preclude

defendant from making a 180-day-rule claim, we must address the validity of Smith, supra, before determining whether defendant's claim is meritorious. We ultimately conclude that defendant's rights under the 180-day rule were not violated (and, in so holding, reach the same outcome as if defendant were not entitled to the protections of the 180-day rule). Nonetheless, our conclusion that a

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defendant facing consecutive sentencing may assert a claim based on the 180-dayrule statute ensures that our holding is not dicta.1 The 180-day rule is set forth in MCL 780.131: (1) Whenever the department of corrections receives notice that there is pending in this state any untried warrant, indictment, information, or complaint setting forth against any inmate of a correctional facility of this state a criminal offense for which a prison sentence might be imposed upon conviction, the inmate shall be brought to trial within 180 days after the department of corrections causes to be delivered to the prosecuting attorney of the county in which the warrant, indictment, information, or complaint is pending written notice of the place of imprisonment of the inmate and a request for final disposition of the warrant, indictment, information, or complaint. The request shall be accompanied by a statement setting forth the term of commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the time already served, the time remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of good time or disciplinary credits earned, the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any decisions of the parole board relating to the prisoner. The written notice and statement shall be delivered by certified mail. (2) This section does not apply to a warrant, indictment, information, or complaint arising from either of the following: (a) A criminal offense committed by an inmate of a state correctional facility while incarcerated in the correctional facility. (b) A criminal offense committed by an inmate of a state correctional facility after the inmate has escaped from the correctional facility and before he or she has been returned to the custody of the department of corrections.

Obiter dictum is defined as "[a] judicial comment made during the course of delivering a judicial opinion, but one that is unnecessary to the decision in the case and therefore not precedential . . . ." Black's Law Dictionary (7th ed).

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MCL 780.133 requires dismissal with prejudice if a prisoner is not brought to trial within the 180-day time limit set forth in the act: In the event that, within the time limitation set forth in section 1 of this act, action is not commenced on the matter for which request for disposition was made, no court of this state shall any longer have jurisdiction thereof, nor shall the untried warrant, indictment, information or complaint be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice. Michigan courts have inconsistently interpreted MCL 780.131 in determining whether the 180-day rule applies to defendants facing mandatory consecutive sentencing upon conviction of the pending charge. In Loney, supra, the Court of Appeals held that the 180-day rule applies only when the pending charge would allow concurrent sentencing: The purpose of the statute is clear. It was intended to give the inmate, who had pending offenses not yet tried, an opportunity to have the sentences run concurrently consistent with the principle of law disfavoring accumulations of sentences. This purpose, however, does not apply in the instance of a new offense committed after imprisonment, nor where the statute, as in the case of an escape or attempted escape, sets up a mandatory consecutive sentence. The legislature was not concerning itself with the need for dispatch in the handling of a charge brought against an inmate for offenses committed while in prison. * * * For the foregoing reasons, it is the opinion of this Court that the 180-day statute does not and was not intended to apply to offenses committed while in prison and for which offenses mandatory consecutive sentences are provided. [Loney, supra at 292-293 (emphasis in original).]

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After Loney, several panels of the Court of Appeals split on the issue.2 This Court resolved the conflict in People v Woodruff, 414 Mich 130; 323 NW2d 923 (1982). In Woodruff, supra at 137, this Court held that the 180-day rule "applies to any untried charge which carries a punishment of imprisonment in a state penal institution against any inmate, even if the offense was committed while in prison or carries a mandatory consecutive sentence." The Woodruff Court determined that the statutory language unambiguously set forth the extent of the 180-day rule by expressly providing that it applied to "`any' untried charge against `any' prisoner, `whenever' the department of corrections shall receive notice of that charge." Id. at 136. The Woodruff Court explained that the statute did not specify the type of sentence that determines the reach of the 180-day rule, but only generally referred to "`a prison sentence.'" Id. Five justices thereafter agreed to overrule Woodruff in Smith, supra at 717718 (Levin, J.), 719 (Boyle, J.). Smith resurrected the Loney panel's holding that

Compare, e.g., People v Charles Moore, 111 Mich App 633; 314 NW2d 718 (1981), rev'd 417 Mich 878 (1983), People v Grandberry, 102 Mich App 769; 302 NW2d 573 (1980), and People v Ewing, 101 Mich App 51; 301 NW2d 8 (1980) (agreeing with Loney that the 180-day rule does not apply to criminal defendants who are facing charges that would involve mandatory consecutive sentencing), with People v Hegwood, 109 Mich App 438; 311 NW2d 383 (1981), People v Marcellis, 105 Mich App 662; 307 NW2d 402 (1981), People v Pitsaroff, 102 Mich App 226; 301 NW2d 858 (1980), People v Anglin, 102 Mich App 118; 301 NW2d 470 (1980), and People v David Moore, 96 Mich App 754; 293 NW2d 700 (1980) (holding that criminal defendants are entitled to the protections of the 180-day rule even if facing mandatory consecutive sentencing).

