Preview:

Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan

Opinion
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v

Chief Justice:

Justices:

Robert P. Young, Jr. Michael F. Cavanagh Marilyn Kelly Stephen J. Markman Diane M. Hathaway Mary Beth Kelly Brian K. Zahra

FILED MAY 14, 2012 STATE OF MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT

No. 142913

VERDELL REESE, III, Defendant-Appellee.

BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH YOUNG, C.J. We granted the prosecution's application for leave to appeal to resolve whether Michigan law recognizes the doctrine of "imperfect self-defense" as an independent theory that automatically mitigates criminal liability for a homicide from murder to voluntary manslaughter when a defendant acts as the initial aggressor and then claims that the victim's response necessitated the use of force. We hold that the doctrine of imperfect self-defense does not exist in Michigan law as a freestanding defense

mitigating murder to voluntary manslaughter, although we recognize that factual circumstances that have been characterized as imperfect self-defense may negate the malice element of second-degree murder. When analyzing the elements of manslaughter in light of defendant's self-defense claim, we conclude that the Court of Appeals erred in its ruling on the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence to sustain defendant's manslaughter conviction. Therefore, we reverse in part the Court of Appeals' judgment,1 affirm the trial court's verdict of manslaughter, and remand this case to the Court of Appeals for further consideration of defendant's remaining issue on appeal. I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Defendant, Verdell Reese, III, was charged with second-degree murder2 and, alternatively, voluntary manslaughter3 for the April 2008 death of Leonardo Johnson.4 Defendant waived his right to a jury trial and proceeded to a bench trial in the Wayne Circuit Court. According to testimony adduced at trial, defendant owed $2,000 to Johnson, who was so upset about the debt that he had not spoken to defendant for approximately six months. Johnson lived with his cousin, James Long, in Detroit. Defendant was Long's
1

The Court of Appeals affirmed defendant's convictions for being a felon in possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f, and felony-firearm, MCL 750.227b. Because defendant does not cross-appeal those convictions in this Court, our opinion today does not disturb them. MCL 750.317. MCL 750.321.

2 3 4

In addition to these charges, defendant was also charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm, carrying a concealed weapon, and felony-firearm.

2

close friend; Long described his relationship with defendant as being "like brothers." Other testimony established that defendant visited the residence that Long and Johnson shared several times a week, even though Johnson did not like that defendant visited with such frequency. Long testified that on the evening of April 17-18, 2008, defendant and a man named John Smith (also known as J.T.) arrived at the Johnson/Long residence. After they had been at the house for a couple of hours, defendant and another friend, D, drove to a nearby store to purchase liquor. While defendant and D were at the store, Lakeshia Williams, who was Johnson and Long's cousin, left the house with Smith and walked toward the east, where she lived. Williams testified that, after she left the house, she saw Johnson approach from the east. Once Smith greeted Johnson, Williams heard two gunshots as defendant's car drove past them. She heard the first gunshot come from the driver's side of the car, but testified that she did not know the origin of the second gunshot. Smith placed himself between Williams and the street and, after the second gunshot, ran back to Johnson and Long's house. Johnson also continued on his way to his house, while Williams continued to her house and told her father about the gunshots she heard.5 Although Williams did not see the ensuing encounter between Johnson and defendant, Long did. After parking his car on the street, defendant walked toward the house and began talking with Long. According to Long, Johnson then approached the

Long also testified that he heard a gunshot from the east and that defendant and D were driving back from the store, also from the east, at about this time.

