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No. 95-131
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1995

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF GERALDINE JOY LEWIS, Petitioner, Respondent and Cross-Appellant, and WILLIAM ISAAC LEWIS, Respondent and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, In and for the County of Cascade, The Honorable Joel G. Roth, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD: For Appellant: Joan E. Cook; Law Office of Joan E. Cook, Great Falls, Montana
For Respondent:
Daniel L. Falcon; Matteucci, Falcon, Squires & Lester, Great Falls, Montana
Y
Submitted on Briefs: October 19, 1995 Decided: November 21, 1995
Justice Karla M. Gray delivered the Opinion of the Court.
Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court 1995 Internal Operating Rules, this decision shall not be cited as precedent and shall be published by its filing as a public document with the Clerk of the Supreme Court and by a report of its result to Montana Law Week, State Reporter and West Publishing Company.
William Isaac Lewis (William) appeals from the December 30, 1994, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of the Eighth Judicial District Court, Cascade County, dissolving his marriage to Geraldine Joy Lewis (Geraldine) and dividing the marital estate. Geraldine cross-appeals from the court's denial in that decree of her request for attorney's fees and from the court's subsequent order amending the decree. We modify the amended 1994 decree and, thereafter, affirm.
We address the following issues on appeal:
1.
Did the District Court err in adopting, nearly verbatim, Geraldine's Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree?

2.
Did the District Court abuse its discretion in distributing the marital estate?

3.
Did the District Court abuse its discretion in denying Geraldine attorney's fees?

4.
Did the District Court abuse its discretion by deleting a finding of fact regarding Geraldine's medical and counseling bills and modifying the decree accordingly?


William and Geraldine married on May 22, 1985. No children were born of the marriage. During the marriage, the parties operated a business in which they boarded horses (stables business). The property on which the stables business was operated, and where William and Geraldine lived, was owned by William prior to the parties' marriage and substantially improved during the marriage.
Geraldine petitioned for dissolution of the marriage in June of 1994 and, on December 30, 1994, the District Court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusion of Law and Decree. Thereafter, William timely filed a Rule 59 motion requesting that the District Court amend the 1994 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree. The District Court amended the decree by adjusting the distribution of the marital estate to correct the duplication of certain marital assets, deleting a finding regarding Geraldine's medical and counseling bills and modifying the decree accordingly.
William appeals from the court's distribution of the marital estate. Geraldine cross-appeals the court's denial of her request for attorney's fees and costs and from the court's order amending the findings and decree regarding her medical and counseling bills.
1. Did the District Court err in adopting, nearly verbatim, Geraldine's Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree?
William argues on appeal that the District Court's adoption of Geraldine's Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree resulted in a Decree which is not supported by the evidence; he contends, therefore, that the 1994 decree must be vacated. We review the adequacy of findings of fact and conclusions of law to determine whether they are sufficiently comprehensive and pertinent to the issues to provide a basis for a decision, and whether they are supported by substantial evidence. In re Marriage of Nikolaisen (1993), 257 Mont. 1, 5, 847 P.2d 287, 289 (citing In re Marriage of Hurley (1986), 222 Mont. 287, 296, 721 P.2d 1279, 1285).
The District Court's findings regarding the marital assets, the credibility of each party's testimony and Geraldine's contributions to the marital estate were extensive. In distributing the marital estate, the court considered each party's current income and the sources of that income; Geraldine's education level and work history; the income from the stables business; Geraldine's contributions as a homemaker and her contributions to the maintenance of the stables business; and the commingling of the parties' income. The findings are sufficiently comprehensive and pertinent in light of the factors enumerated in 5 40-4-202, MCA. In addition, they are supported by substantial evidence and, except as discussed below, William does not argue otherwise.
We will not overturn the court's findings and conclusions simply because they were, in large measure, adopted from those Geraldine proposed. See In re Marriage of Popp (19831, 206 Mont. 415, 423, 671 P.2d 24, 28. Rule 52(a), M.R.Civ.P., provides that a district court may adopt any of a party's proposed findings or conclusions so long as they are supported by the evidence and law apportioning the property and assets of the marital estate between the parties. Section 40-4-202(l), MCA. We review the distribution of a marital estate to determine if the court's findings of fact are clearly erroneous. In re Marriage of Smith (Mont. 1995), 891 P.2d 522, 525, 52 St.Rep. 174, 175-76. If the findings and decree are supported by substantial credible evidence, we will not alter the trial court's decision unless the court abused its discretion. Marriaqe of Smith, 891 P.2d at 525.
of  the  case.  We hold,  therefore,  that  the  District  Court  did not  
err  in  adopting,  nearly  verbatim,  Geraldine's  proposed  findings and  
conclusions.  
2. Did distributing  the  District the marital  Court abuse estate?  its  discretion  in  
A district  court  has  broad  discretion  in  finally  and  equitably  

Premarital Assets
William contends that the District Court abused its discretion by awarding Geraldine a portion of his premarital property and fifty percent of the entire value of the stables. He also asserts error in the court's finding that inadequate evidence existed to trace his premarital investment monies.
A court's distribution of premarital assets is governed, in the first instance, by statutory criteria. In distributing such assets, the court is required to consider the contributions of the other spouse to the marriage--including nonmonetary contributions and the extent to which such contributions facilitated the maintenance of the property--and whether or not the property division serves as an alternative to maintenance. Section 40-4-Notwithstanding its origin, however, such property is subject to equitable apportionment between the parties, and equitable apportionment does not require that the parties be returned to their premarital status. Marriaae of White, 708 P.2d at 269.
202(l)  (a)-(c),  MCA.  
A  district  court  must  consider  the  origin  of  prior-acquired  
property  in  distributing  that  property.  In  re  Marriage  of  White  
(1985),  218  Mont.  343,  345,  708 P.2d  267,  269  (citation  omitted).  

Geraldine testified that she was responsible for the upkeep of the family home and that she helped feed the animals and helped with other outside work. She further testified that she assisted in the purchase of the stables prior to the parties' marriage. When William was unable to work at the stables because of an injury, Geraldine took sole responsibility for care of the stables. Additionally, Geraldine worked at Sperry's Market, a premarital asset of William's, often without pay. The court determined that Geraldine made substantial contributions to the value of all of the marital assets. We conclude that substantial credible evidence supports the court's findings regarding the premarital property.
William also contends that the District Court erred in finding that no valid means existed by which to separate the commingled funds of the parties. However, the record before us contains substantial credible evidence to support this finding.
The record reflects that William and Geraldine maintained a joint account to which they both contributed. Deposits into this joint account included Geraldine's social security benefits, wages and inheritance money; William's social security benefits, wages and income from investments; and income from the stables business. The parties did not make an effort during the marriage to keep their money separate. We conclude that substantial credible evidence supports the court's finding that the parties commingled their money and that no viable means existed to separate each party

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