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Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan

Opinion
PHYLLIS L. GRIFFITH, Legal Guardian for DOUGLAS W. GRIFFITH, a Legally Incapacitated Adult, Plaintiff-Appellee, v STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant. _______________________________ BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH CORRIGAN, J.

Chief Justice:

Justices:

Clifford W. Taylor

Michael F. Cavanagh Elizabeth A. Weaver Marilyn Kelly Maura D. Corrigan Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman

FILED JUNE 14, 2005

No. 122286

In this case, we consider whether the no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 to et seq., requires plaintiff defendant, for her a no-fault

insurer,

reimburse

incapacitated

husband's food expenses. neither "for

Because the food in this case is bodily injury" under MCL

accidental

500.3105(1) nor "for an injured person's care, recovery, or rehabilitation" under MCL 500.3107(1)(a), we hold that the expenses for it may not be recovered under those provisions

of the no-fault act. Court of Appeals.

We thus reverse the judgment of the

I. UNDERLYING FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY On April 28, 1994, plaintiff's sixty-three-year-old

husband, Douglas Griffith,1 suffered a severe brain injury as a result at of a motor vehicle accident. and He received until to a

treatment August

in-patient at which

facilities time he

hospitals

1995,

was

transferred

residence where he received twenty-four-hour nursing and attendant care. with plaintiff. On August 6, 1997, Griffith returned home He remains confined to a wheelchair and

continues to require assistance with basic daily tasks such as eating and bathing. After the accident, defendant provided coverage as

Griffith's no-fault insurer.

Until the time that Griffith

returned home, the expenses that defendant covered included food expenses. After Griffith returned home, defendant

denied plaintiff's claim for Griffith's food expenses, and plaintiff sued to recoup those expenses.2 The trial court

ruled that Griffith's food costs are an "allowable expense"

This opinion references Douglas Griffith "Griffith" and Phyllis Griffith as "plaintiff."
2

1

as

Plaintiff's complaint included claims for items other than Griffith's food, but those claims are not at issue in this appeal. 2


under MCL 500.3107(1)(a) of the no-fault act and ordered defendant to pay a per diem food charge. The Court of Appeals affirmed.3 The Court relied on

Reed v Citizens Ins Co of America, 198 Mich App 443; 499 NW2d 22 (1993), which held that a person receiving at-home care is entitled to room and board costs under MCL

500.3107(1)(a) to the same extent that such costs would constitute an allowable expense if the injured person Thus,

received the same care in an institutional setting.

the panel concluded that, under Reed, Griffith's food costs are an "allowable expense" under MCL 500.3107(1)(a). Defendant filed an application for leave to appeal to this Court, which this Court denied.4 Thereafter, this

Court granted defendant's motion for reconsideration and granted leave to appeal.5 II. STANDARD OF REVIEW This case requires us to determine whether an injured person's food costs constitute an "allowable expense" under MCL 500.3107(1)(a). Issues of statutory interpretation are

Unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court Appeals, issued August 16, 2002 (Docket No. 232517).
4 5

3

of

468 Mich 946 (2003). 469 Mich 1020 (2004). 3


questions of law that this Court reviews de novo. v Patel, 471 Mich 158, 162; 684 NW2d 346 (2004).

Jenkins

III. PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION When interpreting a statute, we must ascertain the

legislative intent that may reasonably be inferred from the statutory language itself. Sotelo v Grant Twp, 470 Mich When the language of a

95, 100; 680 NW2d 381 (2004).

statute is unambiguous, the Legislature's intent is clear and judicial construction is neither necessary nor

permitted.

Koontz v Ameritech Services, Inc, 466 Mich 304, Because the role of the judiciary

312; 645 NW2d 34 (2002).

is to interpret rather than write the law, courts lack authority to venture beyond a statute's unambiguous text. Id. plain Further, we accord undefined statutory terms their and ordinary meanings and may consult dictionary

definitions in such situations. 572, 578; 683 NW2d 129 (2004).

Halloran v Bhan, 470 Mich

IV. ANALYSIS A. Statutory Language and Legal Background MCL 500.3105(1) provides: Under personal protection insurance an insurer is liable to pay benefits for accidental bodily injury arising out of the ownership, operation, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle, subject to the provisions of this chapter. [Emphasis added.]

