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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
LEONARD SMITH,                                                                 )
)
Plaintiff,                                                                     )
)
v.                                                                             )                                                                       No.   4:09CV802 FRB
)
KRAMER & FRANK, P.C.,                                                          )
)
Defendant.                                                                     )
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Presently  pending  before  the  Court  is  defendant  Kramer  &
Frank, P.C.’s Motion to Dismiss  (Doc.  #13).   All matters are pending
before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge, with consent
of the parties, pursuant to  28 U.S.C.  §  636(c).
Plaintiff  Leonard  Smith  brings  this  cause  of  action
pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C.
§§                                                                             1692,  et  seq.,  alleging  that  defendant  Kramer  &  Frank,  P.C.,
engaged in unlawful collection practices relating to a debt allegedly
owed  by  plaintiff  to  a  third  party,  HSBC  Card Services.    Defendant
Kramer & Frank now seeks to dismiss this cause of action under Fed.
R. Civ. P.  12(b)(1) and  (b)(6), arguing that this Court is deprived
of  subject  matter  jurisdiction  under  the  Rooker-Feldman  doctrine,
and,  further,  that  the  Complaint  fails  to  state  a  claim  under  the
FDCPA upon which relief can be granted.    Plaintiff has responded to
the  motion  to  which  defendant  has  replied.     For  the  following
reasons, defendant’s motion should be denied.




I.    Background
In his Complaint, plaintiff claims that on or about August
13,  2008,  he  received  notice  that  a Petition  had  been  filed in  the
Circuit Court of Greene County, Missouri, in relation to an alleged
debt owed by plaintiff to HSBC Card Services  (“HSBC”).   The law firm
of Kramer & Frank, P.C., the defendant here, represented HSBC in that
action.                                                                         (Deft.’s Exh. A, Doc. #30.)1/2/   The summons issued and served
on  the  Petition  set  out  September                                          4,                                                                2008,  as  the  date  on  which
                                                                                plaintiff was to appear in court to answer the claim therein.     (Id.
at p. 25.)   The Petition identified “Alysia Gutierrez” as the contact
person  on  the  matter,  and  included  a telephone  number  by which  Ms.
Gutierrez could be reached.   Plaintiff alleges in his Complaint that
Ms.  Gutierrez  is  an  attorney and agent  of  Kramer  &  Frank.    On  that
same  date,  plaintiff  telephoned  and  spoke  with  Ms.  Gutierrez  and
informed  her  that  he  wanted  to  reach  an  amicable  resolution of  the
state  court  debt  collection  that  would  ensure  that  action  on  the
state  court  Petition  would  not  proceed.    Ms.  Gutierrez  telephoned
1Exhibit  A  to  defendant’s  Motion  to  Dismiss  (Doc.  #30)  is  a
copy  of  the  state  court  file  and  minutes  from  the  Greene  County
action styled HSBC Bank Nevada v. Leonard R. Smith, Case No.  0831-
CV10517.    Although the documents do not appear to be certified as
claimed   by   defendant,   plaintiff   does   not   challenge   their
authenticity.
2For purposes of determining a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss
for  lack  of  subject  matter  jurisdiction,  the  Court  may  consider
matters  outside  the  pleadings.    Drevlow  v.  Lutheran  Church,  Mo.
Synod, 991 F.2d  468,  470  (8th Cir.  1993).   In addition, matters of
public  record  referenced  in  a  Complaint  may  be  considered  in
determining a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim.    Deerbrook Pavilion, LLC v. Shalala,  235 F.3d  1100,  1102
(8th Cir.  2000).
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plaintiff the following day, August  14,  2008, and informed him that
he  could  enter  into  a  payment  agreement.     Ms.  Gutierrez  further
informed  plaintiff  that  a  contract  to  that  effect  would  be  drafted
and sent to plaintiff for his signature.