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the 180-day rule does not apply to offenses committed while in prison or to offenses that provide for mandatory consecutive sentences. In the lead opinion, Justice Levin explained that he agreed with the particular portion of Loney, supra at 292, that discussed the purpose of the 180-day-rule statute.3 Defendant argues that under the plain language of MCL 780.131, the 180day rule applies to inmates facing mandatory consecutive sentencing. The

prosecution acknowledges that the Smith and Chavies decisions extend the exceptions to the 180-day rule beyond the literal wording of the statute. We agree with defendant and hold that Smith and its progeny contravened the plain language of the 180-day-rule statute. Smith resorted to the purpose of the 180-day-rule statute in determining that the statute did not apply to defendants facing mandatory consecutive sentencing. MCL 780.131 delineates only two exceptions to the 180-day rule for those offenses committed by incarcerated and escaped prisoners. MCL 780.131(2). If the Legislature had meant to exclude inmates facing mandatory consecutive

Chavies, supra at 280-281, followed Smith, supra. The Chavies panel held that "the statutory goal of allowing sentences to be served concurrently `does not apply in a case where a mandatory consecutive sentence is required upon conviction.'" Id. at 280 (citation omitted). People v Falk, 244 Mich App 718; 625 NW2d 476 (2001), reaffirmed Chavies, supra. The Falk panel held that the 180-day rule does not apply to a pending charge for which a possible sentence includes either imposition of a mandatory consecutive prison term or probation. Falk, supra at 721-722.

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sentencing on pending charges from the ambit of MCL 780.131, it could have created such an exception. See People v Barbee, 470 Mich 283, 287; 681 NW2d 348 (2004) ("If the Legislature had meant for OV [offense variable] 19 to apply only in cases dealing with the obstruction of justice, it could have easily used that phrase."). Smith overstepped its bounds by drafting an exception to the 180-day rule based on the purpose of the statute. As we explained in Woodruff, supra at 136, the language of MCL 780.131 expressly applies the 180-day rule to "any" untried charge against "any" prisoner "[w]henever" the Department of Corrections receives notice of that charge. The statute does not specify that the type of sentence determines the applicability of the rule. In particular, the statute does not distinguish concurrent and consecutive sentencing on the pending charge. We overrule Smith and its progeny to the extent that they are inconsistent with our ruling. Our decision is to have limited retroactive effect, applying to those cases pending on appeal in which this issue has been raised and preserved. See Cornell, supra at 367. B. Application of the 180-day-Rule Statute Defendant argues that several communications satisfied the notice provision of the statute. For example, on January 26, 2001, the Department of Corrections sent written notice to the Detroit Police Department that defendant was incarcerated and sought disposition of his warrant for armed robbery. The

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Department of Corrections then sent another such notice to the investigator assigned to defendant's case, which the investigator received on February 5, 2001. An employee of the Department of Corrections subsequently communicated with the investigating officer several times regarding defendant's status. Although investigating police officers may and do cooperate with the prosecutor, they are not part of the prosecutor's office. Defendant has cited no persuasive authority for his argument that the investigating police officer is an agent of the prosecutor, or that knowledge by the police of defendant's incarceration should be imputed to the prosecutor. The 180-day-rule statute expressly provides that the Department of Corrections must deliver a written notice of incarceration and request for disposition "to the prosecuting attorney of the county in which the warrant, indictment, information, or complaint is pending . . . ." MCL 780.131(1). The first qualifying written notice from the Department of Corrections was received by the prosecutor on July 16, 2001. Cf. People v Fex, 439 Mich 117, 119-123; 479 NW2d 625 (1992), aff'd 503 US 43 (1993) (the 180-day period in Article III[a] of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers [IAD], MCL 780.601 et seq., does not commence until the prisoner's request for final disposition of the charges against him or her has actually been delivered to the court and prosecuting officer of the jurisdiction that lodged the detainer against him or her). There is no dispute that this written notice complied with the other requirements of the statute that it be

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delivered by certified mail and be accompanied by a statement setting forth defendant's term of commitment, his time served, his time remaining to be served, the amount of sentence credits earned, the time of his parole eligibility, and any decisions of the parole board. Defendant's trial commenced on January 9, 2002, which was less than 180 days after the prosecutor received notice.4 Therefore, defendant was tried within the statutory 180-day limit. C. MCR 6.004(D) In addition to MCL 780.131, the Michigan Court Rules also codify the 180day rule in MCR 6.004(D). Because the 180-day rule, as expressed in the preJanuary 1, 2006, version of the court rule, may be violated even when there is no violation under the plain language of the statute, we must address whether
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Because MCL 780.131 does not specifically address how courts should compute the 180-day time period, we turn to MCR 1.108, which unambiguously governs the computation of a period prescribed by statute. MCR 1.108(1) provides: The day of the act, event, or default after which the designated period of time begins to run is not included. The last day of the period is included, unless it is a Saturday, Sunday, legal holiday, or holiday on which the court is closed pursuant to court order; in that event the period runs until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, legal holiday, or holiday on which the court is closed pursuant to court order. Thus, the 180-day period begins to run the day after the prosecutor receives notice that a defendant is incarcerated and awaiting trial on pending charges. See People v Sinclair, 247 Mich App 685, 688-689; 638 NW2d 120 (2001) (holding that MCR 1.108[1] applies to computation of time for the 180-day rule set forth in the Interstate Agreement on Detainers [IAD], MCL 780.601 et seq.).

