Preview:

No. 81-217 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1981

ROBER W. DVORAK and PATRICIA J. DVORAK, Plaintiffs and Respondents and Cross-Appellants,

HUNTLEY PROJECT IRRIGATION DISTRICT, JOHN PROPP and NORMAN MAYNARD, Defendants and Appellants.

Appeal from:

District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, In and for the County of Yellowstone Honorable Robert Wilson, Judge presiding.

Counsel of Record: For Appellants: Harwood, Galles & Gunderson, Billings, Montana Anderson, Brown, Gerbase, Cebull & Jones, Billings, Montana Rockwood Brown argued, Billings, Montana For Respondents: Keefer, Roybal, Hanson, Stacey and Jarussi, Billings, Montana Calvin J. Stacey argued, Billings, Montana

Submitted: Decided : Filed:

October 26, 1981
i

bft '2 3

~4

DEc 2s " 8 i2

M r . Chief J u s t i c e Court.

F r a n k I . H a s w e l l d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n of for damages a g a i n s t a n

the

I n an a c t i o n a n d two o f

irrigation district

i t s e m p l o y e e s f o r r e f u s a l to p r o v i d e i r r i g a t i o n water
farm, t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t a w a r d e d p l a i n t i f f s com-

t o plaintif fs'

p e n s a t o r y and p u n i t i v e damages i n c o n f o r m i t y w i t h a j u r y v e r d i c t . In a post-trial order, t h e District Court vacated t h e award o f

p u n i t i v e d a m a g e s a g a i n s t t h e i r r i g a t i o n d i s t r i c t and d e n i e d a new

trial.

We

reverse

and

remand

for

a

new

trial.

On A p r i l 2 3 ,

1 9 7 6 , p l a i n t i f f s Roger and Ann Dvorak f i l e d the District Court of Yellowstone County

a

damage

action

in

a g a i n s t d e f e n d a n t s H u n t l e y P r o j e c t I r r i g a t i o n D i s t r i c t and two of

i t s employees,
ditch losses rider.

Norman

Maynard, sought

its manager,
actual

and

John for

Propp,

a

Plaintiffs

damages

their

crop

i n 1 9 7 4 and 1 9 7 5 a n d p u n i t i v e damages o f $ 5 0 , 0 0 0 a g a i n s t The d e f e n d a n t s c r o s s - c l a i m e d f o r puni-

each of t h e s e defendants.

t i v e damages a g a i n s t p l a i n t i f f Roger D v o r a k . On plaintiffs $40,000 November in the 7, 1980, of the jury returned

a

verdict damages

for and

amount

$5,000

compensatory the

punitive

damages

against

each of

three defendants. Roger

The j u r y d e n i e d d e f e n d a n t s ' Dvorak f o r p u n i t i v e damages. Thereafter,

cross-claim

against plaintiff

defendants the

moved of

for

a

new

trial.

The against

District

Court

struck

award

punitive

damages and

defendant Huntley P r o j e c t

I r r i g a t i o n District

denied

a new

trial.
Defendants appeal from d e n i a l of t h e i r motion f o r a new

t r i a l and p l a i n t i f f s c r o s s - a p p e a l

from t h a t p a r t o f

the District

C o u r t ' s o r d e r s t r i k i n g t h e $ 4 0 , 0 0 0 p u n i t i v e damages award a g a i n s t defendant Huntley P r o j e c t I r r i g a t i o n D i s t r i c t . W e r e s t a t e t h e i s s u e s r a i s e d on a p p e a l o r c r o s s - a p p e a l t h i s manner: in

1.
for this

Did

t h e manner of violate

drawing

the preselected and

jury list
MCA,

trial

sections

25-7-202

25-7-204,

thereby

denying

appellants'

right

to

a

trial

before

a

jury

s e l e c t e d i n t h e manner p r o v i d e d by l a w ? 2.
Were e m p l o y e e s Maynard and P r o p p exempt o r immune from

a p u n i t i v e damage j u d g m e n t a g a i n s t them?
3.