Through  his  conversations  with  Ms.  Gutierrez,  plaintiff
believed  that  the  negotiated  agreement  was  a  settlement  of  the
Petition and that Kramer & Frank would not proceed against him on the
Petition.    To  confirm  this  belief,  plaintiff  asked  Ms.  Gutierrez
whether he was required to appear in court on the Petition, to which
Ms.  Gutierrez  responded  that  no  court  appearance  was  necessary
inasmuch as an agreement had been reached between the plaintiff and
defendant with respect to a payment plan by which plaintiff would pay
off the debt.   Plaintiff claims that on October 29, 2008, he received
correspondence   from   defendant   confirming   their   agreement   that
plaintiff would make monthly payments to pay off the debt.3/
In  the  meanwhile,  on  September  4,  2008,  HSBC  appeared  in
court  on  the  Petition  through  its  counsel  Kramer  &  Frank,  the
defendant  here.     Plaintiff  did  not  appear.     The  court  entered
Judgment  on  the  Petition  against  plaintiff  that  same  date  in  the
3On  September  3,  2008,  plaintiff  signed  a  document  entitled
“Consent Judgment” which set out terms whereby plaintiff would make
payments  to  Kramer  &  Frank  in  the  amount  of                            $121.00  per  month
beginning September 25, 2008, and continuing each month thereafter
until  full  judgment  amounting  to  $4,226.56  was  satisfied.    This
document  was  signed  only  by  plaintiff  Leonard  Smith,  and  was  not
executed  by  any  person  on  behalf  of  HSBC  Card Services.    Nor  was
this  “Consent Judgment” ordered approved by the court, despite it
having  been  filed  with  the  court  on  September  3,  2008,  by  HSBC’s
counsel,  defendant  Kramer  &  Frank.                                         (Deft.’s  Exh.  A,  Doc.  #30  at
pp.  1,  22-23.)
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amount  of  $4,226.56,  representing  $3,675.27  in  principal  owed  and
$551.29 in attorney’s fees.   Interest on the Judgment was assessed at
the rate of 9.00 per cent per annum.                                           (Deft.’s Exh. A, Doc. #30 at p.
20.)    Plaintiff  did  not  receive  notification  of  the  Judgment  or  a
copy of the Judgment.
Plaintiff did not make each payment as was agreed to and,
on  March                                                                      26,                                                        2009,  HSBC,  through  its  attorneys  Kramer  &  Frank,
applied  for  and  obtained  a  writ  of  execution  on  the  Greene  County
Judgment,  pursuant  to  which  all  of  plaintiff’s  bank  accounts
maintained  at  U.S.  Bank  were  garnished.    The  application  and  order
for  writ  of  garnishment  was  filed  in  the  Circuit  Court  of  Greene
County with such writ issued by the Circuit Court of Jackson County,
Missouri, the jurisdiction in which U.S. Bank was located.                     (Deft.’s
Exh. A, Doc. #30.)   On April 7, 2009, plaintiff learned that his bank
accounts  had  been  garnished.    Plaintiff  claims  that it  was  at  that
time  when  he  first  became  aware  that  Judgment  had  been  entered
against him on the state court Petition.
In his Complaint, plaintiff alleges that Kramer & Frank’s
conduct in relation to its attempt to collect the debt allegedly owed
by plaintiff to HSBC violated the FDCPA in that Kramer & Frank:
1)                                                                             used  false,  deceptive,  misleading,  and  unfair  or
                                                                               unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect
a debt;
2)                                                                             falsely  represented  the  character,  amount  or  legal
status of the debt;
3)                                                                             used  false  representations  or  deceptive  means  to
collect or attempt to collect the debt;
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4)                                                                             falsely represented or implied that documents were not
                                                                               legal process forms or did not require action on the
part of plaintiff;
5)                                                                             used unfair and/or unconscionable means to collect or
attempt to collect the debt;
6)                                                                             brought a legal action on the debt against plaintiff
                                                                               in a county other than that in which plaintiff resided
at the commencement of the action; and
7)                                                                             was otherwise deceptive and failed to comply with the
provisions of the FDCPA.