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defendant is entitled to relief under the court rule. We conclude that defendant is not entitled to relief under the court rule because the court rule must yield to the statute. At all times relevant to this case, MCR 6.004(D) provided: (D) Untried Charges Against State Prisoner. (1) The 180-Day Rule. Except for crimes exempted by MCL 780.131(2), the prosecutor must make a good faith effort to bring a criminal charge to trial within 180 days of either of the following: (a) the time from which the prosecutor knows that the person charged with the offense is incarcerated in a state prison or is detained in a local facility awaiting incarceration in a state prison, or (b) the time from which the Department of Corrections knows or has reason to know that a criminal charge is pending against a defendant incarcerated in a state prison or detained in a local facility awaiting incarceration in a state prison. For purposes of this subrule, a person is charged with a criminal offense if a warrant, complaint, or indictment has been issued against the person. (2) Remedy. In cases covered by subrule (1)(a), the defendant is entitled to have the charge dismissed with prejudice if the prosecutor fails to make a good-faith effort to bring the charge to trial within the 180-day period. When, in cases covered by subrule (1)(b), the prosecutor's failure to bring the charge to trial is attributable to lack of notice from the Department of Corrections, the defendant is entitled to sentence credit for the period of delay. Whenever the defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial is violated, the defendant is entitled to dismissal of the charge with prejudice.[5]

MCR 6.004(D) has been amended to conform to the 180-day rule as set forth in MCL 780.131, effective January 1, 2006. The court rule now provides: (continued...) 13


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MCR 6.004(D) was adopted in 1989 to codify, with two exceptions, this Court's interpretation of the 180-day-rule statute in People v Hill, 402 Mich 272; 262 NW2d 641 (1978), People v Hendershot, 357 Mich 300; 98 NW2d 568 (1959), and dictum in People v Castelli, 370 Mich 147; 121 NW2d 438 (1963). We hold that this version of MCR 6.004(D) was invalid to the extent that it improperly deviated from the statutory language. This Court's holding in Hill, supra, and its dicta in Castelli, supra, along with the portion of the court rule implementing these holdings, improperly expanded the scope of the 180-day-rule statute by requiring the prosecutor to bring a defendant to trial within 180 days of (...continued) (D) Untried Charges Against State Prisoner. (1) The 180-Day Rule. Except for crimes exempted by MCL 780.131(2), the inmate shall be brought to trial within 180 days after the department of corrections causes to be delivered to the prosecuting attorney of the county in which the warrant, indictment, information, or complaint is pending written notice of the place of imprisonment of the inmate and a request for final disposition of the warrant, indictment, information, or complaint. The request shall be accompanied by a statement setting forth the term of commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the time already served, the time remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of good time or disciplinary credits earned, the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any decisions of the parole board relating to the prisoner. The written notice and statement shall be delivered by certified mail. (2) Remedy. In the event that action is not commenced on the matter for which request for disposition was made as required in subsection (1), no court of this state shall any longer have jurisdiction thereof, nor shall the untried warrant, indictment, information, or complaint be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice.

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the date that the Department of Corrections knew or had reason to know that a criminal charge was pending against the defendant. MCR 6.004(D)(1)(b). This language does not appear in the statute. The statutory trigger is notice to the prosecutor of the defendant's incarceration and a departmental request for final disposition of the pending charges. The statute does not trigger the running of the 180-day period when the Department of Corrections actually learns, much less should have learned, that criminal charges were pending against an incarcerated defendant. We decline to read such nonexistent language into the statute.

American Federation of State, Co & Muni Employees v Detroit, 468 Mich 388, 412; 662 NW2d 695 (2003). We overrule Hill, supra, and Castelli, supra, to the extent that they are inconsistent with MCL 780.131. We also give this decision limited retroactive effect. See Cornell, supra at 367. "`If a particular court rule contravenes a legislatively declared principle of public policy, having as its basis something other than court administration . . . the [court] rule should yield.'" McDougall v Schanz, 461 Mich 15, 30-31; 597 NW2d 148 (1999) (citation omitted). The preamendment version of MCR 6.004(D) is not purely a matter of court administration. Instead, this court rule both codified and modified this Court's interpretations of the statutory 180-day rule. MCR 6.004(D) does not solely attempt to "`regulate the day-to-day procedural operations of the courts.'" McDougall, supra at 32, quoting People v McKenna, 196 Colo 367, 372; 585 P2d 275 (1978). As such, the court rule must yield to MCL 780.131.

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D. Speedy Trial Finally, defendant contends that the trial court erred in holding that his right to a speedy trial under US Const, Am VI, and Const 1963, art 1,

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