5

3

house and asked, "[W]hat's up with that[?]" to which defendant replied, "[W]hat's up with what?" Long testified that he then saw both defendant and Johnson step back and flinch. Long then heard a shot and saw muzzle fire coming from Johnson's direction, followed by five more shots that came from both Johnson's and defendant's positions. Once the shooting ended, Johnson ran across the street and through a vacant lot, while defendant remained in front of the house. A police officer responding to the shooting found Johnson's body facedown on the driveway of a house one block north of the shootings. Johnson's .40 caliber semi-automatic pistol was nearby and contained a live round that had jammed in the chamber. The medical examiner testified that Johnson had been shot twice and that the fatal bullet passed through his right arm into his chest. Defendant had been shot in the right leg. Long and Smith drove defendant to the hospital in defendant's car, but not before Long put defendant's gun in the house. Another officer was dispatched to the hospital where defendant was admitted and took a brief statement from defendant.6 Defendant "was very vague [and] did not want to give any information about what happened." However, defendant did say that "he was

standing outside by the car, heard several shots and was struck by several shots" before being taken to the hospital. Defendant claimed to know neither the person who fired the shots nor where the shots had come from. He later changed his version of the events and told another officer that the shots came from a vacant lot across the street, although defendant again said that he could not provide a description of the shooter. In his third statement to police, defendant denied having seen who shot him and did not state the
6

At this point, officers considered defendant a gunshot victim.

4

location of the shooter. However, he claimed that he did not think he was the intended target of the shooting. At the bench trial, defense counsel did not call any witnesses and argued that defendant did not shoot Johnson or, alternatively, that defendant shot Johnson in selfdefense. The trial court made its findings of fact and issued its ruling from the bench. First, the trial court rejected defense counsel's claim that defendant did not shoot and kill Johnson: "There's no question . . . [that] Mr. Johnson shot at Mr. Reese and Mr. Reese shot at Mr. Johnson, okay. So to suggest that Mr. Reese never shot Mr. Johnson is a mischaracterization of what was proffered by way of evidence here." The trial court theorized that the shootings occurred because defendant and Johnson "[couldn't] settle their scores in a diplomatic or a professional or responsible way." Addressing the defendant's alternative claim of self-defense, the trial court explained that the general rule of self-defense in Michigan is that "one . . . may use deadly force in self-defense if he . . . honestly and reasonably believes that he is in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and that deadly force is necessary to prevent such a death or great bodily harm." The trial court emphasized that "the

touchstone of any claim of self-defense as justified for homicide is a necessity . . . ." Thus, the trial court determined that "whether or not the Defendant himself was the original aggressor . . . [is] key to the evaluation of the self-defense defense." The trial court then explained that "Michigan courts have recognized the doctrine of imperfect self-defense . . . [as] a qualified defense that mitigates second degree murder to voluntary manslaughter . . . ." The trial court continued, emphasizing that "the

doctrine only applies where the Defendant would [have] had the right of self-defense 5

[and] . . . he acted as the initial aggressor." Finally, the trial court explained that an initial aggressor is entitled to the justification of self-defense when "he generally stopped fighting his assault and clearly let the other person know that he wanted to make peace." The trial court acquitted defendant of second-degree murder, explaining: Is this homicide murder in the second degree? It is not. I don't think the People have proven [their] case beyond a reasonable doubt, but what the Court has found is that in this case there's no question that the victim shot at Mr. Reese. The trial court then concluded that defendant was the initial aggressor in the confrontation: The fact of the matter is, is that Mr. Reese was the one that fired the first shot as Mr. Johnson is walking back to his house and I agree with the prosecutor. This is Mr. Johnson's house, not Mr. Reese's house and Mr. Reese knew that if he'd come to that house there would be trouble . . . . That being stated the evidence shows clearly the Defendant shot out of the car the first shot. That was verified by Miss Williams. She saw that. The Court can use circumstantial evidence and you [defendant] were in the car. This is verified by Mr. Long who says you got out of the car and as you're walking up, so, too, is Mr. Johnson and at that point this is where the evidence parts ways, who fired the first shot. This is where the imperfect self-defense comes in and that is clearly that you were the aggressor. The Court finds, Mr. Reese, that you were the aggressor in this case; that you fired the first shot prompting Mr. Johnson to be on guard, prompting Mr. Johnson to pull his weapon on you, prompting you then to pull your weapon on him and no question, this was a shoot-out. After identifying this as a case involving imperfect self-defense, the trial court applied the elements of manslaughter to the evidence in this case: The Court finds the prosecution has proven, first, that the Defendant caused the death of Mr. Johnson; that is, that Mr. Johnson died as a result of multiple gunshot wounds.