Plaintiff  claims  that  defendant’s  conduct  caused  him  to  suffer
personal  humiliation,  embarrassment,  mental  anguish,  and  emotional
distress.    Plaintiff seeks actual and statutory damages, attorney’s
fees,  and  costs.    Plaintiff  does  not  attack  the  validity  of  the
underlying Judgment and does not seek to have the debt set aside or
to prevent the debt from being collected.
II.    Discussion
A.    Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Defendant Kramer & Frank first argues that application of
the  Rooker-Feldman  doctrine  deprives  this  Court  of  subject  matter
jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claims.    With the exception of habeas
corpus petitions, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprives lower federal
courts of subject matter jurisdiction over challenges to state court
judgments.   Lemonds v. St. Louis County,  222 F.3d  488,  492 (8th Cir.
2000)  (citing District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman,  460
U.S. 462, 476 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416
(1923)).    Only  the  United  States  Supreme  Court  has  jurisdiction  to
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review state court decisions.    Friends of Lake View Sch. Dist. Inc.
No.                                                                            25  of  Phillips  County  v.  Beebe,   578  F.3d                                                          753,   758          (8th  Cir.
2009).                                                                                                                “The  Supreme  Court  has    made  clear[,  however,]  that  the
Rooker-Feldman  doctrine  occupies  a  ‘narrow  ground.’”    Id.  (quoting
Exxon  Mobil  Corp.  v.  Saudi  Basic  Indus.  Corp.,                          544  U.S.                              280,                                                               284
(2005)).   As stated by the Supreme Court in Exxon Mobil, the doctrine
“is confined to cases . . . brought by state-court losers complaining
of  injuries  caused  by  state-court  judgments  rendered  before  the
district  court  proceedings  commenced  and  inviting  district  court
review and rejection of those judgments.”    Exxon Mobil,  544 U.S. at
284.
If a federal plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong
an  allegedly  erroneous  decision  by  a  state
court,  and  seeks  relief  from  a  state  court
judgment based on that decision, Rooker-Feldman
bars  subject  matter  jurisdiction  in  federal
district  court.     If,  on  the  other  hand,  a
federal  plaintiff  asserts  as  a  legal  wrong  an
allegedly illegal act or omission by an adverse
party, Rooker-Feldman does not bar jurisdiction.
Noel v. Hall,  341 F.3d  1148,  1164  (9th Cir.  2003)  (quoted favorably
in  Riehm  v.  Engelking,                                                      538  F.3d                              952,                                                               965    (8th  Cir.   2008))       (cited
favorably in Exxon Mobil,  544 U.S. at  293).    See also MSK EyEs Ltd.
v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 546 F.3d 533, 539  (8th Cir.  2008).
In this cause, plaintiff does not seek relief from a state
court  judgment,  nor  does  he  allege  injury  caused  by  a  state  court
judgment.    Instead, plaintiff asserts as legal wrongs the allegedly
illegal conduct by an adverse party, that is Kramer & Frank, in the
manner and method by which it sought and executed the Greene County
Judgment as part of its debt collection practice.   Because plaintiff
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is not challenging the action of the state court in its issuance of
this Judgment, nor the Judgment itself, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
does not apply.    MSK EyEs Ltd.,  546 F.3d at  539; Riehm,  528 F.3d at
965.
Defendant argues, however, that for plaintiff to succeed on
his claims of fraudulent conduct, this Court would have to find that
the  Circuit  Court  of  Greene  County  erred  in  its  entry  of  Judgment.
Defendant contends that the substance of the claims now raised could
have  been  raised  in  state  court  under  Missouri  Supreme  Court  Rule
74.06, which provides an aggrieved party one year from the entry of
judgment to seek relief from that judgment on the basis of mistake,
fraud,  misrepresentation,  misconduct,  irregularity,  or  inequity.
Defendant argues that by raising the instant claims in federal court
instead of through established mechanisms available in state court,
plaintiff seeks an indirect appeal of the Greene County Judgment in
this federal forum.    Citing Kropelnicki v. Siegel,  290 F.3d  118  (2d
Cir.                                                                            2002),  defendant  contends  that  because  plaintiff  could  have
raised the instant claims in state court to challenge the Judgment,
said  claims  are                                                               “inextricably  intertwined”  with  the  state  court
Judgment and thus are barred from review by a federal district court
under Rooker-Feldman.
