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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
INTERFOOD HOLDING, B.V.,                                                    )
)
Plaintiff,                                                                  )
                                                                            )
vs.                                                                         )   No.  4:08CV85-DJS
                                                                            )
LARRY RICE, MICHAEL HUSMANN, and                                            )
DF INGREDIENTS, INC.,                                                       )
)
Defendants.                                                                 )
ORDER
Plaintiff  Interfood  Holding,  B.V.  is  a  Dutch  company.
Defendants Michael Husmann and Larry Rice were once the President
and  Vice  President,  respectively,  of  Interfood,  Inc.,  an  Indiana
corporation in which plaintiff has an interest, and both served on
Interfood,  Inc.’s  Board  of  Directors.     Husmann  and  Rice  then
allegedly formed defendant DF Ingredients, Inc., a competing dairy
foods  business.     Plaintiff  brings  claims  alleging,  among  other
things, that defendants have engaged in trademark infringement by
their  use  of  plaintiff’s  INTERFOOD  trade  name.    Now  before  the
Court are separate motions for summary judgment filed by counsel on
behalf  of  defendants  Husmann  and  DF  Ingredients  and  by  defendant
Rice, acting pro se.
In determining whether summary judgment should issue, the
facts and inferences from these facts are viewed in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party, and the burden is placed on the




movant to establish both the absence of a genuine issue of material
fact  and  that  it  is  entitled  to  judgment  as  a  matter  of  law.
Fed.R.Civ.P.  56(c);  Matsushita  Electric  Industrial  Co.  v.  Zenith
Radio  Corp.,                                                                 475  U.S.                                                         574,   586-87   (1986);  Anderson  v.  Liberty
Lobby,  Inc.,  477  U.S.  242,  247  (1986);  Celotex  Corp.  v.  Catrett,
477  U.S.  317,  322  (1986).    Once  the  movant  has  met  this  burden,
however,  the  non-moving  party  may  not  rest  on  the  allegations  in
its  pleadings  but  by  affidavit  and  other  evidence  must  set  forth
specific  facts  showing  that  a  genuine  issue  of  material  fact
exists.    Fed.R.Civ.P.  56(e).    See also  10A C. Wright, A. Miller &
M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure  §2739  (1983).
The Supreme Court has indicated that:  “Summary judgment
procedure  is  properly  regarded  not  as  a  disfavored  procedural
shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the federal rules as a
whole,  which   are   designed   to                                           ‘secure  the   just,   speedy   and
inexpensive determination of every action’.”   Celotex, 477 U.S. at
327  (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 1).   Thus, the non-moving party  “must do
more  than  show  that  there  is  some  metaphysical  doubt  as  to  the
material facts.”    Matsushita,  475 U.S. at  586.                            “Where the record
as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the
non-moving party, there is no  ‘genuine issue for trial’.”    Id. at
587.                                                                          The  Eighth  Circuit  has  acknowledged  that  the  trilogy  of
Supreme Court opinions demonstrates that the courts should be “more
hospitable to summary judgments than in the past” and that a motion
for  summary  judgment  “can  be  a  tool  of  great  utility  in  removing
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factually insubstantial cases from crowded dockets, freeing courts’
trial time for those cases that really do raise genuine issues of
material fact.”   City of Mt. Pleasant, Iowa v. Associated Electric
Cooperative, Inc.,  838 F.2d  268,  273  (8th Cir.  1988).
Rice’s motion first seeks summary judgment on a number of
plaintiff’s   factual   allegations,   as   to   which   Rice   contends
plaintiff has failed to produce substantive supporting evidence in
response to Rice’s discovery requests.    For the reasons suggested
by plaintiff’s opposition, the Court rejects this aspect of Rice’s
motion,   which   does   not   seek  summary   judgment   on  claims   as
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(f) contemplates, does not comply with this Court’s
Local  Rule  7-4.01(E)  governing  motions  for  summary  judgment,  and
attempts  to  shift  the  summary  judgment  burden  prematurely  to
plaintiff,  the  non-moving  party.    Rice’s  motion  also  adopts  by
reference  the  arguments  set  forth  in  the  motion  of  defendants
Husmann and DF Ingredients, which are analyzed further below.
