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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS


PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v WILLIE J. CAUSEY, Defendant-Appellant.

UNPUBLISHED January 16, 1998

No. 180059 Oakland Circuit Court LC Nos. 93-124614 FC 93-128983 FC

Before: Fitzgerald, P.J., and O'Connell and Whitbeck, JJ. PER CURIAM. Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of conspiracy to deliver more than 650 grams of cocaine, MCL 750.157(a); MSA 28.354(1), possession with intent to deliver more than 650 grams of cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(i); MSA 14.15(7401)(2)(a)(i), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b(1); MSA 28.424(2)(1). Defendant was sentenced to two statutorily-mandated terms of life without parole for the conspiracy and possession convictions and two years' imprisonment for the felony-firearm conviction. The sentences run consecutive to each other. MCL 333.7401(3); MSA 14.15(7401)(3) and MCL 750.227b(2); MSA 28.424(2)(2). Defendant now appeals as of right. We affirm. Defendant's convictions arise out of a controlled delivery of cocaine on March 31, 1993. The transaction was initiated by Jack Griffith, who was in prison in North Carolina on federal charges. Griffith approached Henry Guzman, a government informant with whom he was imprisoned, and Guzman introduced him to Enricke Vargas, another government informant. Griffith provided Vargas with defendant's pager number, and he, Vargas, defendant, and DEA Agent Tim Smith began negotiating the transaction. Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in determining that the circumstances surrounding his conviction did not constitute entrapment. Whether entrapment occurred is a question of law for the trial court to decide. People v Patrick, 178 Mich App 152, 154; 443 NW2d 499 (1989). The trial court must make specific findings of fact when rendering its decision, and this Court reviews those findings under the clearly erroneous standard. Id.

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The purpose of the entrapment defense is to deter law enforcement officials from instigating or manufacturing a crime by a person who would not otherwise commit the crime. People v Juillet , 439 Mich 34, 52 (Brickley, J); 475 NW2d 786 (1991). Michigan has adopted an objective test for determining whether entrapment has occurred. Id. at 53. In People v Fabiano, 192 Mich App 523, 525-526; 482 NW2d 467 (1992), this Court concluded that entrapment can be found in one or both of the following two circumstances: "(1) the police engaged in impermissible conduct that would have induced a person similarly situated as the defendant, though otherwise law-abiding, to commit the crime, or (2) the police engaged in conduct so reprehensible that it cannot be tolerated by the Court." Id. at 526. Where the police do nothing more than offer a defendant the opportunity to commit a crime for which he is later convicted, entrapment will not be found. People v Ealy, 222 Mich App 508, 510; 564 NW2d 168 (1997). The first prong of the entrapment test looks to "whether the government activity would induce a hypothetical person not ready and willing to commit the crime to engage in criminal activity." People v Williams, 196 Mich App 656, 661-662; 493 NW2d 507 (1992). A number of factors are relevant to determining whether entrapment has occurred under this prong: (1) whether there existed any appeals to the defendant's sympathy as a friend; (2) whether the defendant had been known to commit the crime with which he was charged; (3) whether there were any long time lapses between the investigation and the arrest; (4) whether there existed any inducements that would make the commission of a crime unusually attractive to a hypothetical law-abiding citizen; (5) whether there were offers of excessive consideration or other enticement; (6) whether there was a guarantee that the acts alleged as crimes were not illegal; (7) whether, and to what extent, any government pressure existed; (8) whether there existed sexual favors; (9) whether there were any threats of arrest; (10) whether there existed any government procedures that tended to escalate criminal culpability of the defendant; (11) whether there was police control over any informant; and (12) whether the investigation is targeted. [Id. at 661 662.] The second prong analyzes whether the police conduct "run[s] afoul of the basic fairness required by due process." Id. at 663. The fact that the government supplied contraband is not reprehensible per se, but is one factor to consider. People v Jamieson, 436 Mich 61, 88-90 (Brickley, J); 461 NW2d 884 (1990). Similarly, the use of undercover agents is not reprehensible per se. People v Nixten, 160 Mich App 203, 208; 408 NW2d 77 (1987), on remand 183 Mich App 95; 454 NW2d 160 (1990). Where a person who is not a law-enforcement official acts with official encouragement or assistance, he is treated as a government agent for purposes of an entrapment defense. People v Jones, 165 Mich App 670, 674; 419 NW2d 47 (1988). Given the circumstances of this case, the trial court correctly held that entrapment did not occur. Guzman testified that Griffith approached him, asking if they could make some money. According to Guzman, Griffith indicated he knew some people to whom he could sell cocaine. After speaking to his control agent, Guzman introduced Griffith to Vargas, who was also cooperating with the government.

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After an attempted transaction in Miami failed, Griffith told Vargas that he knew someone in Detroit who could handle the deal; Griffith provided Vargas with defendant's pager number. The evidence in the record establishes neither that the government induced defendant to commit the crime nor that the government engaged in reprehensible conduct. Testimony indicated that it was defendant who consistently suggested the amount of cocaine during the negotiations. Defendant was able to raise $50,000

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