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STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee,
V

UNPUBLISHED September 29, 2009

EARNEST LEE ROBINSON, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 286555 Wayne Circuit Court LC No. 07-009901

Before: Murphy, P.J., and Meter and Beckering, JJ. PER CURIAM. Defendant appeals by delayed leave granted from his sentences in connection with his plea-based convictions of two counts of receiving or concealing a stolen motor vehicle, MCL 750.535(7). We affirm. In exchange for dismissal of several other charges, and a downgrade of his habitual offender status, defendant pleaded no contest to the two charges underlying this case. Without defense objection, the prosecuting attorney reported that, on May 17, 2007, in a parking lot in Dearborn, defendant had possession of a Dodge Ram truck and also a Dodge van, knowing at the time that those vehicles were stolen and that he did not have the true owners' permission to possess them. The trial court sentenced defendant as a third habitual offender, MCL 769.11, to serve concurrent terms of imprisonment of two to ten years, as agreed in exchange for the plea. The trial court specified that because defendant was on parole at the time of the instant offenses, he would receive no credit for time he spent incarcerated before sentencing. On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred in not awarding jail credit, and in scoring one of the offense variables under the sentencing guidelines. I. Jail Credit Defendant reports that he was incarcerated for 56 days leading up to the date of sentencing in the instant case. Defendant, acting in propria persona, filed a postsentencing motion with the trial court to have that time applied to his instant sentences, which resulted in a letter from the court's clerk advising defendant that the 56 days of jail time had been credited against the sentence from which he had been on parole at the time. Defendant now asks this Court to have those 56 days applied or credited against the instant sentences.

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MCL 769.11b provides: Whenever any person is hereafter convicted of any crime within this state and has served any time in jail prior to sentencing because of being denied or unable to furnish bond for the offense of which he is convicted, the trial court in imposing sentence shall specifically grant credit against the sentence for such time served in jail prior to sentencing. In People v Idziak, __ Mich __; __ NW2d __, issued July 31, 2009 (Docket No. 137301), slip op at 1-2, our Supreme Court addressed the issue of jail credit, stating and holding: In this case, we consider whether a parolee who is convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment for a felony committed while on parole is entitled, under Michigan's jail credit statute, MCL 769.11b, to credit for time served in jail after his arrest on the new offense and before sentencing for that offense. We hold that, under MCL 791.238(2), the parolee resumes serving his earlier sentence on the date he is arrested for the new criminal offense. As long as time remains on the parolee's earlier sentence, he remains incarcerated, regardless of his eligibility for bond or his ability to furnish it. Since the parolee is not being held in jail "because of being denied or unable to furnish bond," the jail credit statute does not apply. Further, a sentencing court lacks common law discretion to grant credit against a parolee's new minimum sentence in contravention of the statutory scheme. Finally, the denial of credit against a new minimum sentence does not violate the double jeopardy clauses or the equal protection clauses of the United States or Michigan constitutions. US Const, Am V and XIV; Const 1963, art 1,

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