4


According to the plain language of MCL 500.3105(1), a no fault insurer is only required arising to out pay of benefits an "for

accidental accident. insurer's benefits . . . ."

bodily

injury"

automobile

The no-fault act further restricts a no-fault liability that are by defining "for the limited types of

payable

accidental

bodily

injury

MCL 500.3107(1)(a), the statutory provision at

the center of this case, states: Except as provided in subsection personal protection insurance benefits payable for the following: (2), are

(a) Allowable expenses consisting of all reasonable charges incurred for reasonably necessary products, services and accommodations for an injured person's care, recovery, or rehabilitation. [Emphasis added.] Thus, in addition to the requirement under MCL 500.3105(1) that benefits be "for accidental bodily to injury," those MCL

500.3107(1)(a)

circumscribes

benefits

expenses

consisting only of items or services that are reasonably necessary "for an injured person's care, recovery, or

rehabilitation." Both interpreted this and Court and the the Court above of Appeals in have cases In

applied

statutes

involving claims for food or "room and board" expenses.

Manley v Detroit Automobile Inter-Ins Exchange, 127 Mich App 444, 448; the 339 NW2d 205 (1983), son rev'd suffered 425 Mich 140 head

(1986),

plaintiffs'

minor 5


severe

trauma in an automobile accident.

He resided with the Id. at

plaintiffs and received care from nurse's aides. 449.

The plaintiffs sued the defendant no-fault carrier,

seeking, among other things, reimbursement for his room and board costs. Id. at 448-449. The defendant insurance

carrier argued that because the plaintiffs already had a legal duty to care for their child, room and board costs were not compensable. Id. at 451. The Court of Appeals

rejected this argument, largely on the basis of a worker's compensation case that distinguished between "ordinary

household tasks" such as cleaning and washing clothes and nonordinary bathing, . . . .'" tasks such as "`[s]erving escorting a meals in bed and

dressing,

and

disabled

person

Id. at 452, quoting Kushay v Sexton Dairy Co,

394 Mich 69; 228 NW2d 205 (1975). The panel concluded that the distinction between

ordinary and nonordinary tasks could be reconciled with the language "products, necessary of MCL 500.3107(a), and which then provided not that

services, for the

accommodations person's

reasonably or

injured

care,

recovery,

rehabilitation are not `allowable expenses.'" at 453. The Court reasoned:

127 Mich App

The necessity for the performance of ordinary household tasks has nothing to do with the injured person's care, recovery, or rehabilitation; such tasks must be performed whether or not anyone is injured. 6


This reasoning supports a generalization concerning the circumstances in which a product, service, or accommodation can fall within the definition of "allowable expense." Products, services, or accommodations which are as necessary for an uninjured person as for an injured person are not "allowable expenses." [Id. at 453-454 (emphasis added).] The panel then opined that food "is as necessary for an uninjured person as for an injured person" and thus would not ordinarily constitute an "allowable expense" under MCL 500.3107 for an injured person cared for at home. App at 454. When Manley was appealed to this Court, we effectively vacated the Court of Appeals room and board analysis. 127 Mich

Manley v Detroit Automobile Inter-Ins Exchange, 425 Mich 140; 388 NW2d 216 (1986). We stated that the "question

whether food, shelter, utilities, clothing, and other such maintenance injured expenses is are an for allowable at home" expense had when the been

person

cared

neither

raised before the trial court nor argued in the Court of Appeals. Id. at 152. Accordingly, this Court declined to

address the issue and stated that the Court of Appeals analysis of the issue "shall not be regarded as of

precedential force or effect." Justice opinion, Boyle issued that a

Id. at 153. concurring room and and board dissenting issue was

asserting

the

properly before this Court because the Court of Appeals had 7


raised opinion.

it

sua

sponte

and

discussed

the

issue

in

its

Id. at 168 (Boyle, J., concurring in part and She could find "no principled basis" between and food food provided at in home, an and

dissenting in part). for distinguishing setting

institutional

provided

concluded that the Court of Appeals "injured person vs. uninjured unworkable" person" but test it was not only "unwieldy those and who

that

effectively

punished

choose to care for injured family members at home. 168-169.

Id. at

Justice Boyle opined that MCL 500.3107 imposes

three requirements for "allowable expenses": "1) the charge must be reasonable, 2) the expense must be reasonably 425 Mich

necessary, and 3) the expense must be incurred." at 169. Thereafter, in Reed, the Court of Appeals

adopted

Justice Boyle's Manley analysis.