Did t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r i n s t r i k i n g t h e p u n i t i v e against Huntley Project Irrigation District?

damage

award

The p a r t i e s '

sub-issues

w i l l be d i s c u s s e d u n d e r t h e p r i n -

c i p a l i s s u e s set f o r t h above t o t h e e x t e n t n e c e s s a r y f o r d e t e r mination of t h i s appeal. The I r r i g a t i o n D i s t r i c t c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e manner i n which t h e j u r y was s e l e c t e d v i o l a t e d t h e a p p l i c a b l e Montana s t a t u t e s .

The s t a t u t e s i n q u e s t i o n are as f o l l o w s :

" 25-7-202. Judge -- c a p s u l e s c o n t a i n i n g t o draw ballots. When a n i s s u e o f f a c t t o be t r i e d b y a j u r y is b r o u g h t t o t r i a l , t h e d i s t r i c t j u d g e i n t h e p r e s e n c e of t h e c l e r k of t h e c o u r t must o p e n l y d r a w o u t o f t h e t r i a l j u r o r box as many o f t h e c a p s u l e s c o n t a i n i n g b a l l o t s w i t h t h e names o f j u r o r s t h e r e o n , o n e a f t e r a n o t h e r , as a r e s u f f i c i e n t to form a jury."

- -o f d r a w i n g c a p s u l e s . Mode Before the "25-7-204. f i r s t c a p s u l e c o n t a i n i n g a b a l l o t s h a l l have b e e n d r a w n , t h e box m u s t be c l o s e d and w e l l s h a so a s t o t h o r o u g h l y mix t h e c a p s u l e s ken therein. The d i s t r i c t j u d g e m u s t d r a w a c a p s u l e containing a ballot with the juror's name t h e r e o n t h r o u g h a n a p e r t u r e made i n t h e l i d l a r g e e n o u g h o n l y to a d m i t h i s hand c o n v e n i e n t l y a n d w i t h o u t s a i d j u d g e g a z i n g i n t o s a i d box b e f o r e or w h i l e d r a w i n g s a i d c a p s u l e

."

The s t a t u t o r y p r o c e d u r e s s e t o u t a b o v e were n o t f o l l o w e d i n t h i s case. Instead,
a deputy c l e r k of

c o u r t removed p a p e r The d e p u t y c l e r k d i d drawn. The names not

s l i p s , n o t i n c a p s u l e s , from a metal box. not shake the box before the names were

d r a w n by t h e d e p u t y c l e r k were p l a c e d

on a list t h a t w a s

d r a w n by l o t p r i o r t o t h e i m p a n e l i n g o f t h e t r i a l j u r y . t h e most important departure

Finally, took names

from t h e s t a t u t o r y p r o c e d u r e

p l a c e when t h e d e p u t y c l e r k d r e w t h e p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r s ' f r o m t h e metal box o u t s i d e t h e p r e s e n c e o f This procedure violated

t h e d i s t r i c t judge. these

t h e fundamental purpose of

statutes, viz.

t o i n s u r e random s e l e c t i o n o f t r i a l j u r o r s b y l o t o r array. The s t a t u t o r y r e q u i r e m e n t of the jurorst names and

from t h e e n t i r e p a n e l encapsulating the

ballots

containing

t h o r o u g h l y s h a k i n g t h e box b e f o r e d r a w i n g is t h e s t a t u t o r y method f o r a c h i e v i n g random s e l e c t i o n . The s t a t u t o r y r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t the jurors i n the presence

t h e d i s t r i c t j u d g e d r a w t h e names o f

o f t h e c l e r k o f c o u r t is to i n s u r e t h a t t h e s t a t u t o r y p r o c e d u r e s

are followed.

The s t a t u t o r y v i o l a t i o n s h e r e d e f e a t e d t h e o b j ec-

t i v e o f i n s u r i n g random s e l e c t i o n . I n S t a t e v. D i s t r i c t C o u r t County o f S i l v e r Mont. 3 5 4 , 348 p.2d the
BOW

