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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 12/17/96 OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 94-CA-01203 COA ERNEST C. MARTIN, JR. APPELLANT v. ANNA TARCZANIN MARTIN APPELLEE

THIS OPINION IS NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION AND MAY NOT BE CITED, PURSUANT TO M.R.A.P. 35-B

TRIAL JUDGE: HON. GLENN BARLOW COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: JACKSON COUNTY CHANCERY COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: JOSEPH R. MEADOWS ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: D. SUZANNE BAKER NATURE OF THE CASE: DOMESTIC RELATIONS TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION: LOWER COURT DETERMINED NO REDUCTION IN MONTHLY OBLIGATIONS FROM PRIOR DECREE; GRANTED ATTY FEES IN FAVOR OF APPELLEE; RELIEVED APPELLANT DUTY TO PAY FUTURE SCHOOL EXP.

BEFORE MCMILLIN, P.J., BARBER, AND COLEMAN, JJ. McMILLIN, P. J., FOR THE COURT:

This is an appeal from the Jackson County Chancery Court. That court denied Ernest Martin's request for a reduction in his monthly child support and alimony obligations, but relieved him of his obligation to provide private school tuition for his three minor children. The court also found Mr. Martin in contempt for failure to pay medical and school expenses and ordered him to pay attorney's fees to Mrs. Martin in the amount of $1,500.00. Mr. Martin takes issue with the ruling of the lower court, assigning as error the following: (1) the lower court erred in refusing to reduce support payments for the minor children as provided in the guidelines in section 43-19-101 of the Mississippi Code; (2) the lower court erred in failing to reduce spousal support; (3) the lower court erred in awarding a judgment against Mr. Martin for past due school expenses in the amount of $14,525.85 plus interest; and (4) the lower court erred in awarding attorney's fees of $1,500.00 to Mrs. Martin. After review of the record and relevant authority, we find that the lower court did not err in its findings. We, therefore, affirm the judgment of the lower court. I. Facts

Ernest Martin and Anna Martin were granted a divorce in October 1990 on the ground of irreconcilable differences. As a part of the proceeding, the chancellor approved a property settlement and child custody and support agreement entered into by the parties. The agreement provided that Mrs. Martin would have primary custody of the children and obligated Mr. Martin to provide various items of support to his children and former wife. At the time of the divorce, Mr. Martin was employed by an insurance company and had gross earnings in excess of $75,000 per year. Shortly after the divorce, Mr. Martin was terminated from his employment, but under the terms of his separation, he was permitted to continue to service his existing accounts for two years to provide him with income during his transition to other employment. In December 1992, Mr. Martin sought relief from his various support obligations on the basis of the material decrease in his income. That proceeding was resolved by agreement between the parties which provided a reduction of child support and alimony, required Mrs. Martin to assume certain debts that were previously Mr. Martin's responsibility, and permitted Mr. Martin to refinance the debt on the former marital home in order to reduce the monthly mortgage obligation which he was required to pay. A second proceeding seeking further reductions in his obligations was commenced by Mr. Martin in August 1993. This appeal was perfected from the chancellor's decision resulting from that proceeding. II. Failure to Reduce Child Support Payments

The chancellor declined to reduce child support on the basis that Mr. Martin had failed to prove that

there had been a material change in circumstance not reasonably foreseeable at the time of the original adjudication that would warrant modification. See, e.g., Tingle v. Tingle, 573 So. 2d 1389, 1391 (Miss. 1990); Morris v. Morris, 541 So. 2d 1040, 1043 (Miss. 1989). In this case, the issue was not whether there was a change of circumstance from the original divorce, but from the previous modification order entered in December 1992. The chancellor determined that, at the time that order was entered, it was within Mr. Martin's knowledge that his work-out relationship with his former employer was drawing to an end. Therefore, his subsequent reduction in income, though perhaps substantial, was not unforeseen, according to the chancellor's reasoning. Tingle, 573 So. 2d at 1391; Morris, 541 So. 2d at 1043. The chancellor is given broad discretion in making the determination of whether a litigant has met the burden to obtain a modification of a prior judgment, and this Court may reverse only upon a conclusion that there has been an abuse of discretion, manifest error, or the application of an erroneous legal standard. Adams v. Adams , 591 So. 2d 431, 434 (Miss. 1991). Mr. Martin focuses his argument on the proposition that the chancellor erred in not adjusting his child support to fall within the guidelines of section 43-19-101 of the Mississippi Code. See Miss. Code Ann.

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