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Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan 48909 _____________________________________________________________________________________________
C hief Justice Justices

Maura D. Cor rigan

Opinion
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v MARK JOHN VASQUEZ, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
___________________________________ BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH
MARKMAN, J.


Michael F. Cavanagh Elizabeth A. Weaver Marilyn Kelly Clifford W. Taylor Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman

____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

FILED JULY 27, 2001


No. 116660


We granted leave to consider whether defendant's alleged
conduct of lying to a police officer about his name and age,
constituted an "obstruction" within the meaning of Michigan's
"resisting and obstructing" statute. MCL 750.479. Michigan's
"resisting and obstructing" statute does not proscribe any
manner of interference with a police officer, and it also does


not proscribe only conduct that poses a threat to the safety
of police officers; rather, it proscribes threatened, either
expressly or impliedly, physical interference and actual


physical interference with a police officer. would reverse the the decision court's of the Court of

Therefore, we
Appeals the and


reinstate

trial

order

dismissing

charge


against defendant.
I. FACTS
AND

PROCEDURAL HISTORY


While investigating a complaint about a loud party, a
police officer found defendant urinating on the front lawn of
a private residence. The officer approached defendant and
Defendant


asked him whether he had been drinking alcohol. responded, "Yes, but not very much."

The officer suspected
When the officer


that defendant was an intoxicated minor.

asked defendant his name and age, defendant said that his name
was "John Wesley Chippeway" and that he was sixteen years old.
In fact, defendant's name was Mark John Vasquez, Jr., and he
was seventeen years old.
The officer arrested defendant for being a minor in
possession of alcohol. process, the officer MCL 436.1703(1). learned from During the booking
officer, who


another

recognized defendant, that he was actually Mark John Vasquez,
Jr. When confronted about the officer's knowledge of who he


actually was, he admitted his true name and age.


2


The prosecutor charged defendant with being a minor in
possession--second offense and "resisting and obstructing" a
police officer. The trial court quashed the "resisting and


obstructing" charge, relying on People v Philabaun, 234 Mich
App 471; 595 NW2d 502 (1999)(Philabaun I), which this Court
subsequently reversed, 461 Mich 255; 602 NW2d 371 (1999)
(Philabaun II). The Court of Appeals thereafter reversed and


remanded, 240 Mich App 239; 612 NW2d 162 (2000), relying on
our decision in Philabaun II, that a defendant's mere refusal
to obey an order for a blood sample could constitute resisting
or opposing.
II. STANDARD
OF

REVIEW


This case requires us to construe Michigan's "resisting
and obstructing" statute. Questions of statutory construction
are reviewed de novo. Donajkowski v Alpena Power Co, 460 Mich
243, 248; 596 NW2d 574 (1999).
III. ANALYSIS OF STATUTE
"The primary goal of judicial interpretation is to


ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature."
McJunkin v Cellasto Plastic Corp, 461 Mich 590, 598; 608 NW2d
57 (2000). "The first step in that determination is to review
the language of the statute itself." In re MCI


3


Telecommunications, 460 Mich 396, 411; 596 NW2d 164 (1999).
The "resisting and obstructing" statute states in relevant
part:
Any person who shall knowingly and willfully .
. . obstruct, resist, oppose, assault, beat or
wound . . . any person or persons authorized by law
to maintain and preserve the peace, in their lawful
acts, attempts and efforts to maintain, preserve
and keep the peace shall be guilty of a misdemeanor
. . . . [MCL 750.479.]
This statute proscribes conduct that "obstruct[s]" a police
officer while the officer is attempting to "keep the peace."
A. "KEEP The "resisting and
THE

PEACE "
statute proscribes


obstructing"

certain conduct encountered by a law enforcement officer while
the officer is attempting to "keep the peace." Therefore, the
first issue is whether the police officer, in this case, was
attempting to "keep the peace" when defendant lied to him.
"[A]n officer's efforts to `keep the peace' include ordinary
police functions that do not directly involve placing a person
under arrest." People v Little, 434 Mich 752, 759; 456 NW2d


237 (1990). "[T]he broad statutory clause `maintain, preserve
and keep the peace' includes all of the duties legally


executed by a police officer."