The  Second  Circuit’s  broad  reading  of  the  Rooker-Feldman
doctrine  set  out  in  Kropelnicki,  upon  which  the  defendant  relies
here,  was  abrogated  by  the  Supreme  Court’s  decision  in  Exxon  Mobil
Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp.,  544 U.S.  280  (2005).    See McLamb
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v.  County  of  Suffolk,                                                        280  Fed.  Appx.   107   (2d  Cir.   2008)   (Rooker-
Feldman  doctrine  does  not  apply  merely  because  federal  claims  are
“inextricably intertwined” with a state-court decision.).    Instead,
the  narrow  subset  of  cases  which  are  barred  under  the  doctrine  are
only those in which the plaintiff seeks redress in a federal district
court for injuries “caused by” a state court judgment and in which he
seeks “review and rejection” of said judgment.   Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S.
at  291; Skit Int’l, Ltd. v. DAC Techs. of Ark., Inc., 487 F.3d  1154,
1157  (8th Cir.  2007)(citing Exxon Mobil,  544 U.S. at  284).
The  plaintiff  here  does  not  seek  redress  for  any  alleged
injury  stemming  from  the  Greene  County  Judgment  itself.    Indeed,
plaintiff does not challenge the Judgment or the underlying debt; nor
does  he  seek  to  set  either  aside.     Instead,  plaintiff  raises
independent  claims  against  the  defendant  in  relation  to  its  debt
collection practices.   The alleged unlawful conduct here, from which
plaintiff claims he sustained injury, involves the manner and method
by  which  the  defendant  used  the  judicial  process  in  its  attempt  to
collect  a  debt,  not  the  judicial  process  itself.     These  claims
against the defendant would continue even if the state court Judgment
were vacated.
Accordingly, to the extent defendant seeks to dismiss this
cause of action under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, the motion should be denied.
B.    Failure to State a Claim
In  the  alternative,  defendant  argues  that  if  plaintiff’s
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claims are not barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the Complaint
should nevertheless be dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P.  12(b)(6) for
failure to state a claim.
When reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the
Court  must  accept  as  true  all  factual  allegations  contained  in  the
Complaint,  and  review  the  Complaint  to  determine  whether  its
allegations  show  the  pleader  to  be  entitled  to  relief.    Bell  Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007); Fed.
R. Civ. P.  8(a)(2).    The purpose of a motion to dismiss for failure
to state a claim is to test the legal sufficiency of the Complaint.
A  Complaint  must  be  dismissed  under  Rule                                  12(b)(6)  if  it  does  not
plead  “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.”    Twombly,  127 S. Ct. at  1974  (abrogating the traditional
12(b)(6)  “no  set  of  facts”  standard  set  forth  in  Conley  v.  Gibson,
355  U.S.  41,  45-46  (1957)).    While  the  Complaint  need  not  provide
specific facts in support of the claims contained therein, Erickson
v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) (per curiam), it
“must include sufficient factual information to provide the ‘grounds’
on  which  the  claim  rests,  and  to  raise  a  right  to  relief  above  a
speculative  level.”    Schaaf  v.  Residential  Funding  Corp.,  517  F.3d
544,  549  (8th  Cir.  2008)  (citing  Twombly,  127  S.  Ct.  at  1964-65  &
n.3).     This  obligation  requires  a  plaintiff  to  plead                   “more  than
labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of
a cause of action will not do.”    Twombly,  127 S. Ct. at  1965.
In  Gregory  v.  Dillard’s,  Inc.,                                              565  F.3d                     464   (8th  Cir.