Count  I  of  the  first  amended  complaint1  is  a  claim  of
false  advertising  under                                                   §43(a)  of  the  Lanham  Act,   15  U.S.C.
§1125(a)(1)(B).     Plaintiff  alleges  in  support  of  Count  I  that
defendants’ use of INTERFOOD and the domain name “interfood.us,” and
their  statements  implying  a  continued  relationship  with  Interfood
1 A first amended complaint was filed on March  31,  2009.    The
Court construes the pending motions for summary judgment as directed
to that pleading.   Because the first amended complaint contains no
prayer for damages and seeks only injunctive relief, the motions for
summary judgment are moot to the extent that they offer arguments
directed to claims for damages.
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Holdings and the Interfood Group, “constitute misrepresentations in
commercial   advertising   or   promotion   regarding   the   nature,
characteristics  or  qualities  of  Defendants’  goods  and  services.”
First  Amended  Complaint  [Doc.  #135],  ¶25.    Defendants  Husmann  and
DF  Ingredients  argue  that  summary  judgment  is appropriate  because
plaintiff  lacks  evidence  to  support  four  of  the  five  elements  of
such a claim, namely that these defendants (as opposed to defendant
Rice)  made  the  allegedly  false  statements,  that  any  statement
actually deceived or had a tendency to deceive a substantial segment
of  its  audience,  that  any  statement  was  likely  to  influence  a
consumer’s  purchasing  decision,  and  that  plaintiff  has  been  or  is
likely to be injured as a result of the statement.   Def. Memo. [Doc.
#101], pp.4-5.2
Plaintiff’s  response  focuses  on  only  one  of  the  four
challenged elements, and argues that where, as here, a statement is
alleged to be “literally false,” actual consumer confusion need not
be  proved,  citing  United  Industries,                                     140  F.3d  at   1181.   This
contention  is  not  responsive  to  the  challenge  to  defendants
2 The elements of this species of claim under §1125(a)(1)(B) are:
(1)  the  defendant  made  a  false  statement  of  fact  in  commercial
advertising or promotion about its own or another’s goods, services
or commercial activities; (2) the statement actually deceived or has
the tendency to deceive a substantial segment of its audience; (3)
the  deception  is  material,  that  is,  likely  to  influence  the
purchasing decision; (4) the defendant caused its false statement to
enter  interstate  commerce;  and  (5)  the  plaintiff  has  been  or  is
likely  to  be  injured  as  a  result  of  the  false  statement.    See
American Italian Pasta Co. v. New World Pasta Co., 371 F.3d 387, 390
(8th  Cir.  2004);  United  Industries  Corp.  v.  Clorox  Co.,  140  F.3d
1175,  1180  (8th Cir.  1998).
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Husmann’s and DF Ingredients’ role in the making of the statements,
to the issue of materiality or to the final element of injury.   The
Court  here  specially  notes  plaintiff’s  failure  to  respond  to  the
overarching argument of defendants Husmann and DF Ingredients that
Rice, and not they, is the party responsible for all the statements
and representations underlying plaintiff’s claims, so that there is
no  basis  for  liability  against  Husmann  and  DF  Ingredients.    Even
without  more,  this  alone  is  support  for  summary  judgment  in  favor
of  Husmann  and  DF  Ingredients  on  all  claims  asserted  against  them
in the first amended complaint.3
Moreover,  the  assertedly                                                    “literally  false”  statements
plaintiff lists in its opposition to defendants’ motions  [see Doc.
#118, pp.4-5] include only one statement referring to plaintiff and
defendant   DF   Ingredients,   and   three   statements   referring   to
defendant  Rice.    The  remainder  of  the  statements  have  to  do  with
corporate  entities  other  than  the  parties  to  this  action.    More
significantly, none of the statements is a representation  (whether
false or not)  “regarding the nature, characteristics, or qualities
of  Defendants’  goods  and  services”  as  is  the  asserted  basis  for
Count I of the first amended complaint.
