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No. 13452 IN THE SUPREIgE COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1977

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF BABY GIRL HALL, a Minor Child

DONNA HALL NAGY, Appellant,

GLEN E. WILLIAMS and DOLORES LORRAINE WILLIAMS, Respondents.

Appeal from:

District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, Honorable Paul G. Hatfield, Judge presiding.

Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Smith, Emmons, Baillie and Walsh, Great Falls, Montana Robert J. Emmons argued, Great Falls, Montana For Respondents: James W. Zion argued, Helena, Montana Thomas E. Boland argued for Baby Girl Hall, Helena, Montana

Submitted: Decided: Filed:

January 13, 1977

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Hon. Gordon Bennett, District Judge, sitting for Chief Justice Paul G. Hatfield, delivered the Opinion of the Court. This is an appeal from a final order of the district court, Cascade County, denying a petition for annulment of an adoption decree and, in the alternative, for a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner was born January 21, 1954, and gave birth to the child involved in this litigation on June 18, 1970. On July 17,

1970, the district court decreed the adoption of the child by respondents, having found the child was abandoned by its natural parents.

In June 1975, petitioner discovered her child had

purportedly been adopted by respondents and was living in their home. She filed her petition November 4, 1975. Respondents moved

to quash. Pursuant to a written stipulation filed by the parties, the district court on November 14, 1975, issued its order determining, inter alia, that the adoption decree was invalid. It found a lack

of due process because no notice was given the natural parents, and that consent had not been waived by abandonment for the required period of one year, in view of the fact the child was only 24 days old at the time of the adoption, In the same order, and again by stipulation of the parties, the court directed the local welfare office to investigate the living circumstances and parental qualifications of petitioner and respondents and make its recommendation as to where the child should best be placed. The report was to be made to the court with counsel for

both parties present and allowed to cross-examine as to its contents. After the filing of the report and an adversary hearing on the question of the best interests of the child, the court on March

29, 1976, issued its findings of fact, conclusion of law and order, wherein it confirmed its previous conclusion that the adoption decree was invalid for lack of notice and the absence of consent by abandonment. The court then concluded petitioner was guilty of laches and was estopped from maintaining her petition because she could have commenced her action upon reaching majority on July 1, 1973, under the provisions of Art. 11, Section 14, 1972 Montana Constitution. It also concluded it was in the best interests of the child to remain in respondents' home. petition and granted the motion to quash. We would not disturb the stipulation of the parties and the conclusion of the district court pursuant thereto that the adoption decree is invalid, as there is no request or basis presented for doing so. The decree is, however, not only invalid, it is void for all purposes. It is conceded no notice was given the natural The court denied the

parents. More than fifty years ago, this Court recited with approval the universally accepted general rule that notice to natural parents in these cases is indispensable to jurisdiction; if jurisdiction is not thus obtained there can be no judicial determination, and any such purported determination is void.
ex

State

rel. Thompson v. District Court, 75 Mont. 147, 151, 242 P. 959. See: Bascom v. Car-

This Court has not deviated from this rule.

penter, 126 Mont. 129, 136, 246 P.2d 223, recently reinforced by the United States Supreme Court in Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 85 Sect. 1187, 14 L ed 2d 62. Nothing appears in this case that would remove it from the application of the rule. In 1921 this

Court in Lamont v. Vinger, 61 Mont. 530, 546, 202 P. 769, adopted from the landmark case of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 728, 24 L Ed 565, the fundamental principle that:

A judgment void when rendered w i l l always remain void. The v a l i d i t y of every judgment depends upon t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e c o u r t before i t i s rendered, n o t upon what may occur subsequently

II

."

This p r i n c i p l e remains undisturbed, here and elsewhere.

It r e -

q u i r e s t h a t we give a void decree no e f f e c t whatever a t any time and view i t a s a n u l l i t y f o r a l l purposes. Thus it i s t h e l i m i t e d

function of t h i s Court t o d e c l a r e t h e r e never was a l e g a l l y cognizable adoption decree i n t h i s case. That being so, t h e

e q u i t a b l e d o c t r i n e s of laches and e s t o p p e l cannot be a p p l i e d t o save t h e non-existent decree o r . t o implement it i n any way.

