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Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan

Opinion
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v SHAWN LEON JENKINS, Defendant-Appellee. _______________________________ PER CURIAM. This case requires us to

Chief Justice:

Justices:

Clifford W. Taylor

Michael F. Cavanagh Elizabeth A. Weaver Marilyn Kelly Maura D. Corrigan Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman

FILED FEBRUARY 1, 2005

No. 125141

consider

when

defendant's

consensual encounter with a police officer was transformed into an investigatory stop, which gives rise to Fourth

Amendment protections and must be supported by reasonable suspicion. Defendant argues that the officer seized him The trial court to the Court suppress officer of the and

without reasonable suspicion to do so. agreed, granting defendant's later motion found by The

incriminating dismissing affirmed. the

evidence pending

charges.

Appeals

We conclude that the meaning of of the the

defendant was not "seized" within Fourth Amendment gave had until the been after officer engaged the a in

totality reasonable

circumstances that

suspicion

defendant

criminal behavior.

Accordingly, the trial court erred when We reverse the judgment of

it granted defendant's motion.

the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the trial court for reinstatement of the charges brought against

defendant and for further proceedings. I. BACKGROUND

During the evening of August 23, 2001, the Ann Arbor Police Department received a complaint regarding a party in progress in the common area of a housing complex on North Maple Road. Officers Geoffrey Spickard and Jeff Lind were

dispatched to the housing complex, which was known to the police as a high crime and drug area. Upon their arrival,

they found a gathering of fifteen to twenty people drinking and talking loudly. Defendant and another man were seated

on stairs leading to one of the housing units. Officer Spickard approached defendant, and the two

engaged in a general conversation about the party.

At that

point, a woman emerged from the attached housing unit and, using profane language, asked defendant who he was and why he was seated on her porch. Spickard asked defendant if 2
After hearing this, Officer he lived in the housing

complex. Spickard defendant

Defendant asked to

said

that

he

did

not,

and

Officer When card,

see over

defendant's his state

identification. identification

handed

Officer Spickard pulled out his personal radio and started to place a call to the Law Enforcement Information Network (LEIN). Defendant's behavior immediately changed.1 He became

obviously nervous and made furtive gestures toward a large pocket on the side of his pants. despite the fact that and Officer was He began to walk away, Spickard to still him.2 held his

identification

card

speaking

Several

residents of the housing complex called out invitations for defendant to enter their homes.

The dissent fails to note these changes in defendant's behavior. Post at 5-6. The dissent may view these facts as irrelevant but, when the governing Fourth Amendment principles are correctly applied, these changes in defendant's behavior support the officers' ultimate decision to seize the defendant. This fact is also omitted from the dissent's analysis. Thus, while the dissent concludes that no reasonable person would walk away under the circumstances, post at 8, this view was obviously not shared by the defendant, who walked away "under those circumstances." That Justice CAVANAGH finds our reference to the record "enigmatic[]" and "befuddl[ing]," post at 9 n 10, demonstrates the dissent's belief that we are entitled to rewrite the events underlying this appeal with an unrealistic legal formalism. It is only with a lawyer's armchair detachment that the dissent can hypothesize about what a "reasonable person" would do while ignoring the actions of the individual who actually observed the officers' conduct and whose liberty was actually at stake. 3
2

1

At that point, Officer Spickard and his partner walked alongside defendant, encouraging him to wait for the

results of the LEIN inquiry.

When defendant did not stop,

Officer Spickard placed a hand on defendant's back and told him that he was not free to leave. The LEIN inquiry revealed an outstanding warrant for defendant's defendant arrest. in As Officer a gun Spickard fell from was placing

handcuffs,

defendant's

waistband to the ground. II. Defendant was PROCEDURAL HISTORY charged with carrying a concealed

weapon, MCL 750.227; possession of a firearm by a felon, MCL 750.224f; and possession of a firearm during the He

commission of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b.

moved to suppress the evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds and sought dismissal of the charges. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing at which both Officer Spickard and defendant testified. court considered that, was Officer for purposes Spickard's of the he The trial and

testimony Fourth was

determined defendant

Amendment, asked the for trial he that

"seized" In

when this

identification. court relied that on

reaching

conclusion, testimony to

Officer

Spickard's not free

that at

believed point.

defendant

was

leave

The trial court concluded that the officer did not 4


have

a

reasonable stop.

suspicion It granted

to

support

such motion

an to

investigative

defendant's

suppress evidence and dismissed the case. A divided Court of Appeals panel affirmed.3 The

majority agreed with the trial court that Officer Spickard seized defendant when he asked defendant for

identification.4

It concluded that the seizure was not

supported by a reasonable suspicion because defendant was seated in a public area, was not engaged in the conduct for which the officers were summoned, and As a "forthrightly" result, the

answered

the

officer's

questions.

majority held that defendant's Fourth Amendment rights were violated and that the trial court properly granted

defendant's motion to suppress the evidence. The dissenting judge, on the other hand, determined

that the initial encounter, including Officer Spickard's request for defendant's identification, an investigatory stop. did not constitute

The dissent further concluded that

subsequent events gave rise to a reasonable suspicion of possible criminal activity and entitled Officer Spickard to transform the encounter into an investigatory stop.
3

Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued November 18, 2003 (Docket No. 240947). The majority criticized the trial court's reliance on Officer Spickard's subjective belief that defendant was not free to leave once he had been asked to produce identification, but concluded that there was objective evidence as well to support this conclusion. We disagree. 5
4

The prosecutor seeks leave to appeal in this Court. After hearing oral argument for from leave both to parties appeal, on we the have

prosecution's

application

determined that the judgment of the Court of Appeals must be reversed and that this matter must be remanded to the trial court for reinstatement of the charges against

defendant and further proceedings. III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court reviews a trial court's factual findings in a suppression hearing for clear error. 465 Mich 319, 325-326; of 630 NW2d 870 People v Custer, (2001). by But the the

"[a]pplication

constitutional

standards

trial

court is not entitled to the same deference as factual findings." People v Nelson, 443 Mich 626, 631 n 7; 505 Application of the exclusionary rule to a

NW2d 266 (1993).

Fourth Amendment violation is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. Custer, supra at 326. IV. The United States ANALYSIS Constitution and the Michigan

Constitution guarantee the right of persons to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures. IV; Const 1963, art 1,

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