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2009),  the  Eighth  Circuit  recently  elaborated  on  the  standard
enunciated in Twombly when addressing a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6):
After  Twombly,  we  have  said  that  a  plaintiff
“must   assert   facts   that   affirmatively   and
plausibly suggest that the pleader has the right
he  claims                                                                                                                                                                               ,  rather  than  facts  that  are
                                                                                                                                 merely  consistent  with  such  a  right.”    Stalley
                                                                               v.  Catholic  Health  Initiatives,                                                                                                              509  F.3d              517,
                                                                                                                                 521  (8th Cir.  2007); see Wilkerson v. New Media
                                                                               Tech.  Charter  Sch.,                             522  F.3d                                               315,                                  321-22                 (3d
Cir.                                                                           2008).                                                                                                    While  a  plaintiff  need  not  set
forth  “detailed  factual  allegations,”  Twombly,
127  S.  Ct.  at                                                               1964,  or                                         “specific  facts”  that
describe the evidence to be presented, Erickson
v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 []
(2007)  (per curiam), the complaint must include
sufficient  factual  allegations  to  provide  the
grounds on which the claim rests.    Twombly,  127
S.   Ct.   at                                                                  1965   n.3.                                       A   district   court,
                                                                               therefore,   is   not   required                  “to   divine   the
litigant's intent and create claims that are not
clearly  raised,”  Bediako  [v.  Stein  Mart,  Inc.,
354 F.3d  835,  840  (8th Cir.  2004)], and it need
not                                                                            “conjure  up  unpled  allegations”  to  save  a
complaint.    Rios  v.  City  of  Del  Rio,                                    444  F.3d
417,                                                                           421                                               (5th  Cir.                                              2006)                                 (internal  quotation
omitted).
Gregory,  565 F.3d at  473.
Having   reviewed   plaintiff’s   Complaint   against   this
backdrop, it cannot be said that the Complaint fails to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted.   Contrary to defendant’s assertion,
plaintiff articulates sufficient factual information giving rise to
alleged violations of the FDCPA, and adequately pleads said alleged
violations.   Because the Complaint gives the defendant fair notice of
what  plaintiff’s  claims  are,  the  grounds  upon  which  they  rest,  and
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provides  a  sufficient  factual  basis  for  such  grounds,  defendant’s
motion  to  dismiss  for  failure  to  state  a  claim  should  be  denied.
Eckert v. Titan Tire Corp.,  514 F.3d  801,  806  (8th Cir.  2008).
To  the  extent  defendant  argues  that  it  owed  no  duty  to
plaintiff   to   provide   legal   advice   and   that   any   alleged
misrepresentation was immaterial in the circumstances of this case,
a  review  of  the  motion  and  plaintiff’s  response  thereto  shows  such
matters to involve factual issues not properly determined on a motion
to  dismiss.     When  determining  a  motion  to  dismiss  under  Rule
12(b)(6),  “[t]he  issue  is  not  whether  a  plaintiff  will  ultimately
prevail  but  whether  the  claimant  is  entitled  to  offer  evidence  to
support the claims.”    Scheuer v. Rhodes,  416 U.S.  232,  236  (1974).
Finally,  to  the  extent  defendant  contends  that  plaintiff
fails  to  state  a  claim  under  the  venue  provision  of  the  FDCPA,
defendant’s  motion  should  be  denied.    In  his  Complaint,  plaintiff
claims that defendant caused the garnishment proceeding to be filed
in the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri, despite plaintiff’s
residence in Greene County.    Under  15 U.S.C.  §  1692i(a)(2),
Any  debt  collector  who  brings  any  legal  action
on a debt against any consumer shall . . . bring
such  action  only  in  the  judicial  district  or
similar  legal  entity  (A)  in  which  the  consumer
signed  the  contract  sued  upon;  or  (B)  in  which
such consumer resides at the commencement of the
action.
An application for writ of garnishment, as an action in enforcement
of  a  previously  obtained  judgment,  is  a  “legal  action”  which  falls
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within the venue provision of the FDCPA,  15 U.S.C.  §  1692i.    Fox v.
Citicorp  Credit  Servs.,  Inc.,  15  F.3d  1507,  1515  (9th  Cir.  1994).
