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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI NO. 96-CC-01070 COA FAYE D. HEAD v. PACKARD ELECTRIC DIVISION, GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION APPELLANT APPELLEE

THIS OPINION IS NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION AND MAY NOT BE CITED, PURSUANT TO M.R.A.P. 35-B DATE OF JUDGMENT: TRIAL JUDGE: COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: NATURE OF THE CASE: TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION: DISPOSITION: MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: CERTIORARI FILED: MANDATE ISSUED: 8/28/96 HON. WILLIAM F. COLEMAN HINDS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ROBERT G. GERMANY ANDREW D. SWEAT RACHAEL HETHERINGTON LENOIR CIVIL - WORKERS' COMPENSATION AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION AFFIRMED - 12/16/97

2/4/98

BEFORE THOMAS, P.J., HERRING, AND HINKEBEIN, JJ. HINKEBEIN, J., FOR THE COURT: In early 1988 Faye D. Head, an employee of Packard Electric Division, General Motors Corporation, injured her shoulder in an industrial accident. Despite testimony offered by numerous doctors to the contrary, an administrative law judge subsequently found that the trauma associated with Head's injury had resulted in continuing anxiety and depression. More specifically, the administrative law judge found a causal connection between her physical and mental ailments and ordered that Packard pay all medical expenses incurred in connection with the latter. However, the full Workers' Compensation Commission thereafter reversed this order, finding substantial credible evidence to the contrary in the opinions of Head's physicians. Head now appeals from the Hinds County Circuit

Court's subsequent affirmance of the Full Commission's order on the following grounds: I. THE FULL COMMISSION ERRED IN ORDERING A MEDICAL EXAMINATION BY DR. MARK WEBB AND IN DENYING CLAIMANT THE RIGHT TO REOPEN THE DEPOSITION OF DR. TIMOTHY SUMMERS. II. THE FULL COMMISSION ERRED IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE AND IN HOLDING THAT CLAIMANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO ADDITIONAL BENEFITS AND MEDICAL TREATMENT BY DR. SUMMERS. III. THE DENIAL OF ADDITIONAL BENEFITS AND MEDICAL TREATMENT BY DR. SUMMERS BY THE FULL COMMISSION IS MANIFESTLY WRONG AND NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.

Holding these assignments of error to be without merit, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court. FACTS Although Head strained her shoulder during January of 1988, she did not seek treatment until April of that year when she consulted neurologist Dr. Richard W. Naef. Due to observed tenderness, Dr. Naef initially recommended several weeks of recuperation. But in early May, after noting her satisfactory progress, he released Head to return to work and discharged her from his care. Unexpectedly, Head returned to Naef's office just days later with complaints of being reassigned to a new position within Packard's plant. Naef determined that while Head suffered from anxiety caused by the job change, the condition shared no relationship with her mending shoulder injury. He nonetheless suggested that she take an additional few weeks if necessary and thereafter return for a follow-up evaluation. From there the situation only deteriorated since Head has yet to return either to Dr. Naef's office or to work. Over the next few years Head saw a stream of physicians, mostly neurologists and neurosurgeons, with each encounter ending similarly. In every instance Head's reported physical pain was largely unsubstantiated by objective evidence. She repeatedly expressed an utter lack of desire to return to Packard, with the most obvious indicators being statements to that effect in combination with latenight alcoholic binges despite doctors' orders to the contrary. And most importantly, all but one of these examiners concluded that the mental disorders tormenting Head, if any, were unconnected to her professed physical pain and claimed inability to work. On February 7, 1994, after Head's benefits were at last terminated, her claim was heard by an administrative law judge. This administrative law judge found that Head had reached maximum medical recovery from her physical injury nearly four years earlier. However, because he concluded that she continued to suffer from a related and disabling psychological disorder, the administrative law judge ordered that Packard pay temporary total disability benefits dating back to the time of the injury until she reached maximum medical recovery from her psychological disorder as well. The administrative law judge's order relied heavily on the opinions of Dr. Timothy Summers, Head's psychiatrist of nearly five years and the only physician to link the shoulder injury with Head's claimed

