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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS


TONYA BENDER, Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant, v FARMINGTON RIDGE, L.P., Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee.

UNPUBLISHED September 8, 2000

No. 208545 Oakland Circuit Court LC No. 96-518180-NO

Before: Cavanagh, P.J., and Sawyer and Zahra, JJ. PER CURIAM. Defendant appeals as of right from a final judgment awarding plaintiff $397,253.57, plus interest, costs and attorney fees, following a jury trial, in this premises liability case. Plaintiff cross appeals, challenging the trial court's decision to allow the jury to consider comparative negligence. We affirm. This case involves a claim for damages arising from a slip and fall accident in an apartment complex carport owned and operated by defendant. At the time of the incident, plaintiff was a tenant in the apartment complex and had use of the carport pursuant to her lease. The front door of plaintiff's apartment opened directly onto a sidewalk that led to plaintiff's assigned parking space underneath the carport. In the early morning on the day of the incident, plaintiff walked from her apartment down several steps on the sidewalk to the unlit carport without incident. However, as she attempted to step from the sidewalk over a curb that was in front of her car, her right foot slipped out from under her, causing her to fall. As plaintiff was laying on the ground, she noticed that the blacktop underneath her was covered with a thin layer of ice. As a result of the fall, plaintiff suffered serious injuries to her right knee and leg. Defendant first argues that the trial court erred by not reducing the jury's award of $100,000 for future medical expenses to present value pursuant to MCL 600.6306(1)(d); MSA 27A.6306(1)(d). We conclude that defendant waived this claim because it failed to timely and appropriately raise the issue in the trial court. Defendant's argument focuses on the verdict form, which, in part, required the jury to indicate any amount of future medical and health care costs it found plaintiff will incur. To preserve an instructional issue for appeal, a party must object on the record before the jury retires to -1

deliberate. MCR 2.516(C); Hammack v Lutheran Social Services of Michigan, 211 Mich App 1, 9-10; 535 NW2d 215 (1995); see Mina v General Star Indemnity Co, 218 Mich App 678, 680; 555 NW2d 1 (1996), rev'd in part on other grounds 455 Mich 866 (1997). Failure to timely and specifically object precludes appellate review absent manifest injustice, which results if the defect is of such a magnitude as to constitute plain error requiring a new trial or if it pertains to a basic and controlling issue. Mina, supra at 680-681; Janda v Detroit, 175 Mich App 120, 126; 437 NW2d 326 (1989). Here, as defendant notes, the form of the verdict did not provide a delineation by year for future medical expenses. However, our review of the record shows that defendant did not object to the verdict form. In fact, defense counsel approved the form on the record and also by initialing each page to illustrate defendant's approval. 1 That verdict form was thereafter submitted to the jury. Therefore, defense counsel stipulated to the verdict form that is now claimed to be erroneous. See Weiss v Hodge (After Remand), 223 Mich App 620, 636; 567 NW2d 468 (1997). Error requiring reversal must be that of the trial court and not that to which the appellant contributed by plan or negligence. Fellows v Superior Products Co, 201 Mich App 155, 165; 506 NW2d 534 (1993); see Weiss, supra at 635 636. Accordingly, defendant is not entitled to any relief on this basis and no manifest injustice will result from our decision not to review this issue. Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in denying its request for a set-off of $28,000 for the award of past medical expenses pursuant to the collateral source rule, MCL 600.6303; MSA 27A.6303. We disagree. Statutory interpretation is a legal issue, which this Court reviews de novo. The primary goal of judicial interpretation of statutes is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. If the plain and ordinary meaning of a statute's language is clear, judicial construction is normally neither necessary nor permitted. If reasonable minds can differ concerning the meaning of a statute, however, judicial construction is appropriate. [Heinz v Chicago Road Inv Co, 216 Mich App 289, 295; 549 NW2d 47 (1996) (citations omitted).] Contrary to defendant's claim, the medical payments that plaintiff received from her insurance company were not collateral source benefits within the meaning of

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