6

Second, the Defendant had one of these three states of mind; he either intended to kill Mr. Johnson or he intended to do great bodily harm to Mr. Johnson and pumping five rounds into somebody is pretty much evidence that you intended to at least, at the very least, do great bodily harm to Mr. Johnson or knowingly created a very high risk of death or great harm bodily harm knowing that death or such harm would be the likely result of your actions and, third, the Defendant caused the death without legal justification. The Court find[s] you to be the aggressor here. You're the one [who] shot the first shot. You're the one [who] scared Mr. Johnson into believing that now he had to defend himself. . . . Mr. Johnson . . . said, ["]what's up with that[?"] The Court infers from that statement that he's wondering, what the heck you doing shooting a gun off by his house, and the Court finds that you shot him . . . . * * * The Court finds that the Defendant did not act in lawful self-defense and the People have proven that he did not act in lawful self-defense because he was the initial aggressor. He didn't back off. He didn't say, okay, it didn't mean anything. Hey, Mr. Johnson[,] . . . I didn't mean anything . . . . * * * The Court's going to find the Defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter, homicide manslaughter for the reasons stated on this record.[7] The trial court subsequently sentenced defendant, as a third-offense habitual offender, to 8 to 30 years' imprisonment for the manslaughter conviction.8 Immediately before

7

The court also convicted defendant of being a felon in possession of a firearm and felony-firearm, but acquitted defendant of carrying a concealed weapon.

8

Defendant received a sentence of 1 to 10 years' imprisonment for the felon-inpossession conviction and the 2-year mandatory consecutive sentence on the felonyfirearm conviction, with 217 days of credit on the felony-firearm conviction.

7

sentencing, defense counsel moved for a new trial on the basis of potential testimony by Smith. Defendant renewed this request in a postsentence pro se motion for a new trial on the basis of counsel's failure to call Smith as a witness. The trial court denied both motions in a subsequent written opinion. On appeal, defendant claimed that the prosecution had failed to prove that he was the initial aggressor and that, therefore, he had a valid self-defense claim. Second, defendant claimed that the trial court had abused its discretion by denying his posttrial motions for a new trial. The Court of Appeals vacated defendant's conviction for voluntary manslaughter and remanded for a new trial on the basis of defendant's first claim of error.9 The panel stated that it was "unable to reconcile the uncontroverted facts with what appears to be the trial court's inaccurate application of the doctrine of imperfect self-defense."10 In particular, the panel questioned the trial court's conclusion that defendant was the initial aggressor: The evidence indicates the initial firing of two shots in an unknown direction and by an unknown individual before the face-to-face confrontation between Reese and Johnson. Only the first shot was attributed to Reese based on Williams indicating she heard the shot and assumed it was from his vehicle. Williams could not place whether the shooter was in the driver's seat or back seat of the vehicle. There is no testimony or evidence to identify who fired the second shot or where it originated. Based on Johnson's continued ambulation toward Reese and Long's house and engaging Reese in conversation, albeit very briefly, it People v Reese, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued September 16, 2010 (Docket No. 292153), p 1.
10 9

Id.