( 1 9 ~ 9 1 3~ ) 6

1 4 3 , t h i s C o u r t d i s c u s s e d t h e i m p o r t a n c e of
jU
~ Y

following

select i o n

statutes

and

held,

"It is not the r i g h t of the individual n e c e s s a r i l y involved, but r a t h e r the e n t i r e jury s y s t e m and t h e s e l e c t i o n p r o c e d u r e s w h i c h m u s t b e p r o t e c t e d , and when a s h o w i n g i s t i m e l y b r o u g h t b e f o r e t h i s c o u r t w e would be remiss i n o u r d u t i e s i f we p e r m i t t e d m a t e r i a l d e v i a t i o n or d e p a r t u r e f r o m t h e p r o c e d u r e s s p e l l e d o u t by t h e legislature." 348 P.2d a t 1 4 6 . This Court reaffirmed the requirement that the District

C o u r t f o l l o w t h e s t a t u t o r y m a n d a t e o f j u r y s e l e c t i o n i n S t a t e v. F i t z p a t r i c k ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 1 7 4 Mont. 1 7 4 , 5 6 9 P.2d 3 8 3 , when w e s t a t e d :

" S p e c i f i c a l l y , a l l d u t i e s d e l e g a t e d to t h e j u r y c o m m i s s i o n and d i s t r i c t c o u r t j u d g e were p e r f o r m e d b y t h e c l e r k o f c o u r t w i t h o u t a n y apparent overseeing. W h i l e w e h a v e no c a u s e t o q u e s t i o n t h e good f a i t h of t h e p u b l i c o f f i c e r s i n v o l v e d , it is o b v i o u s t h e s t a t u t o r y scheme f o r s e l e c t i n g and d r a w i n g a j u r y w a s c o m p l e t e l y circumvented. The r u l e i n Montana i s t h a t j u r i e s m u s t be s e l e c t e d and drawn i n s u b s t a n t i a l compliance with the l a w . Where t h e d i s r e g a r d f o r l e g i s l a t i v e m a n d a t e s a m o u n t s t o more t h a n t e c h n i c a l i r r e g u l a r i t y s u b s t a n t i a l compliance h a s n o t been achieved." 569 P.2d a t 389.
Respondents contend by the D i s t r i c t Therefore, Court t h a t t h e j u r y s e l e c t i o n process used that court. the
District

. ..

i n t h i s case w a s t y p i c a l of contend that counsel for

respondents

s h o u l d h a v e known t h e p r o c e d u r e and o b j e c t e d to t h e j u r y select i o n p r o c e s s i m m e d i a t e l y and h e s h o u l d n o t h a v e w a i t e d week a f t e r t h e v e r d i c t had been e n t e r e d until a

t o make h i s o b j e c t i o n

known. The basic flaw in this contention
is

that

counsel

for

t h e I r r i g a t i o n District did not discover the discrepancies i n the jury selection process u n t i l c o u n s e l had no r e a s o n , the a week a f t e r t h e t r i a l . Further,

p r i o r to h i s i n q u i r i e s ,

to s u s p e c t t h a t
In other

s t a t u t o r y procedures

were

not

being

followed.

w o r d s , t h e "means o f k n o w l e d g e " were n o t a v a i l a b l e f o r c o u n s e l to o b j e c t b e f o r e or d u r i n g t h e t r i a l . I n L e d g e r v . ~ c ~ e n z i( 1 9 3 8 ) r 1 0 7 Mont. 3 3 5 , 8 5 P.2d e 352,

t h i s Court d i s c u s s e d t h e n e c e s s i t y of o b j e c t i n g t o t h e impaneling

of

a

jury

in

a

timely

manner.

This

Court

held:

" t h a t i f c o u n s e l does n o t have t h e knowledge, o r means o f knowledge, of the i r r e g u l a r i t y i n t h e drawing of t h e j u r y , o r t h e p a n e l from w h i c h it is s e l e c t e d u n t i l a f t e r t h e v e r d i c t , t h e q u e s t i o n may be r a i s e d f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e on m o t i o n f o r new t r i a l . " 8 5 P.2d 353.
I n t h i s c a s e , c o u n s e l had a r i g h t to r e l y on t h e j u d g e and c l e r k t o follow their statutory duties. p r e j u d i c e h a s b e e n shown i s i r r e l e v a n t . dict would
is

. . .

