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Huddleston v. Baumfolder Corporation                                                                        Doc. 58
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
LISA HUDDLESTON,                                                                                            )
)
Plaintiff,                                                                                                  )
)
vs.                                                                                                         )                   Case No.   4:07-CV-00183 SNL
)
BAUMFOLDER CORPORATION,                                                                                     )
)
Defendant.                                                                                                  )
MEMORANDUM
Now before the Court is Defendant’s motion in limine regarding Plaintiff’s designated
liability expert (Doc. #38, filed Jan. 28, 2008).  For the reasons stated herein, Defendant’s motion
is HEREBY GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
Pursuant to the parties’ amended case management order (Doc. #9, filed May 22, 2007),
Plaintiff’s expert witnesses’ identities and reports were to be disclosed no later than August 1,
2007.   On June 29, 2007, Plaintiff filed its expert witness disclosure relating to James Kenneth
Blundell, Ph.D., which set forth that Dr. Blundell may be called to testify as regards the “defective
and unreasonably dangerous condition of the subject drill press at the time of Plaintiff’s injury and
the liability of Defendant.”                                                                                (Doc. #38 ex. A.)
The parties’ pretrial disclosures, due not less than twenty (20) days prior to trial, indicated
Plaintiff’s intention to call Dr. Blundell as a trial witness (Doc. #21, filed Jan. 21, 2008).  Plaintiff
further stated that she may offer into evidence Dr. Blundell’s report and deposition testimony
(Doc. #22, filed Jan. 21, 2008).  Defendant now moves to limit certain portions of this evidence.
LEGAL STANDARD
This Court “has broad discretion in the matter of the admission or exclusion of expert
evidence.”  Salem v. United States Lines Co., 370 U.S. 31, 35 (1962); accord Anderson v.
Raymond Corp., 340 F.3d 520, 523 (8th Cir. 2003). “[D]oubts about whether an expert's
testimony will be useful should generally be resolved in favor of admissibility.”  Williams v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., 922 F.2d 1357, 1360 (8th Cir. 1990); Larabee v. MM & L Int'l Corp., 896 F.2d
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1112, 1116 n. 6 (8th Cir. 1990) (internal citation omitted).  The admissibility of expert testimony
is governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and the Supreme Court's opinion in Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
Under the rules of evidence, an expert witness is permitted to testify in regards to
“scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge” if it serves to “assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.”  FED. R. EVID. 702.  Contrary to that of
an ordinary witness, the testimony of a qualified expert is not limited to opinions based on first
hand knowledge or observation.  Compare FED. R. EVID. 701 with FED. R. EVID. 702.  Therefore,
in order to adhere to “the common law insistence upon ‘the most reliable sources of information,’
” courts must assess a purported expert’s basis for the opinion he seeks to provide.  See FED. R.
EVID. 602 advisory committee's note (citation omitted).
Under the Daubert framework, courts apply FRE 702 by determining whether the expert
testimony is both relevant and reliable.  This is a three-step analysis: (1) “the witness must be
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education;” (2) “the expert's
reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony must be scientifically reliable;” and (3) “the
testimony must assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.”
FED. R. EVID. 702; Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93.
With these principles in mind, the Court turns to an examination of the facts.
ANALYSIS
Defendant first seeks to exclude Dr. Blundell’s opinion “that Plaintiff’s accident would not
have occurred if there had been a guard covering the moving parts of the drive shaft of the
Subject Drill at issue in this case.”  Here, Defendant states that testimony relating to this matter
would be “duplicative and wholly unnecessary” in that the parties have jointly stipulated that “[i]f
there would have been a guard covering the moving parts ... it would have prevented the scalp
injury ...”                                                                                                  (Doc. #28 at ¶13, filed Jan. 22, 2008.)
“The primary purpose of entering into a stipulation is ‘to dispense with proof over matters
not in issue, thereby promoting judicial economy at the convenience of the parties.’ ”  U.S. v.
Lentz, 419 F.Supp.2d 843, 844 (D.Va. 2006) (quoting United States v. Montgomery, 620 F.2d
753, 757 (10th Cir. 1980) (citing 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2588-2597 (3d ed. 1940)).