3  The Court notes that, despite occasional references to the
“dfingredients.com” website in the parties’ briefs, the claims as
pled in the first amended complaint are not based on any allegations
concerning   the   content   of   that   website,   as   opposed   to   the
“interfood.us” site.
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As plaintiff notes, in addition to  “goods and services,”
the  statute  includes  misrepresentations  concerning                        “commercial
activities.”    As  pled,  however, Count  I  is  based  upon  defendants’
alleged  misrepresentations  as  to  defendants’  own                         (rather  than
plaintiff’s)  goods  and  services  (not  commercial  activities).    In
short, the six statements plaintiff relies upon in support of Count
I  are  not  of  the  sort  upon  which  such  a  claim  can  succeed.
Allegedly  false  statements  such  as  these,  about  the  founding  of,
officers of, and control of various corporate entities, are not the
sorts  of  statements  about  goods,  services,  or  even  commercial
activities   which   are   within   the   scope   of   the   Lanham   Act’s
prohibition.4    On  the  record  before  it,  the  Court  concludes  as  a
matter  of  law  that  plaintiff  lacks  evidence  to  support  a  triable
issue  of  fact  as  to  its  entitlement  to  recovery  on  the  claim
asserted in Count I.
Count  II  asserts  a  claim  of  trademark  infringement  and
unfair  competition  under                                                    §43(a)  of  the  Lanham  Act,  based  on  the
allegation  that  defendants’  use  of  INTERFOOD  and  the  domain  name
“interfood.us,”   and   their   statements   implying   a   continued
relationship  with  Interfood  Holdings  and  the  Interfood  Group,  are
likely  to  cause  confusion,  mistake  or  deception as  to  the  source,
origin,  sponsorship,  or  approval  of  DF  Ingredients’  products  and
4  The  attention  the  parties  devote  to  arguments  about  these
issues suggest that such matters of corporate governance are the true
crux of their dispute, rather than the trademark issues which are the
gravamen of the causes of action asserted in this action.
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services.    This  claim  is  brought  pursuant  to  §1125(a)(1)(A).          A
common  law  trademark  infringement  claim  is  asserted  in  Count  IV,
challenging  defendants’  use  of  INTERFOOD  in  the  domain  name
“interfood.us.”   The parties treat Count IV as governed by the same
legal standards, facts and arguments as the federal statutory Lanham
Act claim in Count II.5    The Court will therefore do likewise.
Defendants’  arguments  concerning  Counts  II  and  IV  are
limited  to  the  trademark  INTERFOOD  and  a  Green Triangle logo,  and
do not address the potential application of §1125(a)(1)(A) or common
law trademark principles to defendants’ alleged statements implying
a  continued  relationship  with  plaintiff.     In  opposition  to  the
motion, plaintiff, too, omits any reference to these allegations and
any  argument  that  Counts  II and IV  survive summary  judgment  as  to
statements   implying   a   continued   relationship.                         From   these
circumstances, the Court concludes that Counts II and IV are pursued
only as to the use  of  the INTERFOOD mark.    Further, to the extent
that the parties debate the viability of these claims with respect
to the use of a Green Triangle logo, the Court now notes  (although
it  failed  to  do  in  its  analysis  of  the  motion  for  preliminary
injunction) that plaintiff’s first amended complaint (as well as the
initial complaint before it) contains no mention of or reference to
a Green Triangle logo.   The Court therefore construes the pleadings
5                                                                             “[T]he Missouri common law action utilizes the same elements
as  an  action  under  the  Lanham  Act.”    Children’s  Factory,  Inc.  v.
Benee’s Toys, Inc.,  160 F.3d  489,  491 n.2  (8th Cir.  1998).
7




not  to  predicate  any  claims upon,  or  seek  relief  with  respect  to,
the use of a Green Triangle logo.
