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STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v DEMITRAY LASHONE HODGE, Defendant-Appellant.

UNPUBLISHED July 14, 2009

No. 279405 Genesee Circuit Court LC No. 06-018532-FC

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v SHERMAN MARTINEZ BUGGS, Defendant-Appellant. No. 279550 Genesee Circuit Court LC No. 06-018533-FC

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v JERRY O'KEITH WALKER, Defendant-Appellant. No. 279715 Genesee Circuit Court LC No. 06-018545-FC

Before: Murphy, P.J., and Sawyer and Whitbeck, JJ. PER CURIAM.

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Defendant, Demitray Hodge, was convicted, following a jury trial, of three counts of first-degree premeditated murder, MCL 750.3161; three counts of first-degree felony murder, MCL 750.316; one count of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, MCL 750.157a; MCL 750.316; three counts of armed robbery, MCL 750.529; two counts of conspiracy to commit armed robbery, MCL 750.157a; MCL 750.529; two counts of first-degree home invasion, MCL 750.110a(2); two counts of conspiracy to commit first-degree home invasion, MCL 750.157a; MCL 750.110a(2); one count of carjacking, MCL 750.529a; one count of conspiracy to commit carjacking, MCL 750.157a; MCL 750.529a; one count of arson of a dwelling house, MCL 750.72; one count of conspiracy to commit arson of a dwelling house, MCL 750.157a; MCL 750.72; one count of carrying a concealed weapon, MCL 750.227; one count of felon in possession of firearms, MCL 750.224f; and one count of felony-firearm, MCL 750.227b. The trial court found defendant to be a habitual offender first offense, MCL 769.10. He was sentenced to life without parole for each of the three counts of first-degree premeditated murder, life without parole for the three counts of first-degree felony murder, life without parole for the one count of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, thirty-five to seventy years for the three counts of armed robbery, thirty-five to seventy years for the two counts of conspiracy to commit armed robbery, twenty to thirty years for the two counts of first-degree home invasion, twenty to thirty years for the two counts of conspiracy to commit first-degree home invasion, twenty to forty years for the one count of carjacking, twenty to forty years for the one count of conspiracy to commit carjacking, fifteen to thirty years for the one count of arson of a dwelling house, fifteen to thirty years for the once count of conspiracy to commit arson of a dwelling house, three years to seven years and six months for the one count of carrying a concealed weapon, three years to seven years and six months for the one count of felon in possession of firearms, and two years for the one count of felony-firearm. Defendant appeals and we affirm, but vacate defendant's excessive murder convictions. Defendant, Jerry Walker, was convicted, following a jury trial, of four counts of seconddegree murder, MCL 750.317; two counts of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, MCL 750.157a; MCL 750.316; one count of first-degree premeditated murder, MCL 750.316; three counts of armed robbery, MCL 750.529; two counts of conspiracy to commit armed robbery, MCL 750.157a; MCL 750.529; two counts of first-degree home invasion, MCL 750.110a(2); two counts of conspiracy to commit first-degree home invasion, MCL 750.157a; MCL 750.110a(2); one count of first-degree felony murder, MCL 750.316; one count of arson of a dwelling house, MCL 750.72; and one count of carrying a concealed weapon, MCL 750.227. He was sentenced to thirty to fifty years for the four counts of second-degree murder, life without parole for the two counts of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, fifteen to thirty years for the three counts of armed robbery, fifteen to thirty years for the two counts of conspiracy to commit armed robbery, three to twenty years for the two counts of first-degree home invasion, five to twenty years for the two counts of conspiracy to commit home invasion, life without parole for the one count of first-degree premeditated murder, life without parole for the one count of first-degree felony murder, five to twenty years for the one count of arson of a dwelling

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As to the murders of Green Wedlow and Catherine Wedlow, the jury returned guilty verdicts for second-degree murder and the judge incorrectly sentenced both based on first-degree premeditated murder.