Therefore, joint stipulations as to certain facts “ ‘. . . are equivalent of proof and . . . neither party
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will be heard to suggest that the facts were other than as stipulated.’ ”  Lentz, 419 F.Supp.2d at
844-45 (quoting United States v. Campbell, 453 F.2d 447, 451 (10th Cir. 1972)).   See United
States v. Technic Services, Inc., 314 F.3d 1031, 1045 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Stipulations freely and
voluntarily entered into in criminal trials are as binding and enforceable as those entered into in
civil actions.”).
However, joint stipulation of a material fact does not end the inquiry.                               “All relevant
evidence is admissible, FED. R. EVID. 402; unless the court determines that its “probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading
the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence,”  FED. R. EVID. 403. The relevancy of evidence is unaffected by the
availability of alternative proofs.FN1
FN1.   “The fact to which the evidence is directed need not be in dispute. While
situations will arise which call for the exclusion of evidence offered to prove a
point conceded by the opponent, the ruling should be made on the basis of such
considerations as waste of time and undue prejudice (see Rule 403), rather than
under any general requirement that evidence is admissible only if directed to
matters in dispute.”  FED. R. EVID. 401 advis. comm. note (1972).
Here, Dr. Blundell’s report and deposition testimony substantially set forth that “[h]ad
such a guard been present on the machine on the day of the accident, then Ms. Huddleston would
not have been injured.” (Doc. #38 ex’s A & B.)  While the Court acknowledges the need to
conserve judicial resources, and agrees that the parties’ stipulation substantially embraces the
testimony Defendant wishes to exclude, the subject testimony regarding Plaintiff’s injury and the
surrounding circumstances goes to the very heart of Plaintiff’s complaint.  Furthermore,
permitting Dr. Blundell to testify about everything except his ultimate conclusion may grossly
undermine his credibility.  Accordingly, Defendant’s request is denied.
Next, Defendant seeks to exclude Dr. Blundell’s opinion “that the Subject Drill was
defective because it lacked a quick stop device” in that it is irrelevant , unfounded, and would
result in the jury’s confusion and a waste of time.
According to the Case Management Order, the parties were required to make a Daubert
Challenge prior to October 10, 2007, or it would be waived.   (Doc. #7: 2, filed Mar. 8, 2007.)
The Court is unaware of any just cause as to why Defendant filed the instant motion more than
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three months after the deadline.  Accordingly, the Court finds this evidence, first made available to
Defendant in June of 2007, admissible.
Lastly, Defendant seeks an order limiting Dr. Blundell’s testimony and/or other evidence
to that contained in his report and/or deposition in that Plaintiff has in no way amended and/or
supplemented her initial disclosures regarding the same.  Therefore, Defendant urges, the Local
and Federal Rules require Plaintiff be precluded from offering any undisclosed testimony or
documents.
The Federal Rules require the disclosure of expert witnesses be accompanied by a written
report, signed and prepared by such witness, containing “a complete statement of all opinions the
witness will express and the basis and reasons for them.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2)(B).  This
“certain basic information [] is needed in most cases to prepare for trial or make an informed
decision about settlement,” FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advis. comm. n. (1993); and pertains to both
witnesses and documents that a party intends to use, or may use “if the need arises,”FED. R. CIV.
P. 26 advis. comm. n. (2000).  These disclosure requirements were intended to afford “opposing
parties [] a reasonable opportunity to prepare for effective cross examination and perhaps arrange
for expert testimony from other witnesses.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advis. comm. n. (1993).
Furthermore, all information included in the report and/or during the expert’s deposition
must be amended or supplemented by pre-trial disclosure deadlines.  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(e)(2).
Failure to disclose or supplement will result in the exclusion of such evidence, unless it is
substantially justified or harmless.  FED. R. CIV. P. 37(c)(1).  This threat of exclusion “provides an
incentive for full disclosure; namely, that a party will not ordinarily be permitted to use on direct
examination any expert testimony not so disclosed.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advis. comm. n. (1993).
Here, Defendant avers that Plaintiff has not supplemented Dr. Blundell’s deposition
testimony or report since her initial disclosure, and that Dr. Blundell previously testified that his
report accurately reflected his opinions regarding the case.  Accordingly, all evidence relating to
Dr. Blundell’s opinion shall be limited to the information contained in his deposition and report.
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Dated this 5th day of February, 2008.
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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