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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS


PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v ISAAC DARNELL BURRIS, Defendant-Appellant.

UNPUBLISHED October 23, 2007

No. 271790 Oakland Circuit Court LC No. 2005-205927-FH

Before: Bandstra, P.J., and Talbot and Fort Hood, JJ. PER CURIAM. Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of reckless driving, MCL 257.626(1), but acquitted of third-degree fleeing and eluding, MCL 750.479a(3). Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm. Defendant was charged and convicted after he was stopped by Officer Jeffery Jagielski for operating a motorcycle at a speed of 100 miles per hour on 8 Mile Road in Oakland County. After receiving two citations from Jagielski, defendant drove off at a high rate of speed and forced a pedestrian to "dance" around him to avoid being hit. Jagielski again pursued defendant, and he estimated defendant's speed to be 100 miles per hour. Defendant turned down a side street, which led to Henry Ford High School. Upon reaching Henry Ford High School, defendant stopped his bike and took off his helmet. Defendant then saw Jagielski turn the corner onto the side street to Henry Ford High School. Defendant was thereafter detained. Defendant claims that his conviction for reckless driving is not supported by sufficient evidence because there was no evidence that he knowingly disregarded the safety of persons or property. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found that all of the elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Hunter, 466 Mich 1, 6; 643 NW2d 218 (2002). To be convicted of reckless driving, a defendant must have operated a vehicle with "willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property." MCL 257.626(1). MCL 257.626(1) does not define the phrase "willful or wanton disregard." However, in Jennings v Southwood, 446 Mich 125, 139; 521 NW2d 230 (1994), our Supreme Court concluded that "wilful and wanton misconduct" is a different standard than "wilful misconduct" because the phrases "possess distinct meanings." According to the Court, "`[w]illful means intentional.'" Id. -1-


at 139-140, quoting McKimmy v Conductors Protective Assurance Co, 253 Mich 521, 523; 235 NW 242 (1931). It involves design and purpose. Id. at 139. Wilful and wanton misconduct, on the other hand, describes conduct that is either wilful

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