Preview:

STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS

VERONICA KNIGHT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.

UNPUBLISHED November 17, 2009

No. 284996 Wayne Circuit Court LC No. 07-700243-CZ

Before: Hoekstra, P.J., and Murray and M. J. Kelly, JJ. PER CURIAM. In this discrimination suit, plaintiff Veronica Knight appeals as of right the trial court's order granting summary disposition in favor of defendant Ford Motor Company (Ford) under MCR 2.116(C)(10) and dismissing her claims brought under the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (CRA), MCL 37.2101 et seq. Because we conclude that the trial court properly dismissed Knight's claims, we affirm. Knight is an African-American woman who began working for Ford in 1977. The claims in this lawsuit pertain to her years as a hi-lo driver. She claimed she was denied a hi-lo driver position in a "new building" constructed by Ford and in a buffer work area despite being qualified for the positions. Knight's complaint, which was filed in 2007, asserted that she was denied the positions due to race, gender, and weight discrimination, and in retaliation for grievances she had filed against various supervisors. Ford filed a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), arguing, among other things, that (1) many of Knight's complaints fell outside the statute of limitations, (2) she failed to show direct evidence of race or gender discrimination, (3) she failed to show direct or indirect evidence of weight discrimination, and (4) she was not subject to any adverse employment action because the positions she sought offered the exact same pay, benefits, and opportunities for overtime as her current job. The trial court agreed: The problem is, counsel, as I read through all of that, there's one sentence [in] [Wilcoxon v Minnesota Mining & Mfg Co, 235 Mich App 347, 363; 597 NW2d 250 (1999)] that make[s] a great deal of sense to me. When you're claiming indirect evidence [of] discrimination, you still have to show an adverse employment action. And the Court stated, there must be some objective basis for

-1-

demoting; the change is adverse because of a plaintiff's subjective impression as to the desirability of one position over another are not controlling. So far all I've heard you argue as far as facts is that on occasion her hilo was not available, that on one or two times her hours were not correctly calculated and that [a co-worker] got the job in the new building, except that. And those positions fall in the same classification, duties, compensation, benefit, overtime opportunity, as the plaintiff already had in her present position. In addition to that, the job was given to an African American male and a white male, both of whom had more seniority than the plaintiff. I'm looking for something here and I don't see it. It may not have been the most pleasant place to work, but I'm not seeing any activity that demonstrate[s] any discrimination here. On appeal, Knight claims there were genuine issues of material fact, as established through her deposition testimony and that of three former co-workers, to support her claims of race, gender, and weight discrimination, and for retaliation. This Court reviews de novo a trial court's decision on a motion for summary disposition. Kreiner v Fischer, 471 Mich 109, 129; 683 NW2d 611 (2004). Summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) is appropriate where there is no genuine issue regarding any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment or partial judgment as a matter of law. A trial court may grant a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) if the pleadings, affidavits, and other documentary evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmovant, show that there is no genuine issue with respect to any material fact. Quinto v Cross & Peters Co, 451 Mich 358, 362; 547 NW2d 314 (1996). Initially, the moving party has the burden of supporting its position with documentary evidence, and, if so supported, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish the existence of a genuine issue of disputed fact. Quinto, 451 Mich at 362. "Where the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue rests on a nonmoving party, the nonmoving party may not rely on mere allegations or denials in pleadings, but must go beyond the pleadings to set forth specific facts showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists." Id. If the opposing party fails to present documentary evidence establishing the existence of a material factual dispute, the motion is properly granted. Id. at 363. "A genuine issue of material fact exists when the record, giving the benefit of reasonable doubt to the opposing party, leaves open an issue upon which reasonable minds might differ." West v Gen Motors Corp, 469 Mich 177, 183; 665 NW2d 468 (2003). A plaintiff may use either direct or indirect evidence to establish a case of unlawful discrimination under the CRA. Hazle v Ford Motor Co, 464 Mich 456, 462; 628 NW2d 515 (2001). Direct evidence of discrimination consists of evidence that, if believed, requires the conclusion that unlawful discrimination was at least a motivating factor with respect to the actions of an employer. Id. In cases that involve indirect or circumstantial evidence, a plaintiff must proceed by using a burden-shifting approach. Sniecinski v Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 469 Mich 124, 133-134; 666 NW2d 186 (2003). Under this approach, a plaintiff is permitted to present a rebuttable prima facie case of discrimination on the basis of evidence from which a trier of fact could infer that the plaintiff was the victim of unlawful discrimination. Id. at 134. "To establish a rebuttable prima facie case of discrimination, a plaintiff must present evidence that (1) she belongs to a protected class, (2) she suffered an adverse employment -2-

action, (3) she was qualified for the position, and (4) her failure to obtain the position occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination." Sniecinski, 469 Mich at 134. The fourth element can be shown by evidence that other employees, similarly situated and outside the protected class, were not subject to the employer's adverse conduct. Lytle v Malady (On Rehearing), 458 Mich 153, 178; 579 NW2d 906 (1998). "Once a plaintiff has presented a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden then shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action." Sniecinski, 469 Mich at 134. When a defendant produces evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory basis in support of the adverse employment action, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the reasons proffered by the defendant were not true, but were merely a pretext for discrimination. Id. In order to establish claims under MCL 37.2202 and 37.2701, the plaintiff must present evidence that he or she suffered an adverse employment action. Chen v Wayne State Univ, 284 Mich App 172, 201; 771 NW2d 820 (2009). There is no exhaustive list of what constitutes adverse employment actions. Pe

Download VERONICA KNIGHT V FORD MOTOR CO.pdf

Michigan Law