It i s a l s o conceded t h a t no consent was given by t h e n a t u r a l
p a r e n t s , nor was t h e r e a v a l i d exception t o t h e consent requirement of ~ o n t a n a ' ss t a t u t e , s e c t i o n 61-205, R.C.M. 1947. W have required e

s t r i c t compliance with t h a t s t a t u t e (Adoption of Biery, 164 Mont. 353, 522 P.2d 1377), but have not y e t found f a i l u r e t o comply with i t j u r i s d i c t i o n a l , a s have c o u r t s i n o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s . f o r example: Franklin v. Biggs, 14 Or.App.450, 2 C.J.S. See

513 P.2d 1216,1217;

Adoption of P e r s o m , 551, p. 470, and cases c i t e d t h e r e i n .

W see no reason f o r r e l a x a t i o n of t h e standard i n t h i s c a s e and e would s e t a s i d e t h e decree, a s we d i d i n Biery, i f i t had any v a l i d i t y i n t h e f i r s t place. P e t i t i o n e r sought not only annulment of t h e adoption decree but t h e r e t u r n of h e r c h i l d upon a w r i t of habeas corpus. Appar-

e n t l y pursuant t o t h e l a t t e r p e t i t i o n , and upon s t i p u l a t i o n of t h e p a r t i e s , a f u l l hearing was provided i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t on t h e question of t h e "best i n t e r e s t s of t h e child". This being t h e b a s i c

c r i t e r i o n by which custody i s determined t h e hearing may be considered a cugtody hearing, held with t h e consent of both p a r t i e s . O the n

b a s i s of t h i s hearing, t h e c o u r t concluded a s a matter of law t h a t
i t was i n t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t s of t h e c h i l d t o leave i t with respon-

dents.

Having so concluded, t h e c o u r t granted responsents' motion

t o quash and, i n e f f e c t , granted custody t o them. W cannot q u a r r e l with t h e c o u r t ' s conclusion a s t o t h e b e s t e i n t e r e s t s of t h e c h i l d . The t r a n s c r i p t r e v e a l s t h e c a s e was

thoroughly i n v e s t i g a t e d by t h e county welfare department and i t s r e p o r t was a i r e d with equal thoroughness a t t h e hearing. There

i s an abundance of s u b s t a n t i a l c r e d i b l e evidence t o support t h e
c o u r t ' s conclusion. Thus we f i n d no abuse of d i s c r e t i o n by t h e Adoption of

d i s t r i c t c o u r t and must a f f i r m i t s conclusion. Biery, supra, and cases cPted t h e r e i n .

For t h e above reasons, t h e adoption decree involved h e r e i n should be annulled and permanent custody of t h e c h i l d decreed i n respondents. The cause i s remanded t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t f o r

e n t r y of i t s decrees i n accordance with t h i s opinion.

Judge.

W Concu e

/-

Justices.

M r . J u s t i c e D a n i e l J. Shea c o n c u r r i n g i n p a r t and d i s s e n t i n g i n part:
I concur with t h a t p o r t i o n of t h e m a j o r i t y d e c i s i o n voiding

t h e a d o p t i o n d e c r e e , b u t I d i s s e n t on i t s d e c i s i o n g r a n t i n g permanent c u s t o d y t o t h e a d o p t i v e p a r e n t s . For a l l p r a c t i c a l

p u r p o s e s t h i s d e c i s i o n f o r e c l o s e s t h e n a t u r a l mother from e v e r s u c c e s s f u l l y p e t i t i o n i n g t o o b t a i n custody of h e r daughter. She

can have n o c o n s o l a t i o n i n w i n n i n g h e r c a s e b u t l o s i n g h e r c h i l d .
I do n o t b e l i e v e t h a t t h e r e s u l t would have been t h e same