mental illness. The administrative law judge cited Dr. Summers' unique expertise in the field of psychiatry as the basis for this weighted consideration and directed that all charges incurred by Head while in his care be paid by Packard. Upon Packard's subsequent appeal and accompanying motion for independent medical examination, the full Commission found that "an accurate and timely appraisal of [Head's] condition was necessary to determine the nature and extent of her disability" and ordered her to submit to a second psychiatric evaluation. When the forthcoming, and undeniably qualified, report again denied any relationship between Packard and Head's psychological difficulties, Dr. Summers' evaluation lost much of its significance. As a result, the full Commission reversed with regard to the alleged causal connection and related expenses. After an affirmance by the circuit court, we are presented with these issues yet again. ANALYSIS I. THE FULL COMMISSION ERRED IN ORDERING A MEDICAL EXAMINATION BY DR. MARK WEBB AND IN DENYING CLAIMANT THE RIGHT TO REOPEN THE DEPOSITION OF DR. TIMOTHY SUMMERS. Head begins by questioning the above-mentioned independent psychiatric examination conducted by Dr. Mark Webb. She directs our attention to certain procedural rules requiring first that parties file a pretrial statement setting forth the identity of all witnesses and also that each case be handled in one hearing. She argues, without additional supporting authority, that "the letter and intent" of these rules was violated by the Commission's order that she submit to examination by a physician of Packard's choosing. Head then continues, claiming in the alternative that she should have at least been allowed to rebut Dr. Webb's subsequently reported findings by reopening the deposition of Dr. Timothy Summers, the physician upon which the administrative law judge's initial determination of psychological disorder was based. In response, Packard characterizes the Commission's interlocutory order as a "proper and lawful exercise of its administrative function"while citing both statutory and case law directly addressing these issues. Because these authorities easily overcome Head's unsupported contentions, we agree with Packard. Section 71-3-37 of the Mississippi Code Annotated (Rev. 1995) provides the authority by which the Commission granted Packard's request: The Commission (a) may upon its own initiative at any time in a case in which payments are being made without an award, and (b) shall in any case where right to compensation is controverted or where payments of compensation have been stopped or suspended, upon receipt of notice . . . from the employer that the right to compensation is controverted or that payments of compensation have been stopped or suspended, make such investigation, cause such medical examination to be made, hold such hearings, and take such further action as it considers will properly protect the rights of all parties. The Mississippi Supreme Court recognized this authority in Everett v. Lovitt, 192 So. 2d 422 (Miss. 1966), wherein it reversed the lower court's order prohibiting the Commission from requiring a claimant to undergo a psychiatric examination similar to that undergone by Head.Everett, 192 So. 2d at 431. In Everett, the employer and carrier moved for an independent examination of the claimant

during the administrative hearing. After the Commission granted the motion, the claimant obtained a writ of prohibition from the circuit court. The supreme court reversed the prohibition order on the ground that the Commission had acted well within its statutory power. Notably, the court rejected the claimant's argument, which Head replicates here, that the psychiatrist was suggested by the employer and carrier vitiated the authority of the Commission. Id. In rejecting this argument, the supreme court concluded that "[t]he only redress available to the employer and carrier [in workers' compensation cases] . . . is to have the claimant examined by competent physicians to determine whether disability is compensable, and, if so, the extent of such disability." Id. at 430. Any other result, would "permit . . . claimants to search at will until they finally found some medical testimony which was in support of their theory. In such cases the employer and carrier have to accept it regardless of their rights under the act." Id. The Mississippi Supreme Court has also previously considered Head's claim that the Commission should have concluded her case in one hearing. In Roberts v. Junior Food Mart, 308 So. 2d 232 (Miss. 1975), the Commission required the claimant to submit to a medical examination after it made an award in his favor. The court upheld the Commission's order, noting that

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