The  venue  provision  in  the  FDCPA  reflects  the  concern  of
Congress about consumers having to defend against lawsuits in distant
or inconvenient courts.   Fox,  15 F.3d at 1515; see also Blakemore v.
Pekay,  895  F.  Supp.  972,  978-79  (N.D.  Ill.  1995).    Consumers  face
similar  burdens  in  defending  against  enforcement  proceedings  in  a
distant court.    See Fox,  15 F.3d at  1515.    Here, although defendant
filed its application for writ of garnishment in the Circuit Court of
Greene  County,  Missouri,  the  county  of  plaintiff’s  residence,  the
application,  as  completed  by  the  defendant,  was  made  to  Jackson
County,  Missouri,  and  indeed  was  executed  in  Jackson  County,
Missouri.                                                                      (Deft.’s  Exh.  A,  Doc.  #30  at  p.  9.)4/    Summons  upon  the
writ  issued  from  the  Circuit  Court  of  Jackson  County.                  (Id.)    The
Notice to Debtor of Exemptions issued   to plaintiff was issued by the
Circuit Court of Jackson County and advised plaintiff that he could
review  the  case  in  person  in  the  Department  of  Civil  Records  in
Kansas  City,  Missouri,  which  is  located  in  Jackson  County.     The
Notice  from  the  Jackson  County  Circuit  Court  further  informed
plaintiff  that  any  claims  for  exemptions  were  to  be  filed  in  the
Court Administrator’s Office and that he could request a hearing on
any  objections  to  claimed  exemptions.    The  Notice  further  informed
plaintiff  that  he  could  have  his  claim  for  exemption  reviewed  and
determined by the court upon his request.                                      (Id. at p.  10.)
4See supra nn.  1,  2.
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On April 24, 2009, plaintiff submitted Exemption Affidavits
to the Circuit Court of Jackson County.    A review of the Affidavits
shows plaintiff to have signed them before and in the presence of a
deputy  clerk  of  the  Jackson  County  Circuit  Court.     The  related
Notices to Creditor were issued that same date by the Jackson County
Circuit Court.   The Notices to Creditor informed Kramer & Frank that
any requests for court review of the exemption claims were required
to  be  filed  with  the  Execution/Garnishment  Section  in  Kansas  City,
that is, in Jackson County.                                                     (Deft.’s Exh. A, Doc.  #30 at pp.  5-8.)
                                                                                Because  no  objections  were  filed  to  the  claimed  exemptions,  the
                                                                                Circuit  Court  of  Jackson  County  released  the  garnishment  against
                                                                                plaintiff’s bank accounts.   The court executed the Release on May 5,
2009.                                                                           (Id. at p. 4.)   The Release was thereafter filed in the Greene
County Circuit Court on May  11,  2009.                                                                                                                    (Id. at pp.  2,  4.)
On  this  information  before  the  Court,  it  cannot  be  said
that plaintiff failed to state a claim under the venue provision of
the FDCPA.   Although the written application for writ was physically
filed  in  the  Circuit  Court  of  Greene  County,  a  review  of  the
application  shows  Kramer  &  Frank  to  have  unequivocally  applied  to
Jackson  County  for  issuance  of  and  execution  on  the  writ.    Indeed,
all proceedings on the writ occurred in the Circuit Court of Jackson
County, including plaintiff’s personal appearance before a deputy of
that  court  to  swear  to  and  affirm  his  claimed  exemptions.     The
instant claim against Kramer & Frank thus appears to fit within the
ambit  of  15  U.S.C.  §  1692i  inasmuch  as  the  purpose  of  this  venue
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provision  is  to  proscribe  debt  collection  practices  which  require
consumers to defend against legal actions in distant or inconvenient
courts.     Defendant’s  motion  to  dismiss  on  this  basis  should  be
denied.
Accordingly, for all of the foregoing reasons,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant Kramer & Frank, P.C.’s
Motion to Dismiss  (Doc.  #13) is denied.
                                                                            UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Dated this                                                                  2nd    day of December,  2009.
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