People v Weatherspoon, 6 Mich


App 229, 232; 148 NW2d 889 (1967).
In this case, the officer was responding to a complaint
about a loud party when he found defendant urinating on the
4


front lawn of a private residence.

Because the officer


suspected that defendant was an intoxicated minor, the officer
asked defendant for his name and age. Defendant told the


officer that his name was "John Wesley Chippeway" and that he
was sixteen years old. In fact, defendant's name was Mark
Defendant
MCL


John Vasquez, Jr. and he was seventeen years old.

was arrested for being a minor in possession of alcohol. 436.1703(1).

It is clear that, at the time defendant lied to


the officer, the latter was responding to suspected criminal
activity, which constitutes an ordinary police function.


Because the officer was performing such a lawfully assigned
function when he questioned defendant, the officer was


attempting to "keep the peace" within the meaning of the
"resisting and obstructing" statute, when defendant lied to
him.
B. "OBSTRUCT "
The next issue is whether defendant "obstructed," within
the meaning of the "resisting and obstructing" statute, the
police officer when he lied to him. "[T]he meaning of
King


statutory language, plain or not, depends on context."

v St Vincent's Hosp, 502 US 215, 221; 112 S Ct 570; 116 L Ed
2d 578 (1991). "Contextual understanding of statutes is


generally grounded in the doctrine of noscitur a sociis: `[i]t
is known from its associates,' see Black's Law Dictionary (6th
5


ed), at 1060.

This doctrine stands for the principle that a


word or phrase is given meaning by its context or setting."
Tyler v Livonia Pub Schs, 459 Mich 382, 390-391; 590 NW2d 560
(1999). "[I]n seeking meaning, words and clauses will not be


divorced from those which precede and those which follow."
Sanchick v Michigan State Bd of Optometry, 342 Mich 555, 559;
70 NW2d 757 (1955). "It is a familiar principle of statutory


construction that words grouped in a list should be given
related meaning." Third Nat'l Bank in Nashville v Impac Ltd,


Inc, 432 US 312, 322; 97 S Ct 2307; 53 L Ed 2d 368 (1977).
In the present case, the statute uses the word "obstruct"
as part of a list containing five other words, namely,


"resist, oppose, assault, beat [and] wound."

The meaning of


the word "obstruct" should be determined in this particular
context, and be given a meaning logically related to the five
surrounding words of the statute. "Resist" is defined as "to


withstand, strive against, or oppose." Random House Webster's
College Dictionary (1991) at 1146. "Resistance" is


additionally defined as "the opposition offered by one thing,
force, etc." Id. "Oppose" is defined as "to act against or
Id. at 949. "Assault" is
Id. at 82.


furnish resistance to; combat"

defined as "a sudden violent attack; onslaught."

"Beat" is defined as "to strike forcefully and repeatedly;
. . . to hit repeatedly as to cause painful injury." 6
Id. at


120.

"Wound" is defined as "to inflict a wound upon; injure;
Id. at 1537. Each of these words, when read together,


hurt."

clearly implies an element of threatened or actual physical
interference.
The accompanying term "obstruct" is susceptible to


several potential meanings.

"Obstruct" is defined as: "1. to


block or close up with an obstacle. 2. to hinder, interrupt,
or delay the passage, progress, course, etc. of. 3. to block
from sight; be in the way of (a view, passage, etc.)." 935. Id. at


Accordingly, we understand the dissent's definition of


"obstruct," which defines it as including both physical and
nonphysical conduct. Although we understand that "obstruct"


can be defined in such a manner, when read in context, we
believe that the more reasonable interpretation is one that
communicates interference.1
An Iowa statute, very similar to Michigan's "resisting
and obstructing" statute, provides:
A person who knowingly resists or obstructs
anyone known by the person to be a peace officer
. . . in the performance of any act which is within
the scope of the lawful duty or authority of that
officer . . . commits a simple misdemeanor. [Iowa
Code

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