i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t if t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t had voided t h e a d o p t i o n d e c r e e , f o r i n t h a t c a s e t h e a d o p t i v e p a r e n t s would n o t have had a n y l e g a l c l a i m t o t h e c h i l d . While t h e c o u r t would

n o t have been bound t o i m m e d i a t e l y g i v e c u s t o d y t o t h e n a t u r a l mother, t h e a d o p t i v e p a r e n t s would have had no l e g a l b a s i s f o r t h e n o b t a i n i n g permanent c u s t o d y of t h e c h i l d .
It i s c l e a r

however, t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t r e c o g n i z e d t h i s problem f o r i t h e l d t h a t a l t h o u g h t h e a d o p t i o n d e c r e e was v o i d , i t r e a l l y was not void. The r e a s o n was t h a t t h e n a t u r a l mother was g u i l t y o f

l a c h e s and t h e r e f o r e had no l e g a l b a s i s t o s e t t h e a d o p t i o n a s i d e . However, by u p h o l d i n g t h e a d o p t i v e p a r e n t s 1 c l a i m o f l a c h e s t h e c o u r t d i d n o t have t o r e a c h a d e c i s i o n on t h e " b e s t i n t e r e s t s " o f t h e c h i l d , f o r a t t h a t p o i n t t h e n a t u r a l mother had n o l e g a l r i g h t t o be h e a r d . She was s t a n d i n g b e f o r e t h e c o u r t a s a

s t r a n g e r t r y i n g t o o b t a i n c u s t o d y of a c h i l d t h a t was no l o n g e r hers. C e r t a i n l y t h e c o u r t was n o t g o i n g t o award permanent But t h i s C o u r t by o v e r r u l i n g t h e c l a i m

custody t o a s t r a n g e r .

of l a c h e s a s a p p l i e d t o a void adoption decree, held t h e ; n a t u r a l mother was n o t a s t r a n g e r , and s h e was wronged b y t h e a d o p t i v e p a r e n t s p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n t h e f i l i n g of a f a l s e adoption p e t i t k o n . But i n t h e same b r e a t h t h e C o u r t h a s d e p r i v e d t h e n a t u r a l mother

from e v e r o b t a i n i n g l e g a l c u s t o d y o f h e r d a u g h t e r .

The p r o v i s i o n s

o f t h e Uniform M a r r i a g e a n d D i v o r c e Act, a p p l i c a b l e t o f u r t h e r d i s t r i c t c o u r t p r o c e e d i n g s i n t h i s case<, p l a c e a n i m p o s s i b l e b u r d e n on t h e n a t u r a l m o t h e r . The Uniform M a r r i a g e and D i v o r c e Act went i n t o e f f e c t on J a n u a r y 1, 1976 a n d p u r s u a n t t o s e c t i o n 48-341(4) R.C.M. 1947,

a n y f u r t h e r d i s t r i c t c o u r t p r o c e e d i n g s i n t h i s c a s e must b e u n d e r t h i s Act. S e c t i o n 48-341(4) provides:

" I n a n y a c t i o n o r p r o c e e d i n g i n which a n a p p e a l was p e n d i n g o r a new t r i a l was o r d e r e d p r i o r t o t h e e f f e c t i v e d a t e of t h i s a c t , t h e law i n e f f e c t a t t h e t i m e of t h e o r d e r s u s t a i n i n g t h e a p p e a l o r t h e new t r i a l g o v e r n s t h e a p p e a l , t h e new t r i a l , and a n y s u b s e q u e n t t r i a l o r a p p e a l . " Here, t h e t r i a l t o o k p l a c e i n March, 1976 a n d a n a p p e a l was f i l e d on A p r i l 27, 1976. Therefore, f u r t h e r proceedings i n t h i s case

must be u n d e r t h i s Act. Under S e c t i o n 4 8 - 3 3 9 ( 1 ) ,
R.C.M.

