Preview:

STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS

RITA REID, as Trustee of the RITA G. REID TRUST, Plaintiff-Appellant, v LINCOLN CHARTER TOWNSHIP and RED RIDGE PROPERTIES, L.L.C., Defendants-Appellees, and KEVIN GILLETTE and LINCOLN CHARTER COMMITTEE, Defendants.

UNPUBLISHED March 2, 2010

No. 287002 Berrien Circuit Court LC No. 2005-003282-CZ

Before: K. F. Kelly, P.J., and Hoekstra and Whitbeck, JJ. PER CURIAM. Plaintiff Rita Reid, as trustee of the Rita G. Reid Trust, appeals as of right the July 16, 2008 final order granting summary disposition to defendant Lincoln Charter Township (the Township) on her claims for regulatory taking and inverse condemnation. Reid also appeals several other orders entered by the trial court: the May 18, 2007 order denying in part her motion for leave to file an amended complaint; the October 5, 2007 order granting summary disposition to the Township and defendant Red Ridge Properties (Red Ridge) on the nuisance per se claims in the original complaint and granting the Township's motion to strike the second amended complaint; and the May 30, 2008 order denying her motion for leave to file a third amended complaint. We affirm in part, reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings. I. Basic Facts The Rita G. Reid Trust owns the property located at 4508 Red Arrow Highway (the trust property). The 7.14-acre parcel is long and narrow, and has been split-zoned since 1947. The eastern three acres, the land abutting the Red Arrow Highway, is zoned C-3; the western four acres are zoned R-1. The only access to the trust property is from the Red Arrow Highway. -1-

In 2000, the Township board approved a plat (the Plat) submitted by Red Ridge for the development of the Sanctuary Subdivision (the Subdivision). The eastern section of the Subdivision would border the trust property on the north. Pursuant to the Plat, Sanctuary Drive, the only road in the Subdivision, would be a 1,200-foot cul-de-sac. It would not be stubbed to the trust property or to any of the Subdivision's boundaries. Access to the Subdivision would be from Ridge Road. Reid listed the trust property for sale in 2003. According to Reid, because there was no residential access to the trust property, there was little interest, if any at all, in the western portion of the trust property. By December 2005, when Reid sued the Township and Red Ridge, at least 21 lots in the Subdivision had been purchased and houses built thereon. Red Ridge still owned a few lots, including two adjacent lots in the southeastern corner of the Subdivision. Reid's original complaint contained two claims for nuisance per se. In the first count, Reid claimed that, because Sanctuary Drive violated the Township's Subdivision Control Ordinance, which prohibited cul-de-sacs longer than 600 feet and required streets in a subdivision to be stubbed if the land adjoining the subdivision was not subdivided, the Subdivision was a nuisance per se. In the second count, Reid claimed that the Township violated the Land Division Act (LDA), MCL 560.01 et seq., because by approving the Plat, the Township board isolated the trust property. Reid requested the trial court to issue an order for superintending control requiring the Township to enforce the stubbed road requirement or, in the alternative, to grant her damages for the loss of value to the trust property. Twice during the course of the proceedings below, Reid requested the Township board to rezone the trust property. In March 2007, the Township board denied Reid's request to rezone the western portion of the trust property to R-3. In January 2008, the Township board denied Reid's request to rezone the western portion to C-3. II. The May 18, 2007 Order Denying in Part and Granting in Part Reid's Substituted Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint Reid moved for leave to file an amended complaint. The amended complaint contained eight counts. In counts I and II, Reid alleged that, because Sanctuary Drive was not stubbed, the Subdivision was in violation of the Subdivision Control Ordinance and the LDA. She requested that the trial court issue an order of superintending control requiring the Township to comply with the stubbed road requirement. In count III, Reid alleged that the Subdivision, because it did not include a stubbed road, was a nuisance per se. In count IV, Reid alleged a regulatory taking by the Township. In counts V and VI, Reid claimed that the Township's failure to require that Sanctuary Drive be stubbed deprived her of procedural and substantive due process. In count VII, Reid alleged that agents of the Township and Red Ridge entered into a "clandestine agreement" that the Township would not enforce certain laws and ordinances regarding the Subdivision and would not grant any request to rezone the trust property. She claimed that, because of the agents' adherence to the agreement, she was denied due process and the trust property was the subject of a taking. Finally, count VIII was a claim for inverse condemnation. In its May 18, 2007 order, the trial court granted Reid leave to file claims for regulatory taking and inverse condemnation. It denied leave with respect to the other counts in the proposed amended complaint. According to the trial court, because Reid did not file a timely, -2-

direct appeal of the Township board's decision to approve the Plat, it did not have jurisdiction to hear an appeal of the board's decision. Regarding the counts for superintending control, the trial court concluded that amendment would be futile because Reid could not obtain relief on the claims. It reasoned that because Reid had an adequate remedy in the form of a direct appeal, Reid could not maintain an action for superintending control. Regarding the counts for nuisance per se and violations of due process, the trial court concluded that amendment would be futile because it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the claims. It reasoned that the claims related directly to the Township board's decision to approve the Plat and the methods employed by the Township board to reach its decision and, therefore, the claims should have been raised in a direct appeal of the Township board's decision. Regarding the conspiracy count, the trial court concluded that amendment would be futile because the count failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted. It reasoned that the conspiracy claim was a restatement of the due process and taking claims and that Reid was "either entitled to recover on the underlying claims, or she is not . . . ." On appeal, Reid argues that the trial court erred in holding that she had an available remedy by way of a direct appeal of the Township board's decision to approve the Plat. According to Reid, because no statute provides for an appeal of a township board's decision to approve a subdivision plat, her only method of seeking review of the Township board's decision was through a complaint for superintending control. Reid further claims that, because she could appeal the Township board's decision to approve the Plat through a complaint for superintending control, the trial court erred in denying her leave to file an amended complaint. A. Standard of Review We review a trial court's decision on a motion for leave to amend a pleading for an abuse of discretion. Titan Ins Co v North Pointe Ins Co, 270 Mich App 339, 346; 715 NW2d 324 (2006). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's decision falls outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes. Maldonado v Ford Motor Co, 476 Mich 372, 388; 719 NW2d 809 (2006). Questions concerning the jurisdiction of the trial court are questions of law reviewed de novo. Glen Lake-Crystal River Watershed Riparians v Glen Lake Ass'n, 264 Mich App 523, 527; 695 NW2d 508 (2004). B. Analysis The Michigan Constitution grants the circuit courts "appellate jurisdiction from all inferior courts and tribunals except as otherwise provided by law." Const 1963, art 6,

Download RITA REID V LINCOLN CHARTER TWP.pdf

Michigan Law