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STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS

THOMAS A. WOOTTON and LUCY X. YANG, Plaintiffs/Counter-DefendantsAppellees, v JO DIANE CARLSON, Defendant/Counter-PlaintiffAppellant.

UNPUBLISHED October 19, 2010

No. 293435 Van Buren Circuit Court LC No. 08-570078-CH

Before: SAWYER, P.J., and FITZGERALD and SAAD, JJ. PER CURIAM. This case involves the parties' rights under a joint driveway easement. Defendant/counter-plaintiff appeals as of right from the trial court order granting summary disposition in favor of plaintiffs/counter-defendants pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10). We affirm. This case has been decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E). The relevant facts of this case are not in dispute. The parties own adjoining properties in South Haven, Michigan. Plaintiffs own the property located at 316 Indiana Avenue, while defendant owns the property located at 314 Indiana Avenue. Prior to April 1936, the properties were owned by Christian Niffenegger, Sr., and Anna Niffenegger, husband and wife. These properties were sold in April 1936 to two separate owners, creating two separate chains of title. The plaintiffs' property was conveyed by the Niffenggers to Harry and Vada Teske, by warranty deed on May 6, 1936. The Teskes sold plaintiffs' property to a third party, and it was eventually purchased by plaintiffs from Claud W. Burrows and Nancy Sue Burrows by warranty deed recorded February 27, 2002. The defendant's property was conveyed by the Niffenggers to James and Francis Steele on May 4, 1936. The Steele's later sold defendant's property to a third-party and was eventually purchased by defendant on December 13, 1996, from Jerry Friedman, Trustee of the Herman and Sidille Friedman Irrevocable Trust by warranty deed recorded on December 19, 1996. The warranty deeds for both properties contain the same joint driveway language: "It being further understood and agreed that the said spaces shall not be used for parking purposes or obstructed in any way whatsoever and shall be kept free and clear so as to be available at all -1-

times for use of the parties herein mentioned, their heirs and assigns, for the purpose of ingress and egress to the respective garages located in the rear of the aforesaid dwellings." Neither plaintiffs' nor defendant's title insurance policy referenced the joint driveway easement. The garages on both properties were removed at some point in time. Plaintiffs maintained the joint driveway during their ownership by controlling weeds on the area. In June of 2006, defendant erected a fence on the joint driveway within inches of plaintiffs' property. The fence blocks use of the joint driveway. Plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that they had occasionally used the joint driveway to park their cars in the backyard of their property and had been unable to do so since the fence was erected. Plaintiffs filed an action in trespass seeking removal of the fence erected by defendant on the joint driveway. Defendant filed a counter-complaint seeking to quiet title in favor of her to her property, that the interest created by the 1936 Niffenegger deeds were licenses to use the property between the two houses for a specific limited purpose which terminated when the garages were destroyed, or whatever easement interest was granted had terminated because of the destruction of the garages. Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8), (9), and (10) arguing that the joint driveway easement was still in effect. Defendant filed a separate motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10). The trial court granted plaintiffs' motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) and denied defendant's motion for summary disposition. On appeal, defendant claims the trial court erroneously determined that the joint driveway easement remained in effect after the original garages were taken down. We disagree and affirm the trial court order. This Court reviews the grant or denial of a motion for summary disposition de novo. Brown v Brown, 478 Mich 545, 551-552; 739 NW2d 313 (2007); City of Taylor v Detroit Edison Co, 475 Mich 109, 115; 715 NW2d 28 (2006). When reviewing a motion brought under MCR 2.116(C)(10), this Court considers the pleadings, admissions, and other evidence submitted by the parties in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Brown, 478 Mich at 552. A grant of summary disposition is appropriate if there is no genuine issue of any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Brown, 478 Mich at 552; Greene v AP Products, Ltd, 475 Mich 502, 507; 717 NW2d 855 (2006). In addition, the language of a deed, which is a contract, is reviewed de novo on appeal. In re Egbert R Smith Trust, 480 Mich 19, 24; 745 NW2d 754 (2008); In re Jane E Ruddell Estate, 286 Mich App 391, 402-403; 780 NW2d 884 (2010). The scope of a party's rights under an easement is a question of fact that is reviewed for clear error. Blackhawk Dev Corp v Village of Dexter, 473 Mich 33, 40; 700 NW2d 364 (2005); Unverzagt v Miller, 306 Mich 260, 266; 10 NW2d 849 (1943). An easement is a limited property interest that is generally confined to a specific purpose. Dep't of Natural Resources v Carmody-Lahti Real Estate, Inc, 472 Mich 359, 378; 699 NW2d -2-

272 (2005); Schadewald v Brul

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