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Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan

Opinion
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v KEVIN M. ROBINSON, Defendant-Appellee. _______________________________ BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH YOUNG, J.

Chief Justice:

Justices:

Clifford W. Taylor

Michael F. Cavanagh Elizabeth A. Weaver Marilyn Kelly Maura D. Corrigan Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman

FILED MAY 31, 2006

No.126379

Defendant and a codefendant, Samuel Pannell, committed an aggravated assault, and Pannell shot and killed the victim, Bernard Thomas. After a bench trial, the trial court convicted defendant of second-degree murder under an aiding and abetting theory. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's judgment, because it concluded that there was insufficient evidence that defendant shared or was aware of Pannell's intent to kill. We hold that under Michigan law, a defendant who intends to aid, abet, counsel, or procure the commission of a crime, is liable for that crime as well as the natural and probable consequences of that crime. In this case, defendant

committed and aided the commission of an aggravated assault. One of the natural and probable consequences of such a crime is death. Therefore, the trial court properly convicted defendant of second-degree murder. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate defendant's conviction of second-degree murder. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY According to the evidence adduced at trial, defendant and Pannell went to the house of the victim, Bernard Thomas, with the stated intent to "f*** him up." Under Pannell's direction, defendant drove himself and Pannell to the victim's house. Pannell knocked on the victim's door. When the victim opened the door, defendant struck him. As the victim fell to the ground, defendant struck the victim again. Pannell began to kick the victim. Defendant told Pannell that "that was enough," and walked back to the car. When defendant reached his car, he heard a single gunshot.1 Following a bench trial, the trial court found defendant guilty of second degree murder "on the prong of great bodily harm only."2 Specifically, the court found that defendant drove Pannell to the victim's house with the intent to physically attack the victim. The court also found that once at the victim's home,

The parties stipulated that the victim died from a gunshot wound. Defendant stated that he did not shoot the victim and that only he, Pannell, and the victim were at the victim's house.
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A jury convicted Pannell of first-degree murder.

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defendant initiated the attack on the victim, and that defendant's attack enabled Pannell to "get the upper-hand" on the victim. The court sentenced defendant to a term of 71 months to 15 years. The Court of Appeals reversed defendant's murder conviction, holding that there was insufficient evidence to support defendant's second-degree murder conviction.3 The Court held that the trial court improperly convicted defendant of second-degree murder because there was no evidence establishing that defendant was aware of or shared Pannell's intent to kill the victim. This Court granted the prosecution's application for leave to appeal, directing the parties to address the elements of accomplice liability and the mens rea required to support a conviction of aiding and abetting second-degree murder.4 STANDARD OF REVIEW The requirements of the aiding and abetting statute5 are a question of law that this Court reviews de novo.6 "[W]ords and phrases that have acquired a unique meaning at common law are interpreted as having the same meaning when

Unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued April 29, 2004 (Docket No. 237036).
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472 Mich 898 (2005). MCL 767.39. People v Schaefer, 473 Mich 418, 427; 703 NW2d 774 (2005).

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used in statutes dealing with the same subject."7 In evaluating defendant's claim regarding the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court reviews the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecutor to determine whether any trier of fact could find the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.8 Findings of fact by the trial court may not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous.9 ANALYSIS This case involves liability under our aiding and abetting statute, MCL 767.39, which provides: Every person concerned in the commission of an offense, whether he directly commits the act constituting the offense or procures, counsels, aids, or abets in its commission may hereafter be prosecuted, indicted, tried and on conviction shall be punished as if he had directly committed such offense. Unlike conspiracy10 and felony murder,11 which also allow the state to punish a person for the acts of another, aiding and abetting is not a separate

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Pulver v Dundee Cement Co, 445 Mich 68, 75; 515 NW2d 728 (1994).
People v Hardiman, 466 Mich 417, 421; 646 NW2d 158 (2002).
MCR 2.613(C).
MCL 750.157a.
MCL 750.316(1)(b).


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substantive offense. Rather, "being an aider and abettor is simply a theory of prosecution"12 that permits the imposition of vicarious liability for accomplices. This Court recently described the three elements necessary for a conviction under an aiding and abetting theory: "(1) the crime charged was committed by the defendant or some other person; (2) the defendant performed acts or gave encouragement that assisted the commission of the crime; and (3) the defendant intended the commission of the crime or had knowledge that the principal intended its commission at the time that [the defendant] gave aid and encouragement."[13] The primary dispute in this case involves the third element. Under the Court of Appeals analysis, the third element would require the prosecutor to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant intended to commit the identical offense, here homicide, as the accomplice or, alternatively, that a defendant knew that the accomplice intended to commit the homicide. We reaffirm that evidence of defendant's specific intent to commit a crime or knowledge of the accomplice's intent constitutes sufficient mens rea to convict under our aiding and abetting statute. However, as will be discussed later in this opinion, we disagree that evidence of a shared specific intent to commit the crime of an accomplice is the exclusive way to establish liability under our aiding and abetting statute.

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People v Perry, 460 Mich 55, 63 n 20; 594 NW2d 477 (1999).

People v Moore, 470 Mich 56, 67-68; 679 NW2d 41 (2004), quoting People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 768; 597 NW2d 130 (1999) (change in Moore).

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AIDING AND ABETTING STATUTE The theory that a defendant could be liable for another's criminal actions as an "aider and abettor" goes back to the common law. At common law, there were four categories of offenders to a felony: (1) principal in the first degree

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Michigan Law