1947, a p e t i t i o n t o o b t a i n

c u s t o d y o f a c h i l d ( a b s e n t e x t e n u a t i n g a n d emergency s i t u a t i o n s ) c a n b e f i l e d o n l y once i n a two y e a r p e r i o d . Th,is means t h e

m o t h e r must e n d u r e a s u b s t a n t i a l w a i t i n g p e r i o d b e f o r e s h e c a n f i l e a custody p e t i t i o n . But even i f s h e l a t e r f i l e d a p e t i t k o n ,

h e r e f f o r t s would most l i k e l y b e doomed t o f a i l u r e b e c a u s e s h e must overcome t h e h e a v y b u r d e n of proof p l a c e d on h e r by t h e A c t . To be e n t i t l e d t o a h e a r i n g u n d e r s e c t i o n 48-339,
R.C.M.

1947, t h e n a t u r a l m o t h e r must f i l e a n a f f i d a v i t o r sworn p e t i t i o n a l l e g i n g e v i d e n t i a r y f a c t s ( s e c t i o n 48-340,
R.C.M.

1947) t h a t t h e

c h i l d ' s " p h y s i c a l , mental, moral, o r emotional h e a l t h " i s b e i n g harmed i n h e r p r e s e n t home. Because a l l a g r e e t h a t t h e a d o p t i v e

p a r e n t s have been good p a r e n t s , i t would i n d e e d t a k e a c r e a t i v e mind t o a l l e g e s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n t i a r y f a c t s t h a t would e n t i t l e t h e n a t u r a l mother t o a h e a r i n g . Moreover, s i n c e t h e t r i a l c o u r t

has a l r e a d y determined t h e " b e s t i n t e r e s t s ' ' of t h e c h i l d a r e w i t h

t h e a d o p t i v e p a r e n t s , upon a n o t h e r h e a r i n g t h e c o u r t would b e r e q u i r e d t o r e t a i n them a s c u s t o d i a n s u n l e s s " t h e c h i l d ' s p r e s e n t environment e n d a n g e r s s e r i o u s l y h i s p h y s i c a l , m e n t a l , moral, o r e m o t i o n a l h e a l t h , and t h e harm l i k e l y t o b e c a u s e d b y a change o f environment i s outweighed by i t s a d v a n t a g e s t o him." Section 48-339{2)(c). Thus we have a s i t u a t i o n where t h e s t a t e d

purpose o f t h e Uniform M a r r i a g e and D i v o r c e Act o f k e e p i n g t h e c h i l d i n a s t a b l e , permanent environment i s d e p r i v i n g t h e n a t u r a l mother from e v e r o b t a i n i n g c u s t o d y of h e r c h i l d . just r e s u l t , nor is it necessarily, decision f o r the child. The n a t u r a l mother l i v e s o n l y a few b l o c k s from h e r c h i l d , b u t o n l y knew o f h e r whereabouts j u s t a s h o r t p e r i o d b e f o r e f i l i n g t h e p e t i t i o n i n d i s t r i c t court t o annul t h e adoption decree. The c h i l d d o e s n o t know s h e h a s been a d o p t e d . However,

his

is not a

t h e long run, t h e r i g h t

even assuming t h e a d o p t i v e p a r e n t s have been g r a n t e d permanent c u s t o d y i t would a p p e a r t h e n a t u r a l mother now h a s a r i g h t t o p e t i t i o n f o r r e a s o n a b l e v i s i t a t i o n r i g h t s p u r s u a n t t o s e c t i o n 483 3 7 ( 1 ) , R.C.M. 1947, which p r o v i d e s :

"A p a r e n t n o t g r a n t e d c u s t o d y o f t h e c h i is e n t i t l e d t o reasonable v i s i t a t i o n r i g h t s unless the court finds, a f t e r a hearing, t h a t v i s i t a t i o n would e n d a n g e r s e r i o u s l y t h e c h i l d physical, mental, moral, o r emotional h e a l t h .

It would seem most l i k e l y t h e c h i l d w i l l now f i n d o u t s h e h a s
,
,

-

been a d o p t e d and t h e i d e n t i t y o f h e r n a t u r a l m o t h e r .

