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Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan 48909 _____________________________________________________________________________________________

C hief Justice

O pinion
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v MICHELLE ANN SOBCZAK-OBETTS,


Maura D. Cor rigan

Justices

Michael F. Cavanagh Elizabeth A. Weaver Marilyn Kelly Clifford W. Taylor Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman

____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

FILED MAY 1, 2001


PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,


No. 115890


Defendant-Appellee.
___________________________________ BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH
YOUNG, J.
We granted leave in this case to consider whether


firearms found in defendant's home, upon execution by federal
and state police officers of a federal search warrant, were
properly excluded from evidence in a state prosecution. The


firearms were suppressed on the ground that a copy of the
affidavit in support of the search warrant was not provided,
as required by statute, to defendant at the time the warrant
was executed. Because we are unable to conclude that the


Legislature intended the exclusionary rule to apply to the


procedural

violation

of

Michigan's

statutory

warrant


requirements at issue in this case, we reverse.
I. FACTUAL
AND

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND


Defendant and her husband, Timothy Obetts, were co-owners
of Pro Temp One Incorporated,1 a Michigan corporation that
provided skilled and semiskilled health care workers to


hospitals, nursing homes, and private homes. In May 1997, the
Michigan Accident Fund, Pro Temp One's worker's compensation
carrier, received a call on its fraud hotline indicating that
defendant, Obetts, and Pro Temp One had misrepresented


worker's compensation employee classifications to the fund.
After gathering information from associates and former


employees of Pro Temp One, a fraud investigator from the fund
contacted Michigan State Police Sergeant Jack Vanderwal, who
initiated a criminal investigation. Federal Bureau of Investigation Vanderwal contacted the
after determining that


defendant and Obetts may have obtained bank loans by use of
fraud in addition to defrauding the fund of worker's


compensation premiums.
Special Agent David Smith of the FBI interviewed two
former employees of Pro Temp One and a personal friend of
defendant.2 On the basis of the information provided by these


Pro Temp One also conducted business as First Agency
Professionals Incorporated and Agency Professionals
Incorporated.
It appears from the record that the two former employees
had been fired by defendant, and that at least one of them was
(continued...)
2

2

1

three sources, Smith sought a federal search warrant to search
the private residence of defendant and Obetts. Smith's


affidavit in support of the search warrant referred to the
three sources as "Source One," "Source Two," and "Source
Three." On October 30, 1997, a federal magistrate issued the
The magistrate ordered that the


requested search warrant.3

affidavit in support of the warrant be sealed, apparently to
protect the sources.
On October 31, 1997, the federal search warrant was
executed at the residence of defendant and Obetts by one or
more FBI agents and one or more Michigan State Police


officers.

While searching the basement of the home, two of
The agents asked


the FBI agents came upon a locked safe.

defendant about the contents of the safe, and she replied that
it contained weapons. Defendant then unlocked the safe, and
In accordance with


the agents seized two handguns from it.

federal procedure, when the search was completed, defendant
was given a copy of the search warrant and a tabulation of the
items seized. Notably, defendant was not provided with a copy
of the sealed affidavit. Defendant was subsequently charged


by the Kent County Prosecutor with possession of a firearm by


(...continued)
involved in litigation with defendant.
The magistrate also issued a warrant to search the
business premises of Pro Temp One. This warrant was executed
simultaneously with the warrant to search the private
residence.
3

3

2

a person convicted of a felony.

MCL 750.224f; MSA 28.421(6).4


At defendant's preliminary examination, defense counsel
requested a copy of the affidavit in support of the search
warrant. The assistant prosecutor indicated that the federal


magistrate would be petitioned to unseal the affidavit for
purposes of the state proceedings. The district court judge


presiding over the preliminary examination stated that he
would bind defendant over for trial after defendant received
a copy of the affidavit. preliminary examination, Within two weeks following the
the affidavit was unsealed and


provided to defendant, and she was bound over for trial.
Defendant moved to exclude the firearms from evidence on
various grounds, including that the police did not comply with
Michigan statutory requirements regarding warrant execution.
Following two hearings on the motion to suppress, the trial
court held that the motion had to be granted on the ground
that defendant was not provided with a copy of the affidavit
in support of the search warrant at the time of the search in
contravention of MCL 780.654; MSA 28.1259(4). The trial court
noted that the issuance and execution of the search warrant
were "perfectly legitimate" under federal law. However, the


court held that precedent from this Court required that
evidence seized in the absence of full compliance with


Michigan's statutory warrant provisions be suppressed in a
state prosecution. Accordingly, the trial court entered an


Defendant was not charged with any federal offense or
with worker's compensation fraud as a result of the search.
4


4

order suppressing the firearms and dismissing the case.
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed. Mich App 495, 496-504; 606 NW2d 658 (1999). 238


