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STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v JARQUECE DAMON BLOODWORTH, Defendant-Appellant.

UNPUBLISHED March 20, 2012

No. 302409 Wayne Circuit Court LC No. 09-030166-FC

Before: O'CONNELL, P.J., and SAWYER and TALBOT, JJ. PER CURIAM. Defendant was convicted, following a jury trial, of voluntary manslaughter, MCL 750.321, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b. Defendant was charged with first-degree premeditated murder, MCL 750.316, but convicted of the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter, MCL 750.321. Defendant was sentenced to 57 months to 15 years' imprisonment for the voluntary manslaughter conviction and two years' imprisonment for the felony-firearm conviction. Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm. First, defendant argues that the trial court's removal of defendant's first court-appointed attorney, Gabi Silver, just prior to trial, because of a perceived conflict, was a structural error that requires a new trial. We disagree. This Court reviews a trial court's discretion affecting defendant's right to counsel of choice for an abuse of discretion. People v Akins, 259 Mich App 545, 556; 675 NW2d 863 (2003). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's decision falls outside the range of principled outcomes. People v Blackston, 481 Mich 451, 460; 751 NW2d 408 (2008). "[H]armless-error analysis does not apply where a trial court violates a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel by improperly removing appointed or retained trial counsel and [ ] a defendant need not establish prejudice under these circumstances." People v Johnson, 215 Mich App 658, 669; 547 NW2d 65 (1996). "[R]eversal is required even if no prejudice is shown in improperly removing a defendant's court-appointed attorney." Id. at 668. Also, "[t]he application of ethical norms to a decision whether to disqualify counsel is reviewed de novo." Rymal v Baergen, 262 Mich App 274, 317; 686 NW2d 241 (2004). The United States and Michigan constitutions provide that an accused has the right to counsel for his defense. People v Aceval, 282 Mich App 379, 386; 764 NW2d 285 (2009). This -1-

guaranteed right incorporates a defendant's right to choice of counsel. Id. However, "the right to counsel of choice does not extend to defendants who require counsel to be appointed for them." United States v Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 US 140, 151; 126 S Ct 2557; 165 L Ed 2d 409 (2006); Aceval, 282 Mich App at 386. However, "the arbitrary, unjustified removal of a defendant's appointed counsel by the trial court during a critical stage in the proceedings, over the objection of the defendant, violates the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel." Johnson, 215 Mich App at 665-666. Also, "once the right to counsel exists, there is a correlative right to effective representation that is free from actual conflicts of interest." In re Osborne, 237 Mich App 597, 606; 603 NW2d 824 (1999). Prior to defendant's trial, Silver became aware of a potential conflict of interest, which she explained to defendant. During a meeting with defendant, defendant indicated that he had some information regarding another murder case, which involved a defendant that Silver's husband was representing. Defendant did not know whether he was going to take a deal or whether the prosecution was going to offer him a deal for the information he had regarding this other defendant. Despite the potential conflict of interest, defendant wanted Silver to remain his defense counsel and also asserted that he did not want a deal if it meant losing Silver as his counsel. The trial court removed Silver because of the potential appearance of impropriety and appointed Matthew Evans to represent defendant. We hold that defendant was not entitled to a court-appointed counsel of his choice. Aceval, 282 Mich App at 386. Defendant was entitled to representation free from conflicts of interest. In re Osborne, 237 Mich App at 606. We hold that the removal of Silver for the potential appearance of impropriety was not arbitrary because the trial court was remedying the potential conflict of interest regarding the information defendant had pertaining to another defendant that was being represented by Silver's husband and the possibility that defendant may want to accept a potential deal from the prosecution. Therefore, we hold that defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel was not violated. Johnson, 215 Mich App at 665-666. Next, defendant argues that the prosecution failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant did not shoot the decedent in self-defense. We disagree. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court reviews the evidence de novo, in the light most favorable to the prosecution. People v Tombs, 472 Mich 446, 459; 697 NW2d 494 (2005), overruled on other grounds People v Nyx, 479 Mich 112 (2007); People v Ericksen, 288 Mich App 192, 196; 793 NW2d 120 (2010). This Court determines whether a rational trier of fact could find that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. "Voluntary manslaughter is an intentional killing committed under the influence of passion or hot blood produced by adequate provocation and before a reasonable time has passed for the blood to cool and reason to resume its habitual control." People v Fortson, 202 Mich App 13, 19; 507 NW2d 763 (1993). The elements of felony-firearm, MCL 750.227b, are that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of, or the attempt to commit, a felony. People v Taylor, 275 Mich App 177, 179; 737 NW2d 790 (2007). "[O]nce the defendant injects the issue of self-defense and satisfies the initial burden of producing some evidence from which a jury could conclude that the elements necessary to establish a prima facie defense of self-2-

defense exist, the prosecution bears the burden of proof to exclude the possibility that the killing was done in self-defense." People v Dupree, 486 Mich 693, 709-710; 788 NW2d 399 (2010). The Self-Defense Act (SDA), MCL 780.971 et seq., provides that "an individual who has not or is not engaged in the commission of a crime at the time he or she uses deadly force may use deadly force against another individual anywhere he or she has the legal right to be with no duty to retreat if . . . [t]he individual honestly and reasonably believes that the use of deadly force is necessary to prevent the imminent death of or imminent great bodily harm to himself or herself or to another individual." MCL 780.972(1)(a). A jury is free to draw its own conclusions of the evidence or reject it outright. People v Roper, 286 Mich App 77, 88; 777 NW2d 483 (2009). "[B]ecause of the difficulty of proving an actor's state of mind, minimal circumstantial evidence is sufficient." People v Fetterley, 229 Mich App 511, 517-518; 583 NW2d 199 (1998). Moreover, the credibility of witnesses' testimony is a question for the trier of fact that this Court does not resolve anew. People v Davis, 241 Mich App 697, 700; 617 NW2d 381 (2000). This case arises out of the killing of George Douglas, Jr. Here, there is evidence that immediately after the decedent was shot, the decedent's fianc

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