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house, and nine months to five years for the one count of carrying a concealed weapon. Defendant appeals and we affirm, but vacate defendant's excessive murder convictions. Defendant, Sherman Buggs, was convicted, following a jury trial, of six counts of firstdegree murder, MCL 750.316; two counts of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, MCL 750.157a; MCL 750.316; three counts of armed robbery, MCL 750.529; two counts of conspiracy to commit armed robbery, MCL 750.157a; MCL 750.529; two counts of first-degree home invasion, MCL 750.110a(2); two counts of conspiracy to commit home invasion, MCL 750.157a; MCL 750.110a(2); three counts of carrying a concealed weapon, MCL 750.227; one count of felon in possession of firearms, MCL 750.224f; one count of felony-firearm, MCL 750.227b; one count of carjacking, MCL 750.529a; one count of conspiracy to commit carjacking, MCL 750.157a; MCL 750.529a; and one count of arson of a dwelling house, MCL 750.72. The trial court found defendant to be a habitual offender second offense, MCL 769.10. He was sentenced to life without parole for each of the six counts of first-degree murder, life without parole for the two counts of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, forty-five to eighty years for the three counts of armed robbery, forty-five to eighty years for the two counts of conspiracy to commit armed robbery, twenty to forty years for the two counts of first-degree home invasion, twenty to forty years for the two counts of conspiracy to commit home invasion, three to ten years for the three counts of carrying a concealed weapon, three to ten years for the one count of felon in possession of firearms, two years for the one count of felony-firearm, forty to sixty years for the one count of carjacking, forty to sixty years for the one count of conspiracy to commit carjacking, and twenty to forty years for the one count of arson of a dwelling house. Defendant appeals and we affirm, but vacate defendant's excessive murder convictions. The codefendants were tried together with separate juries. The trial court joined for trial crimes that occurred at Green and Catherine Wedlow's home and crimes that occurred at Robert Vondrasek's home. The facts presented at trial established that on January 27, 2006, Catherine Wedlow and her husband, Green Wedlow, were found shot to death in their home. The front door had been forced open, and various items were taken from the home. Testimony revealed that the codefendants planned to rob the Wedlows, that Buggs shot Mrs. Wedlow, and that Hodge shot Mr. Wedlow. Further, on January 30, 2006, Robert Vondrasek was found dead in his home, which had been set on fire. His body was severely burned and his throat was cut. Testimony also revealed that the codefendants planned to rob Vondrasek's home and steal his car, the robbery went badly, and they ended up stabbing him. I. Defendant Hodge's issues Hodge first argues that his convictions for the Wedlow murders be reversed and his case remanded for a new trial because the jury's verdict was against the great weight of the evidence. We disagree. This Court denied Hodge's motion to remand, but the Court can review Hodge's claim for plain error affecting his substantial rights. People v Musser, 259 Mich App 215, 218; 673 NW2d 800 (2003). To avoid forfeiture of an unpreserved, non-constitutional plain error, three requirements must be met: 1) error must have occurred, 2) the error was plain, i.e., clear and obvious, 3) and the plain error affected substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).

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A new trial can be granted "only if the evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict so that it would be a miscarriage of justice to allow the verdict to stand." People v Lemmon, 456 Mich 625, 627; 576 NW2d 129 (1998). In addition, the trial court judge may not act as "thirteenth juror" in ruling on motions for a new trial. Id. Finally, "new trial motions based solely on the weight of the evidence regarding witness credibility are not favored." Id. at 639. In this case, Hodge argues that certain witnesses lacked credibility because they were jail inmates who made deals with the prosecutor, and the testimony was deprived of all probative value because it was contradicted by the undisputed evidence. However, the jury was made fully aware of the witnesses' backgrounds and the deals that were made. The jury was also aware of any evidence that may have contradicted any testimony. None of the testimony was so far impeached that it was deprived of any probative value. Although some of the evidence contradicted witnesses' testimony, the witnesses' versions of the murders were sufficiently similar to contain some probative value. The jury must weigh the credibility, and the judge must not act as the "thirteenth juror." Thus, there was not plain error affecting Hodge's substantial rights. Hodge argues secondly that his multiple conspiracy convictions violate double jeopardy because they were based on a single conspiracy. We disagree. This Court reviews challenges under the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the Michigan and United States Constitutions de novo. People v Calloway, 469 Mich 448, 450; 671 NW2d 733 (2003). Because defendant did not object to being charged with multiple conspiracies, we review his claim under the Double Jeopardy Clause for plain error. People v Matuszak, 263 Mich App 42, 47; 687 NW2d 342 (2004). The primary goal of judicial interpretation of statutes is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. Neal v Wilkes, 470 Mich 661, 665; 685 NW2d 648 (2004). The best source for determining legislative intent is the specific language of the statute. Id. When the Legislature has unambiguously conveyed its intent, the statute speaks for itself and judicial construction is neither necessary nor permitted. Koontz v Ameritech Services, Inc, 466 Mich 304, 312; 645 NW2d 34 (2002). Further, both the United States and Michigan Constitutions prohibit placing a defendant twice in jeopardy for a single offense. US Const, Am V; Const 1963, art 1,

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