8

seems reasonable to assume that Johnson did not feel threatened or intimidated by this random, preceding gunfire, which requires us to question the trial court's labeling of Reese as the initial aggressor to justify the use of imperfect self-defense to convict him of voluntary manslaughter.[11] The Court of Appeals criticized the trial court's characterization of defendant's intent to harm Johnson as "problematic on a number of levels."12 First, the panel claimed that there was a "lack of evidence that Reese personally fired five shots during the events involved" because "[t]he medical examiner identified only two wounds to Johnson."13 Second, the panel claimed that the trial court's ruling "would contraindicate the applicability of imperfect self-defense," given the trial court's conclusion that Smith interfered with Williams's ability to see the shots from the car "[be]cause he knows something is coming down . . . ."14 If this observation could be attributed to defendant's state of mind, the panel reasoned, that "state of mind would preclude the use of imperfect self-defense."15 Third, the panel claimed that an "insurmountable" difficulty in the trial court's ruling was that the trial court had "failed to address Reese's intent at the crucial point in time--the initial provocation."16 The panel then concluded that the evidence did not

11 12 13 14 15 16

Id. at 3. Id. Id. Id. at 4. Id. Id.

9

support the assumption that defendant acted with the required intent during the initial provocation because even if defendant fired the initial shots before the deadly confrontation, "there is no evidence that he aimed his weapon at Johnson" and the only evidence regarding defendant's intent was "some cryptic comments between Johnson and Reese before they exchanged fire . . . ."17 Finally, the panel criticized the trial court for failing to account for the "delay between the first shots and any further aggression," which the panel speculated was a sufficient length of time for defendant to "withdr[a]w from the conflict" and for Johnson to "initiate a new conflict."18 In the end, the Court of Appeals concluded that it could not "state with any confidence that either the factual findings or the conclusions of law by the trial court are sufficient to sustain Reese's conviction for voluntary manslaughter."19 Accordingly, the panel vacated defendant's manslaughter conviction and remanded this case to the trial court for a new trial, although it affirmed defendant's convictions and sentences for being a felon in possession of a firearm and possessing a firearm during a felony. Because it granted defendant a new trial, the panel did not address defendant's second claim of error, involving defendant's motion for a new trial based on Smith's potential testimony. This Court granted the prosecution's application for leave to appeal and ordered the parties to address "whether the doctrine of imperfect self-defense can mitigate
17 18 19

Id. Id. at 4-5. Id. at 5.

10

second-degree murder to voluntary manslaughter and, if so, whether the doctrine was appropriately applied to the facts of this case by the Wayne Circuit Court."20 II. STANDARD OF REVIEW Whether the doctrine of imperfect self-defense exists under Michigan law is a question of law, which this Court reviews de novo.21 In examining the sufficiency of the evidence, "this Court reviews the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecutor to determine whether any trier of fact could find the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt."22 A trial court's findings of fact may not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous.23 A ruling is clearly erroneous "if the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that the trial court made a mistake."24 III. ANALYSIS Because the trial court concluded that the doctrine of imperfect self-defense applied to this case, and because the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's verdict on the ground that the trial court had misapplied the doctrine to the facts of the case, this case presents this Court with the question whether the doctrine of imperfect self-defense exists under Michigan law. Although the Court of Appeals has adopted and applied the

20 21 22 23 24

People v Reese, 489 Mich 958 (2011). People v Riddle, 467 Mich 116, 124; 649 NW2d 30 (2002). People v Robinson, 475 Mich 1, 5; 715 NW2d 44 (2006). MCR 2.613(C); Robinson, 475 Mich at 5. People v Armstrong, 490 Mich 281, 289; 806 NW2d 676 (2011).

11

doctrine of imperfect self-defense,25 this Court has neither adopted it nor defined its scope and applicability. A. MICHIGAN LAW OF HOMICIDE In analyzing the doctrine of imperfect self-defense to determine whether it can mitigate second-degree murder to voluntary manslaughter, we follow the foundational principles of interpretation that this Court has outlined regarding Michigan's law of homicide: Because Michigan's homicide statutes proscribe "murder" without providing a particularized definition of the elements of that offense or its recognized defenses,16 we are required to look to the common law at the time of codification for guidance. See Const 1963, art 3,

Download PEOPLE OF MI V VERDELL REESE.pdf

Michigan Law