As to the merits of Counts II and IV, movants contend that
in the absence of evidence of secondary meaning or likely confusion
based  on  use  of  INTERFOOD,  no  trademark  infringement  claim  can
succeed.    Plaintiff counters that the INTERFOOD mark is inherently
distinctive,  such  that  secondary  meaning  is  not  required  to  be
shown.   In support, plaintiff urges an inference from the Patent and
Trademark  Office’s  recent  action  on  its  application  to  register a
trademark  consisting  of  INTERFOOD  with  a  green  triangle  symbol.
Because  the  PTO  did  not  object  to  either  INTERFOOD  or  the  green
triangle  symbol  on  the  basis  of  descriptiveness  or  genericness,
plaintiff  contends  that  the PTO has  found  that both  components  of
the trademark are inherently distinctive.    The inference plaintiff
urges is inapposite and unpersuasive, however, because the trademark
application is for a mark consisting of a stylized type of the word
INTERFOOD,  in  which  the  “T”  overlies  the  letters  “N”  and  “E,”  in
combination with a green triangle.   Count II, by contrast, is based
on the mere word INTERFOOD alone.
As  in  its  preliminary  injunction  analysis,  the  Court
remains  of  the  view  that  INTERFOOD  is  at  best  descriptive  of  an
international  food  company  or  its  product,  and  cannot  be  found  to
be arbitrary, fanciful or suggestive, as those terms are used in the
Abercrombie  classifications  commonly  used  in  trademark  analysis.
See, e.g., Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc.,  505 U.S.  763,  768
8




(1992), citing Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc.,  537
F.2d                                                                         4,                                                              9   (2nd  Cir.   1976).   “A  descriptive  mark  designates  the
characteristics,  qualities,  effects,  or  other  features  of  the
product,   and   is   protectable   only   if   shown   to   have   become
distinctive,  that,  shown  to  have  acquired  a  secondary  meaning.”
Co-Rect Products, Inc. v. Marvy! Advertising Photography, Inc., 780
F.2d  1324,  1329  (8th Cir.  1985).6
Such   a   classification   of   INTERFOOD   results   in   the
determination that it is not inherently distinctive.   Id. at 768-69.
Protection  under  the  Lanham  Act  therefore  requires  a  showing  that
the  mark  has  acquired  secondary  meaning.    Plaintiff’s  response  to
the summary judgment motion demonstrates its inability to make the
necessary  showing  that  INTERFOOD  has                                     “acquired  distinctiveness
through extensive use by a single supplier, so that the public would
recognize                                                                    [the  word]  as  identifying  the  source  of  the  product.”
Chevron Chemical Company v. Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc.,  659
F.2d  695,  702  (5th Cir.  1981).
To  establish  secondary  meaning,  the  user  must show  that
the  mark  or  symbol                                                        “‘by  long  and  exclusive  use  and
advertising...in  the  sale  of  [the  user’s]  goods...[has]
become  so  associated  in  the  public  mind  with  such
goods...that  it  serves  to  identify  them  and  distinguish
them from the goods...of others.’”
6 By contrast, the next category in the classification spectrum
is suggestive marks, “which require imagination to reach a conclusion
as to the nature of the goods.”   Id.; see also Frosty Treats, Inc. v.
Sony Computer Entertainment America, Inc., 426 F.3d 1001, 1005 (8th
Cir. 2005).   This is hardly the case where INTERFOOD expressly refers
to food as the nature of the goods.
9




Co-Rect Products,  780 F.2d at  1330  (internal citations omitted).
Plaintiff  demonstrates  no  ability  to  offer  evidence  supporting  a
case submissible to a jury on this issue.