In the lead


opinion, Judge Hoekstra noted first that, pursuant to People
v Paladino, 204 Mich App 505, 507-508; 516 NW2d 113 (1994), in
a joint operation between the state and federal governments,
state law governs the validity of a search warrant in state
court proceedings. Judge Hoekstra next opined that, although


two panels of the Court of Appeals had recently held that a
failure by law enforcement officers to comply with the


statutory requirement to attach a copy of the affidavit to the
copy of the warrant provided to the defendant does not require
suppression of evidence seized pursuant to the warrant,5 those
decisions conflicted with this Court's holding in People v
Moten, 233 Mich 169; 206 NW 506 (1925).6 Judge Hoekstra


concluded that, because Moten had not been overturned, the
Court of Appeals was constrained to hold that, where a warrant
relies on an attached affidavit for its statement of probable
cause and that affidavit is not attached to the warrant as
statutorily required, the evidence seized pursuant to the
warrant is inadmissible. However, Judge Hoekstra indicated


People v Garvin, 235 Mich App 90, 99; 597 NW2d 194
(1999); People v Pipok (After Remand), 191 Mich App 669, 673;
479 NW2d 359 (1991).
In Moten, this Court held that, where the face of the
search warrant did not recite all the material facts alleged
in the supporting affidavit as required by the then-applicable
search warrant statute, the warrant was invalid, and the
evidence seized pursuant thereto must be suppressed. Id. at
174.
5

6

5

his disagreement with the Moten holding:
While this particular statutory provision
generally relates to a constitutional right, the
specific portion of the statute requiring a
recitation of the basis for probable cause or the
attachment of the affidavit only barely relates to
the substantive right the Legislature is seeking to
protect. The requirement is more of a ministerial
duty than a right. Consequently, were I able, I
would hold that defendant must show some prejudice
before the trial court suppresses the evidence
seized using a statutorily defective warrant. In
this case, for example, defendant was eventually
afforded a chance to contest the basis for the
warrant. I am unable to see how defendant was put
at a disadvantage by being forced to delay her
arguments until the parties obtained a copy of the
federal affidavit. I think it is especially
important that defendant be forced to show some
level of prejudice given that the warrant met all
the requirements of the federal warrant statute.
Here, I find it necessary to exclude the evidence
in question because the state warrant requirements
differ from federal warrant requirements. Neither
party has argued that the federal warrant
requirements are unconstitutional, so it seems that
I am forced to declare a search invalid because the
ministerial duties associated with executing a
federal warrant differ from those associated with
executing a state warrant, a result I hope our
Supreme Court will find equally unsettling. [238
Mich App 503-504.]
Judge Cavanagh concurred only in the result. 504.
Judge Gage dissented, opining that the Court of Appeals
decisions in People v Garvin, 235 Mich App 90; 597 NW2d 194
(1999), and People v Pipok (After Remand), 191 Mich App 669;
479 NW2d 359 (1991), controlled this case, and that this case
was distinguishable from Moten. While the statute in effect
238 Mich App


at the time Moten was decided required that the search warrant
itself contain a recitation of the affidavit's statement of
probable cause, Judge Gage noted, the current statute allows
6


instead the attachment of the affidavit to the search warrant.
In light of this statutory amendment, Judge Gage stated she
would hold that Moten was not controlling, and that


suppression of the firearms in this case was not required
because defendant had failed to demonstrate that she was
prejudiced as a result of the "technical, nonconstitutional"
statutory violation. 238 Mich App 504-508.


We granted the prosecution's application for leave to
appeal,7 and we now reverse.
II. STANDARD
OF

REVIEW


This Court reviews a trial court's ruling regarding a
motion to suppress for clear error. People v Stevens (After


Remand), 460 Mich 626, 631; 597 NW2d 53 (2000); People v
Burrell, 417 Mich 439, 448; 339 NW2d 403 (1983). questions of law relevant to the suppression However,
issue are


reviewed de novo.

Stevens, supra at 631; see also People v


Sierb, 456 Mich 519, 522; 581 NW2d 219 (1998).
Where "`[w]hether violation of is a state statute is a is involved,
of


suppression

appropriate

question

statutory interpretation and thus one of legislative intent.'"
Stevens, supra at 644, quoting People v Wood, 450 Mich 399,
408; 538 NW2d 351 (1995) (BOYLE , J., concurring). "`Because


our judicial role precludes imposing different policy choices
than those selected by the Legislature, our obligation is, by
examining the statutory language, to discern the legislative


7

462 Mich 912 (2000).
7


intent

that

may

reasonably

be

inferred

from

the

words


expressed in the statute.'"

People v McIntire, 461 Mich 147,


152; 599 NW2d 102 (1999), quoting 232 Mich App 119 (YOUNG ,
P.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). "`When a


statute is clear and unambiguous, judicial construction or
interpretation is unnecessary and therefore, precluded.'"
Stevens, supra at 644, quoting Lorencz v Ford Motor Co, 439
Mich 370, 376; 483 NW2d 844 (1992).


III.

ANALYSIS


A. STATUTORY WARRANT REQUIREMENTS
In support of her that motion MCL to suppress MSA the weapons,


defendant

contended

780.655;

28.1259(5)

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