The insured in Reed had Reed, supra at

been severely injured in an auto accident. 445.

The plaintiff, the insured's mother, filed various

claims against the defendant insurer and moved to amend her complaint to include a claim for room and board expenses. Id. at 445-446. The trial court denied the motion on the

basis that such expenses were not recoverable under the no fault act. Id. at 446.

The Court of Appeals reversed, reasoning as follows:

8


We see no compelling reason not to afford the same compensation under the act to family members who provide room and board. Subsection 1(a) does not distinguish between accommodations provided by family members and accommodations provided by institutions, and we decline to read such a distinction into the act. Moreover, holding that accommodations provided by family members is [sic] an "allowable expense" is in accord with the policy of this state. Denying compensation for family-provided accommodations while allowing compensation in an institutional setting would discourage home care that is generally, we believe, less costly than institutional care. Irrespective of cost considerations, it can be stated without hesitation that home care is more personal than that given in a clinical setting. . . . We hold that, where an injured person is unable to care for himself and would be institutionalized were a family member not willing to provide home care, a no-fault insurer is liable to pay the cost of maintenance in the home. [Id. at 452-453 (citations omitted; emphasis added).] In addition to the above reasoning, the Court of Appeals relied on the notion that because be the no-fault act is in

remedial

in

nature,

it

"must

liberally

construed

favor of persons intended to benefit thereby."

Id. at 451.

B. Interpretation of Statutory Language and Application As previously stated, two MCL 500.3105(1) and and MCL

500.3107(1)(a) requirements for

impose "care,

separate or

distinct

recovery,

rehabilitation" First,

expenses to be compensable under the no-fault act.

such expenses must be "for accidental bodily injury arising out of the ownership, operation, maintenance or use of a 9


motor vehicle . . . ."

MCL 500.3105(1) (emphasis added).

Second, these expenses must be "reasonably necessary . . . for an injured person's care, recovery, or rehabilitation." MCL 500.3107(1)(a). Defendant contends that MCL 500.3105(1) requires that allowable injury. expenses We agree. be causally connected to a person's

In fact, MCL 500.3105(1) imposes two

causation requirements for no-fault benefits. First, an insurer is liable only if benefits are "for accidental bodily injury . . . ." connection.6 "[A]ccidental "[F]or" implies a causal injury" therefore

bodily

triggers an insurer's liability and defines the scope of that liability. to pay benefits Accordingly, a no-fault insurer is liable only to the extent that the claimed

benefits are causally connected to the accidental bodily injury arising out of an automobile accident. Second, an insurer is liable to pay benefits for

accidental bodily injury only if those injuries "aris[e] out of" or are caused by "the ownership, operation,

Random House Webster's College Dictionary (1997) defines "for," when used as a preposition, as "with the object or purpose of," "intended to belong to or be used in connection with," or "suiting the purposes or needs of." The definition offered by Justice Kelly--"`by reason of'"-- also implies a causal connection. See post at 5. (Citation omitted.) 10


6

maintenance or use of a motor vehicle . . . ." any bodily injury that triggers an insurer's

It is not liability

under the no-fault act.

Rather, it is only those injuries

that are caused by the insured's use of a motor vehicle. In this case, it is uncontested that the insured's injuries arose out of his use of an automobile. Therefore,

to the extent that the insured's injuries stem from an automobile accident, application of the second causal

element noted above does not bar plaintiff's claim. The first causal element, however, poses a problem for plaintiff. Plaintiff does not claim that her husband's

diet is different from that of an uninjured person, that his food expenses are part of his treatment plan, or that these costs are related in any way to his injuries. claims instead that Griffith's insurer is liable She for

ordinary, everyday food expenses. not established that these

As such, plaintiff has are "for accidental

expenses

bodily injury . . . ."7

Our dissenting colleagues fail to explain how they avoid the causation requirement in MCL 500.3105(1). As we will explain, because plaintiff is not on a special diet, his food expenses are not "for accidental bodily injury," and those expenses therefore are not recoverable in this case. It is therefore not surprising that our dissenting colleagues avoid developing their analysis of MCL 500.3105(1), because their position is plainly inconsistent with the unambiguous language of that provision. 11


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Even if ordinary food expenses were compensable under

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