Yet t h e

mother w i l l n e v e r have a m e a n i n g f u l o p p o r t u n i t y t o o b t a i n t h e custody of h e r daughter. In s e t t i n g a s i d e t h e adoption decree but s t i l l leaving permanent c u s t o d y i n t h e a d o p t i v e p a r e n t s , t h e C o u r t r e l i e s on Adoption O f B i e r y , 164 Mont. 353, 522 P.2d 1377, b u t I f e e l t h a t r e l i a n c e i s misplaced. I n B i e r y t h e n a t u r a l mother was

s e r v e d w i t h p r o c e s s b e f o r e t h e a d o p t i o n and p a r t i c i p a t e d

f u l l hearing t o determine t h e "best i n t e r e s t s " of the c h i l d . t h e a d o p t i v e p a r e n t s i n B i e r y had a c t u a l custody of t h e c h i l d before t h e adoption.

Also,

The r e a s o n f o r s e t t i n g a s i d e t h e a d o p t i o n

i n B i e r y was b e c a u s e t h e r e was n o f i n d i n g b y t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t t h a t t h e m o t h e r had abandoned t h e c h i l d f o r a p e r i o d o f one y e a r .
A s t a t u t e r e q u i r e d t h e a d o p t i v e p a r e n t s t o prove t h e mother d i d

n o t s u p p o r t t h e c h i l d f o r a one y e a r p e r i o d a n d s h e had t h e a b i l i t y t o support the child during t h a t period. R.C.M. S e c t i o n 61-205, The

1947.

The a d o p t i o n was s e t a s i d e w i t h o u t p r e j u d i c e .

f a c t s a r e very d i f f e r e n t i n t h e i n s t a n t case. The n a t u r a l mother was a minor when s h e s i g n e d a c o n s e n t form t o have h e r c h i l d a d o p t e d . No g u a r d i a n a d l i t e m was a p p o i n t e d

t o represent her interests.
the guardianship proceedings.

She was n o t s e r v e d w i t h p r o c e s s i n The p e t i t i o n t o a d o p t was f a l s e on

its face.

It a l l e g e d abandonment, i n which c a s e t h e abandonment
S e c t i o n 61-

must have e x i s t e d f o r a p e r i o d o f a t l e a s t one y e a r . 205,R.C.M.

1947.

However, t h e p e t i t i o n a l l e g e d t h e c h i l d was

b o r n on June 18, 1970, a n d t h e p e t i t i o n was f i l e d on J u l y 17, 1970, j u s t 24 d a y s a f t e r t h e c h i l d ' s b i r t h . the adoption. S t i l l t h e c o u r t approved

The e n t i r e p r o c e e d i n g s were d e v o i d o f even t h e

r u d i m e n t s o f due p r o c e s s . The e f f e c t o f t h e C o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n i s t h a t due p r o c e s s when a p p l i e d t o c h i l d custody c a s e s i s meaningless, of t h e c h i l d t h a t i s important. f o r it is custody

I f a c o u p l e , however w e l l

i n t e n t i o n e d , c a n a c q u i r e permanent c u s t o d y o f a c h i l d i n t h e manner done i n t h i s c a s e , t h e n p a r e n t a l r i g h t s a r e m e a n i n g l e s s . I n e f f e c t , t h i s C o u r t i s h o l d i n g t h a t permanent c u s t o d y o f a c h i l d can be a c q u i r e d by a h y b r i d form o f a d v e r s e p o s s e s s i o n a n d i t d o e s n o t m a t t e r t h a t t h e i n i t i a l p o s s e s s i o n was a c q u i r e d by i l l e g a l means.

I

~ ~ o u l c lo v

~ uthe entire p r ? o c e z d i n & s drld a l l o w t h e a d o p t i v e

uaren t s t e m p o r a r y c u s t o d y u n t i l s u c h t i m e as s a t i s f a c t o r y a r r a n g e -

ments c o u l d be worked o u t f o r t h e t r a n s f e r o f permanent c u s t o d y

so t h e n a t u r a l mother.



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