The f a c t t h a t no a c t u a l Whether a d i f f e r e n t verprocedures been to

have

resulted

had

the

statutory

followed determine. departure

purely

speculative,

conjectural

and

impossible

The D i s t r i c t C o u r t went w e l l beyond a mere t e c h n i c a l from the jury selection statutes and this type of

d e p a r t u r e n e c e s s i t a t e s t h e r e v e r s a l o f t h e v e r d i c t and a r e t r i a l w i t h a j u r y s e l e c t e d i n t h e p r o p e r manner. To a s s i s t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t o n r e t r i a l , we w i l l d e t e r m i n e two o t h e r i s s u e s r a i s e d i n t h i s a p p e a l . The defendants second Propp issue and presented by the
District is w h e t h e r

Maynard

are

exempt

and

immune

from

the

e x e m p l a r y and p u n i t i v e damages awarded a g a i n s t them. gation 2-9-105,
District
MCA,

The Irriand

contends

that

because

of

s e c t i o n s 2-9-104

Maynard

and P r o p p are n o t l i a b l e f o r t h e $ 4 0 , 0 0 0

e x e m p l a r y award. S e c t i o n s 2-9-104 and - 1 0 5 ,
MCA, d o n o t a p p l y to i n d i v i d u a l

d e f e n d a n t s b u t t o t h e s t a t e and g o v e r n m e n t a l e n t i t i e s .

The sec-

t i o n o f C h a p t e r 9 t h a t a p p l i e s t o i n d i v i d u a l d e f e n d a n t s is s e c t i o n 2-9-305

,

MCA,

which p r o v i d e s :

"Governmental e n t i t y to be j o i n e d a s defendant-immunization and i n d e m n z i c a t i o n o f employees. (1) I t is t h e p u r p o s e o f t h i s s e c t i o n t o p r o v i d e f o r t h e i m m u n i z a t i o n and i n d e m n i f i c a t i o n o f p u b l i c o f f i c e r s and e m p l o y e e s s u e d f o r t h e i r a c t i o n s o t h e r t h a n i n t e n t i o n a l t o r t or f e l o n i o u s a c t s , t a k e n w i t h i n t h e c o u r s e and s c o p e o f t h e i r employment.
-

" ( 2 ) I n a n a c t i o n b r o u g h t a g a i n s t any employee o f a s t a t e , c o u n t y , c i t y , town, or o t h e r governm e n t a l e n t i t y f o r a n e g l i g e n t a c t , e r r o r , or omission or o t h e r a c t i o n a b l e conduct of t h e employee committed w h i l e a c t i n g w i t h i n t h e c o u r s e and s c o p e o f h i s o f f i c e or e m p l o y m e n t , t h e g o v e r n m e n t a l e n t i t y e m p l o y e r s h a l l be made a p a r t y defendant t o the action. " ( 3 ) Recovery a g a i n s t a governmental e n t i t y under t h e p r o v i s i o n s of p a r t s 1 through 3 o f t h i s c h a p t e r s h a l l c o n s t i t u t e a c o m p l e t e b a r to a n y a c t i o n o r r e c o v e r y o f damages b y t h e c l a i m a n t , b y r e a s o n o f t h e same s u b j e c t m a t t e r , a g a i n s t t h e e m p l o y e e whose n e g l i g e n c e o r wrongf u l a c t , e r r o r , o r o m i s s i o n or o t h e r a c t i o n a b l e I n any such c o n d u c t g a v e r i s e t o t h e claim. a governmental entity, the action against e m p l o y e e whose c o n d u c t g a v e r i s e t o t h e s u i t s h a l l be immune from s u i t by r e a s o n s o f t h e same s u b j e c t matter if the governmental entity a c k n o w l e d g e s or i s bound b y a j u d i c i a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t t h e c o n d u c t upon which t h e claim i s b r o u g h t a r i s e s o u t o f t h e c o u r s e and s c o p e o f s u c h e m p l o y e e s 1 e m p l o y m e n t , u n l e s s t h e c l a i m is b a s e d upon a n i n t e n t i o n a l t o r t or f e l o n i o u s a c t o f t h e employee.
"(4) I n a n y a c t i o n i n which a governmental the e n t i t y e m p l o y e e is a p a r t y d e f e n d a n t , e m p l o y e e s h a l l be i n d e m n i f i e d b y t h e government a l e n t i t y e m p l o y e r f o r a n y money j u d g m e n t s or l e g a l e x p e n s e s t o w h i c h he may be s u b j e c t as a r e s u l t o f t h e s u i t u n l e s s t h e c o n d u c t upon which t h e claim is b r o u g h t d i d n o t a r i s e o u t o f t h e c o u r s e and s c o p e o f h i s employment or i s a n tort o r f e l o n i o u s act of tG intentional employee ( ~ p ha m i s a d d e d . ) s

."

