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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS


RAYNARD NEWBERRY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v GENERAL MOTORS, Defendant-Appellee.

UNPUBLISHED November 6, 1998

No. 201841 Wayne Circuit Court LC No. 95-527087 CZ

Before: Hoekstra, P.J., and Cavanagh and O'Connell, JJ. PER CURIAM. In this race discrimination case brought pursuant to Michigan's Civil Rights Act (CRA), MCL 37.2202(1)(a)-(b); MSA 3.548(202)(1)(a)-(b), plaintiff, an African American employee of defendant, alleged in his complaint that defendant failed to promote plaintiff because of plaintiff's race, that defendant demoted plaintiff because of plaintiff's race, and that the environment in which plaintiff worked was racially hostile. Defendant moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10), and the lower court granted the motion, dismissing all of plaintiff's claims. Plaintiff appeals as of right from this order of the lower court, although he takes issue with only the lower court's dismissal of the claim regarding his demotion. We affirm. Plaintiff asserts that summary disposition was improperly granted on the demotion claim because of his evidence that defendant's decision to demote him in October 1992 could not have been based upon the allegations of sexual harassment that a female summer student working for defendant brought against plaintiff. Plaintiff asserts that the allegations of sexual harassment are false and that the nature of defendant's investigation of the allegations raises a question of fact that the conclusions drawn from the investigation and the resulting action taken to discipline plaintiff were motivated by defendant's racial animus. This Court reviews de novo a trial court's determination regarding motions for summary disposition. Harrison v Olde Financial Corp, 225 Mich App 601, 605; 572 NW2d 679 (1997). A motion for summary disposition brought pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual support for a claim. Id. This Court must consider the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and other documentary evidence, must give the benefit of any reasonable doubt to the nonmoving party, and must draw any reasonable inferences in favor of that party. Id.

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Plaintiff's claim constitutes one of disparate treatment that may be proved by alternate methods. Harrison, supra at 606; Meagher v Wayne State Univ, 222 Mich App 700, 708-710; 565 NW2d 401 (1997). A plaintiff may prove disparate treatment by the presumption-based scheme set forth by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp v Green, 411 US 792; 93 S Ct 1817; 36 L Ed 2d 668 (1973). Matras v Amoco Oil Co, 424 Mich 675, 683-684; 385 NW2d 586 (1986); Harrison, supra at 606-609; Meagher, supra at 710-712. Alternatively, a plaintiff may prove discrimination under ordinary principles of proof by any direct or indirect evidence relevant to and sufficiently probative of the issue without resort to any special judicially created presumptions or inferences related to the evidence. Matras, supra; Harrison, supra; Meagher, supra at 710. Here, plaintiff first attempts to prove disparate treatment by direct evidence of intentional discrimination. To support his assertion that defendant's adverse employment decision was driven by its racial animus, plaintiff produced the statements contained within two pieces of documentary evidence: (1) an October 1993 memo from the director of the lab where plaintiff worked sent to defendant's personnel director summarizing a meeting that the lab director had with plaintiff at plaintiff's request to discuss plaintiff's concerns about not being promoted; and (2) the deposition of the personnel director. Plaintiff relies on the lab director's statement that plaintiff did not deny his reputation as a "pot-stirrer." Plaintiff relies on the personnel director's comments during deposition that plaintiff was a "difficult" employee who "used his race to intimidate people." Plaintiff opines that these comments constitute direct evidence that defendant did not find plaintiff credible during its investigation of the sexual harassment charges because of plaintiff's race and earlier complaints about defendant's discriminatory practices against African Americans. We disagree. Direct evidence is evidence that, if believed, requires the conclusion that unlawful discrimination was at least a motivating factor. Harrison, supra at 610. For example, racial slurs by a decision maker constitute direct evidence of racial discrimination that is sufficient to get the plaintiff's case to a jury. Downey v Charlevoix County Bd of Road Comm'rs, 227 Mich App 621, 633; 576 NW2d 712 (1998). When this kind of direct evidence is adduced, there is no need to employ the McDonnell Douglas presumption-based scheme. Matras, supra at 683-684. Here, we find that the statements within the documentary evidence proffered by plaintiff are not evidence that, if believed, requires the conclusion that unlawful discrimination was at least a motivating factor in defendant's adverse employment decision. See Harrison, supra at 610. The statements instead require an inference to reach that conclusion. Compare Downey, supra at 633-635 (deciding that the plaintiff had created a question of fact regarding the reason for his discharge where he presented evidence that the defendant stated, "If I have to, I will get rid of the older guys

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