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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS


PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v MICHAEL SCOTT CHEGWIDDEN, Defendant-Appellant.

UNPUBLISHED January 16, 1998

No. 189699 Houghton Circuit Court LC No. 95-001348-FH

Before: Murphy, P.J., and Hood and Bandstra, JJ. PER CURIAM. Defendant was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to commit first-degree home invasion, MCL 750.157a; MSA 28.354(1) and MCL 750.110a(2); MSA 28.305(a)(2), and unarmed robbery, MCL 750.530; MSA 28.798. For those respective convictions, defendant was sentenced as a second habitual offender1 to eighteen to thirty years' imprisonment and fifteen to twenty-two and one-half years' imprisonment. Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm. Defendant first claims that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a change of venue because of the potential bias caused by pretrial media news coverage. We disagree. During voir dire, when an individual became a possible juror for the case, the trial judge and counsel met with him or her in chambers to ask about the effect, if any, of publicity on that person's ability to be impartial. All twelve of the seated jurors went through the process. From this record, we do not conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant's motion. Although the record indicates that media coverage of these events was widespread, that is not enough. Defendant failed to carry his burden of showing that the jurors were biased. People v Hack, 219 Mich App 299, 311; 556 NW2d 187 (1996). Defendant also argues that the trial judge, "during individualized sequestered voir dire of the prospective jurors, utilized the type of questions recently disapproved of by the Michigan Supreme Court in People v Tyburski," 445 Mich 606; 518 NW2d 441 (1994). Although the questions challenged by defendant may be somewhat similar to the leading questions asked by the trial judge in Tyburski, the present case is otherwise distinguishable and therefore reversal is not required. First, the trial judge in Tyburski denied the request of defense counsel to sequester each potential juror for -1

individual voir dire. Id. at 611. In the present case, the judge and counsel met in chambers with the potential jurors. Second, the trial judge in Tyburski would not allow the attorneys to ask questions; the judge would allow only written follow-up questions submitted through him. Id. In this case, each attorney asked questions of potential jurors. Third, the trial judge in Tyburski questioned the jurors in open court and gave "subtle admonishment" to a juror who admitted to having a bias. Id. at 612-617. Here, there was no such admonishment. The questions complained of by defendant were the trial judge's explanations to the individual jurors as to why he or she needed to meet in chambers with the judge and counsel. It appears that the trial court in the present case, by conducting individual voir dire of each juror along with the participation of counsel, strove zealously to impanel an unbiased jury. See id. at 618. Defendant asserts that the trial court improperly denied his motion to dismiss the jury panel after a potential juror pointed in the direction of defendant and stated, "My son was assaulted by

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