Under t h i s s e c t i o n , i n d i v i d u a l d e f e n d a n t s a r e immune from b e i n g s u e d f o r t h e i r a c t i o n s u n l e s s t h e i r a c t is i n t e n t i o n a l o r felonious. S e c t i o n 2-9-305(1),
MCA.

The I r r i g a t i o n D i s t r i c t

c o n t e n d s t h a t t h i s C o u r t c a n n o t s p e c u l a t e as t o w h e t h e r t h e j u r y , in their verdict, had f o u n d P r o p p and Maynard t o h a v e c o m m i t t e d

an intentional tort.

The o r i g i n a l a c t i o n was b a s e d tion 85-7-1911(1),
MCA,

upon

t h e v i o l a t i o n of in pertinent

secpart:

which

states

"The b o a r d o f c o m m i s s i o n e r s s h a l l a p p o r t i o n t h e water f o r i r r i g a t i o n among t h e l a n d s i n t h e d i s t r i c t i n a j u s t and e q u i t a b l e manner

. . ."

The j u r y

found

that

t h e D i s t r i c t had v i o l a t e d

t h i s s e c t i o n and

t h a t P r o p p and Maynard b y t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l a c t s had a l s o v i o l a t e d t h i s section. T h e r e was a c l e a r v i o l a t i o n o f

a s t a t u t o r y duty
failed

when t h e D i s t r i c t , t h r o u g h t h e a c t s o f P r o p p and Maynard,

t o p r o v i d e water t o t h e D v o r a k s .

The " a c t " o f f a i l i n g - p r o v i d e to

water - - i- case w a s a r g u a b l y - i n t e n t i o n a l a c t a n d a s s u c h in th s an
it an of - would j u s t i f y - award - p u n i t i v e d a m a g e s . S e c t i o n 27-8-221,

I

MCA.

The I r r i g a t i o n D i s t r i c t c o n t e n d s t h a t no showing o f a c t u a l

malice was made and t h e r e f o r e t h e p u n i t i v e damage award a g a i n s t
P r o p p and Maynard c a n n o t s t a n d . Goddard St.Rep. (1979)
---- Mont ----

I n F i r s t S e c . Bank o f Bozeman v .
I

.

5 9 3 P.2d

1040,

1048-10491

36

8 5 4 , 864-865,

t h i s Court held:

" I t is n o t n e c e s s a r y t o show a c t u a l m a l i c e t o r e c o v e r p u n i t i v e damages. Kwmk+w+ v. H o l i d a y ' N a r r ; n q i ? - 0 ~ Y R a m b l e r C o r p o r a t i o n ( 1 9 7 8 ) , ----Mon t ---- I 5 7 5 P.2d 5 7 8 , 3 5 S t . R e p . 46. F r a u d or malice may be S e c t i o n 17-208, R.C.M. a c t u a l or presumed. 1 9 4 7 , now s e c t i o n 27-1-221, MCA. I m p l i e d malice may be shown b y p r o o f t h a t d e f e n d a n t e n g a g e d i n a c o u r s e o f c o n d u c t knowing i t to be h a r m f u l and unlawful. Ferguson v. Town Pump, I n c . v. Wallace D i t e m a n ( 1 9 7 8 ) , Mon t I 580 P.2d 9 1 5 , 9 2 1 , 35 S t . R e p . 8 2 4 , 8 3 1 ; Miller v . Fox (1977)1 Mon t , 5 7 1 P.2d 8 0 4 , 34 S t . R e p . 1 3 6 7 ; C a s h i n v. N o r t h e r n p a c i f i c R a i l w a y Company ( 1 9 3 4 ) 96 Mont. 9 2 , 28 P.2d 8 6 2 .

.

.

.