Plaintiff has no direct evidence in the form of consumer
testimony  or  market  surveys  to  support  a  finding  of  secondary
meaning.   Furthermore, rather than proffer pertinent circumstantial
evidence,7  plaintiff  merely  asserts  that  secondary  meaning  exists
because  its  own  customers  make  repeat  purchases  and  identify  the
name  INTERFOOD  as  the  source  of  their  products,  and  because  the
individual  defendants,  while  working  in  the  dairy  industry  or  for
an  Interfood  Group  company,  believed  the  name  had  some  industry
recognition.    The Court finds as a matter of law that INTERFOOD is
not shown to have trademark protection under the Lanham Act, because
it  is  merely  descriptive  and  cannot  be  shown  to  have  acquired
secondary meaning.   As a result, the Court does not reach the issue
of  consumer  confusion.     Plaintiff’s  evidence  fails  to  raise  a
genuine issue of material fact on threshold elements of its claims
in Counts II and IV, and defendants are entitled to summary judgment
on these claims.
7 Such evidence would address matters such as “the exclusivity,
length  and  manner  of  use  of  the  mark;  the  amount  and  manner  of
advertising;  the  amount  of  sales  and  number  of  customers;  the
plaintiff’s established place in the market; and the existence of
intentional  copying.”     Frosty  Treats,  Inc.  v.  Sony  Computer
Entertainment America, Inc.,  426 F.3d  1001,  1005  (8th Cir.  2005).
10




In Count III, plaintiff alleges that the wrongful use of
the  domain  name  “interfood.us”  violates  §43(d)  of  the  Lanham  Act
because  it  is  identical  or  confusingly  similar  to  plaintiff’s
INTERFOOD mark, with bad faith intent to profit from the mark.   The
relevant   statutory   provisions,   found   at                               §1125(d),   are   the
codification  of  the  Anti-Cybersquatting  Consumer  Protection  Act.
On  this  claim,  movants  Husmann  and  DF  Ingredients  seek  summary
judgment asserting that it is undisputed that they did not register,
traffic  in  or  use  the  “interfood.us” domain  name,  as  the  cause  of
action  requires.    Plaintiff’s  opposition  to  their  motion  tacitly
concedes  this  point  by  citing  no  evidence  to  contradict  these
defendants’  disclaimer  of  any  responsibility  for  the  domain  name
registered and controlled by defendant Rice.
Defendant Rice’s motion fails to provide an argument for
summary judgment in his favor on the claim of Count III that his use
of the  “interfood.us” domain name violates  §1125(d).    Count III as
against defendant Rice is not disposed of by the motions for summary
judgment and remains pending.
Count   V   contains   a   common   law   claim   of   injurious
falsehood,  alleging  that  defendants  have  included  statements  on
their  website  regarding  plaintiff  which  are  false  and  harmful  to
plaintiff’s  interest.    Defendants  argue  that  Count  V  is no  longer
viable after the first amended complaint has removed any prayer for
damages from this count.    On a claim for injurious falsehood under
Missouri law, a plaintiff may recover only for pecuniary or economic
11




loss,  and  proof  of  such  a  loss  is  an  element  of  the  claim.
Wandersee  v.  BP  Products  North  America,                                 263  S.W.2d                     623,        630  n.3
(Mo.banc 2008).   By failing to address Count V in its opposition to
the motion for summary judgment, plaintiff appears to concede that
the  claim  is  no  longer  viable  for  the  reasons defendants  suggest.
Summary judgment in favor of defendants will be granted as to Count
V of the first amended complaint.
Accordingly, for all the foregoing reasons,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion for summary judgment
of  defendants  Husmann  and  DF  Ingredients,  Inc.                         [Doc.                           #100]  is
granted as to all claims asserted against them in the first amended
complaint.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion for summary judgment
of defendant Rice [Doc. #108] is granted as to Counts I, II, IV and
V  of  the  first  amended  complaint.    Count  III  remains  pending  as
against defendant Rice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, in view of the summary judgment to
be   entered   in   favor   of   defendants   Michael   Husmann   and   DF
Ingredients, that the motion of those defendants to reconsider [Doc.
#136] the order granting leave to file the first amended complaint
and vacating the trial setting is denied.
Dated this                                                                   8th      day of April,  2009.
/s/Donald J. Stohr
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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