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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI NO. 96-CA-00372 COA ORVAL RAY GLISSON, II v. METHODIST MEDICAL CENTER, INC.; HINDS COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS; AND DR. BINFORD NASH, D/B/A WEST JACKSON FAMILY MEDICAL CENTER APPELLANT APPELLEES

THIS OPINION IS NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION AND MAY NOT BE CITED, PURSUANT TO M.R.A.P. 35-B DATE OF JUDGMENT: TRIAL JUDGE: COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: 02/07/96 HON. JAMES E. GRAVES JR. HINDS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT WILLIAM LISTON III PAUL SNOW WILLIAM LISTON RANDALL D. NOEL HEBER S. SIMMONS, III CIVIL - WRONGFUL DEATH GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS AFFIRMED - 11/18/97

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES: NATURE OF THE CASE: TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION: DISPOSITION: MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: CERTIORARI FILED: MANDATE ISSUED:

2/23/98

BEFORE McMILLIN, P.J., HINKEBEIN, AND SOUTHWICK, JJ. HINKEBEIN, J., FOR THE COURT: During December 1992, the Chancery Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County ordered Orval Ray Glisson, III committed to the Mississippi State Hospital at Whitfield for mental treatment pursuant to Section 41-21-61 through 41-21-105 of the Mississippi Code. The court further ordered that Glisson be held at Methodist Medical Center in Jackson temporarily until space at the state facility became available. In early January, while still awaiting transfer, Glisson attempted to commit suicide. He was successfully resuscitated, but sustained serious injuries that ultimately caused his

death. His father, Orval Ray Glisson, II, thereafter filed suit against the Hinds County Board of Supervisors, Methodist Medical Center, Pendleton Detectives of Mississippi, and Doctor Binford Nash for wrongful death. Each of the defendants requested and the trial court granted summary judgment based on statutory immunity. Feeling aggrieved, Glisson's father appeals the grant as to all but Pendleton based on the following assignment of error: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES ON THE GROUND THAT THEY ARE IMMUNE UNDER SECTION 41-21-105 OF THE MISSISSIPPI CODE FROM THE CIVIL CLAIMS ASSERTED IN THIS ACTION. Holding this assignment of error to be without merit, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court. FACTS Prior to 1986, the Hinds County Detention Center held involuntarily committed mental patients awaiting admission into the state psychiatric hospital. During that year, the United States Department of Justice investigated detention center conditions pursuant to the Federal Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act. Upon concluding its probe, the department opined that the rights of the mental patients housed therein were being violated. Department officials wrote, "[s]uch mentally-ill persons have rights to adequate medical care, reasonably safe conditions of confinement, and that degree of treatment necessary to ensure that they are not exposed to unreasonable risks to their personal safety and are free from undue bodily restraint. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 U.S. 324 (1982). Then, while characterizing the county's treatment of the patients as "cruel and unusual," the department cited the housing of such patients in a facility designed and used primarily for the detention of convicted and accused criminals as well as the complete lack of mental health professionals, services, or treatment. Thereafter, the Hinds County Board of Supervisors attempted to comply with the recommendations. It established an alternative "holding area" via an agreement with Hinds General Hospital -- later leased by Methodist -- wherein these individuals might be housed separately and receive the required "necessary medical care" while awaiting transfer. However, neither party envisioned "necessary medical care" to encompass immediate implementation of aggressive psychiatric treatment. Methodist merely provided an environment designed to prevent patients from causing harm to themselves and/or others, dispensed care for physical ailments, and maintained previously prescribed psychiatric protocols. More extensive efforts were postponed until arrival at the better equipped state facility. As stated, Glisson entered Methodist near the end of 1992. On December 17, as a prerequisite to his involuntary commitment, he underwent a thorough mental and medical evaluation. After arriving at a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia with accompanying threats of harm to others, both a physician and a psychologist recommended Glisson's hospitalization. Later that day, he was admitted to Methodist. Upon his arrival, Glisson was examined again by Dr. Nash, a family practitioner and staff physician at West Jackson Family Medical Center, who happened to be "on call" to attend the needs of the detainees. Dr. Nash noted Glisson's condition, the accompanying symptoms, and scars from a prior suicide attempt. He then elected to continue Glisson's previously prescribed medication and gave the "observe at all times" order which was standard for these transitional patients. Being aware of Glisson's recent evaluation, Dr. Nash requested no assistance from additional psychiatric experts.

Two weeks later, Glisson still awaited transfer. On the evening of January 2, nurses observed no unusual behavior when checking Glisson, as they did every two hours on average. But around 11:30, a guard hired through Pendleton Detectives discovered him hanging from his bathroom door knob by a noose fashioned from his bed linens. Hospital staff successfully resuscitated Glisson, but he had suffered severe complications which resulted in a persistent vegetative state and ultimately in his death several months later. ANALYSIS THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES ON THE GROUND THAT THEY ARE IMMUNE UNDER SECTION 41-21-105 OF THE MISSISSIPPI CODE FROM THE CIVIL CLAIMS ASSERTED IN THIS ACTION. The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuading the trial court that no genuine issue of material fact exists, and that they are, based on the established facts, entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Skelton v. Twin County Rural Elec. Ass'n, 611 So.2d 931, 935 (Miss. 1992). However, to prevent summary judgment the non-moving party must produce "evidence of significant and probative value" tending to show the inappropriateness of the measure. Palmer v. Biloxi Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc., 564 So. 2d 1346, 1355 (Miss. 1990)(emphasis in original). In that vein, the trial court analyzes all affidavits, admissions in pleadings, interrogatory answers, depositions and other matters of record, and considers all such evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made. Clark v. St. Dominic-Jackson Mem'l Hosp., 660 So. 2d 970, 972 (Miss. 1995). As an appellate court, we conduct a de novo review of the trial court's granting of summary judgment. Seymour v. Brunswick Corp., 655 So. 2d 892, 894 (Miss. 1995). Therefore this court again analyzes such evidence and may reverse the trial court's decision to grant summary judgment if a legal issue was incorrectly decided or material facts are in dispute. Clark v. St. Dominic-Jackson Mem'l Hosp., 660 So. 2d 970, 972 (Miss. 1995); Radmann v. Truck Ins. Exchange, 660 So. 2d 975, 977 (Miss. 1995). In this light, we examine the granting of summary judgment to each of the appellees separately. A. HINDS COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS Glisson's father first criticizes the Board's selection of Methodist as the temporary holding facility. He claims that because the hospital was ill-equipped for providing psychiatric treatment, the Board breached its duty to provide adequate care and maintenance for Glisson during this interim period. The Board, rather than addressing Mr. Glisson's assertions directly, claims immunity from suit under Section 41-21-105 of the Mississippi Code. Because its handling of the situation failed to rise to the level of gross negligence, we agree that the Board is entitled to such immunity. For efficiency's sake, we will move directly to the statute on which the trial court based its granting of summary judgment. Section 41-21-105 reads as follows: (1) All persons acting in good faith in connection with the preparation or execution of applications, affidavits, certificates or other documents; apprehensions; finding; opinion of physicians and psychologist; transportation; examination; treatment; emergency treatment; detention or discharge of an individual, under the provisions of

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