"'Malice-in-law' is imp1 i e d where d e f e n d a n t ' s c o n d u c t is u n j u s t i f i a b l e

."

the

Here

,

P r o p p and Maynard s cond u c t was a r g u a b l y un j u s t i-

f i a b l e i n t h a t t h e y i n t e n t i o n a l l y f a i l e d t o p r o v i d e water to t h e Dvoraks' farm. T h e i r a c t i o n s , i f b e l i e v e d by t h e j u r y , a r e suf-

f i c i e n t t o c o n s t i t u t e a v i o l a t i o n s u b j e c t i n g them to l i a b i l i t y f o r p u n i t i v e damages. The Dvoraks have cross-appealed, alleging that the

D i s t r i c t C o u r t c o m m i t t e d error by s t r i k i n g t h e p u n i t i v e damage

award a g a i n s t t h e D i s t r i c t .

They p r e s e n t s e v e r a l c o n t e n t i o n s b u t

w e need o n l y t o d i s c u s s w h e t h e r Montana l a w p r o v i d e d f o r g o v e r n mental immunity at the time this a c tion

arose.

T h i s a c t i o n arose i n and is l i m i t e d to t h e summer o f 1 9 7 4 , a f a c t t h a t was s t i p u l a t e d to by b o t h p a r t i e s . C o n s t i t u t i o n p r o v i d e s i n S e c t i o n 1 8 , A r t i c l e 11: " S e c t i o n 1 8 . S t a t e s u b j e c t t o s u i t . The s t a t e , c o u n t i e s , c i t i e s , t o w n s , and a l l o t h e r l o c a l g o v e r n m e n t a l e n t i t i e s s h a l l h a v e no immunity f r o m s u i t f o r i n j u r y t o a p e r s o n or p r o p e r t y , e x c e p t as may be s p e c i f i c a l l y p r o v i d e d b y l a w b y a 2/3 v o t e o f e a c h h o u s e of t h e l e g i s l a t u r e The 1 9 7 2 Montana

."

The l e g i s l a t u r e d i d n o t p r o v i d e governmental 2-9-105,
MCA,

immunity f o r c e r t a i n s t a t e and enacted sections 2-9-104 and this
MCA

entities in 1977.

until

it

These

s t a t u t e s do not

a p p l y to

a c t i o n and c a n n o t be a p p l i e d r e t r o a c t i v e l y . provides :

S e c t i o n 1-2-109,

"When laws r e t r o a c t i v e . No l a w c o n t a i n e d i n a n y -o f t h e s t a t u t e s o f Montana is r e t r o a c t i v e u n l e s s e x p r e s s l y so d e c l a r e d . " The D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d by s t r i k i n g t h e award o f p u n i t i v e damages against the Huntley Project Irrigation
District.

R e v e r s e d and remanded f o r a new t r i a l .

Chief J u s t i c e

W e concur:

Mr. J u s t i c e Gene B . D a l y d i s s e n t i n g :
I respectfully dissent.

The m a j o r i t y h o l d s t h a t t h e manner i n which t h e j u r y was s e l e c t e d v i o l a t e d s e c t i o n s 25-7-202 and 25-7-204,
MCA,

and t h e r e b y a b r i d g e d t h e D i s t r i c t ' s f u n d a m e n t a l . r i g h t s t o a f a i r and i m p a r t i a l j u r y . The m a j o r i t y r e l i e s upon S t a t e v . 354,

D i s t r i c t C o u r t , C o u n t y o f S i l v e r Bow ( 1 9 5 9 ) , 1 3 6 Mont. 348 P.2d P.2d 569 352; P.2d 1 4 3 ; Ledger v . MacKenzie ( 1 9 3 8 ) , 1 0 7 Mont. and S t a t e v. 383. While Fitzpatrick each for of

3 3 5 , 85 174, fact

( 1 9 7 7 ) , 1 7 4 Mont. cases does to in

these

discuss the necessity

a D i s t r i c t Court

follow the

s t a t u t o r y p r o c e d u r e s when s e l e c t i n g a j u r y ,

t h e r e a r e some

i m p o r t a n t d i s t i n c t i o n s between t h e f a c t s i n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e and t h o s e i n t h e c a s e s r e l i e d upon by t h e m a j o r i t y . In supra, State v. District judge Court, to County o f follow Silver
BOW,

the

trial

failed

the

statutory

p r o c e d u r e s f o r s e l e c t i n g a j u r y v e n i r e when h e drew s l i p s o f paper, jurors, which were numbered box. and The represented slips of prospective were not

from t h e

jury

paper

enclosed i n separate black capsules.

The f a i l u r e t o f o l l o w c o u n s e l on t h e This

t h i s s t a t u t o r y p r o c e d u r e was c h a l l e n g e d by

v e r y n e x t d a y , b e f o r e a n y j u r y was a c t u a l l y i m p a n e l e d . Court held: " I t is not t h e r i g h t of t h e individual necessarily involved, but r a t h e r t h e e n t i r e j u r y system and t h e s e l e c t i o n p r o c e d u r e s which m u s t b e p r o t e c t e d , and when a showinq i s t i m e l y b r o u g h t b e f o r e t h i s C o u r t we would be r e m i s s i n o u r d u t i e s i f we p e r m i t t e d m a t e r i a l d e v i a t i o n o r d e p a r t u r e from t h e p r o c e d u r e s s p e l l e d o u t by t h e l e g i s l a t u r e . " (Emphasis added.) 348 P.2d a t 1 4 6 . The g e n e r a l r u l e a s s e t o u t i n 50 C . J . S . at 903, emphasizes the timeliness of an

J u r i e s , S175 objection by

stating, "Objections because of irregularities in drawing or is summonin the u r s h o u l d be m a d e b e f o r e --------q-----j -- y........................... t h e B u r yimpaneled and sworn, and if not so made ordinarily are not available after verdict on a motion in arrest or for a new trial." 499. See, State v. Steen, (1916), 29 Id. 337, 158 P.

In this case no objection was made by counsel until This delayed it begs the

one week after the verdict had been entered. objection cannot be considered timely, and

question as to whether counsel would have objected had the verdict gone the other way. The District contends, and the majority agrees, that counsel did not discover the improper method of impaneling the jury until a week after the trial. MacKenzie, supra, to support They cite Ledger v. argument that

their

irregularities in selection of a jury panel can be objected to after a verdict has been entered. tation of the holding Ledger. Ledger states the general rule that a party who fails to challenge or object waives an irregularity in the This is a misinterpre-

impaneling of a jury.

85 P.2d at 352.

This Court, when

discussing the "knowledge" necessary for a timely objection held: "Counsel had the means of knowledge, and while it may be true that the fact and manner of the drawing were not brought home to them personally, nevertheless such means of knowledge were at their command, and therefore, these cases do not come within the rule of the Missouri court." 85 P.2d at 353. Here, counsel also had the "means of knowledge," for he merely had to ask, at anytime, how the jury was impaneled. It is hard to imagine that, if counsel felt that the jury was not impartial at the time of trial, he would wait until

a week a f t e r t h e v e r d i c t b e f o r e o b j e c t i n g t o t h e i m p a n e l i n g . S t a t e v. Fitzpatrick, s u p r a , was n o t a r e v e r s a l t h a t

was b a s e d upon t h e q u e s t i o n a b l e n a t u r e o f t h e j u r y s e l e c t i o n procedure. District
It

was

a

reminder use

to and

the Thirteenth Judicial comply with the jury

that

it

shall

selection statutes.

This Court s a i d , "[wle s t a t e d i n i t i a l l y but it for

t h a t t h i s m a t t e r was n o t p r o p e r l y r a i s e d o n a p p e a l ,

is

of

sufficient

import

to

warrant

a

full

discusion

f u t u r e guidance."

569 P.2d a t 3 8 9 .

H e r e , a s i n F i t z p a t r i c k , t h e s e l e c t i o n o f j u r o r s was n o t i n t o t a l c o m p l i a n c e w i t h s e c t i o n s 25-7-202
MCA.

and 25-7-204,

However, t h e o b j e c t i o n t o t h e p r o c e d u r e was n o t t i m e l y therefore, should not be the basis of a reversal.

and,

Further,

t h e r e h a s b e e n no i n d i c a t i o n t h e j u r y h e a r i n g t h e

c a s e was a n y t h i n g b u t f a i r and i m p a r t i a l .

.
0:-

i

, . , + Justice

/a(-

r;"

C



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Montana Law