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No. 96-497
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

1997

DONNA RICHARDSON,

Plaintiff and
Appellant,

vs.

CORVALLIS PUBLIC
SCHOOL
DISTRICT NO.
1,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Twenty-First Judicial District,
In and for the County of Ravalli,
The Honorable Jeffrey H. Langton, Judge presiding.

COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Dennis E. Lind, Paul N. Tranel, Datsopoulos, MacDonald & Lind,
Missoula, Montana
For Respondent:
Bradley J. Luck, Garlington, Lohn & Robinson, Missoula, Montana

Submitted on Briefs: April 24, 1997

Decided: December 23, 1997
Filed:

__________________________________________

Clerk

Justice James C. Nelson delivered the Opinion of the Court.

This is an appeal from the Twenty-first Judicial District Court, Ravalli

County.
Following a hearing, the District Court granted Defendant Corvallis Public School
District No. 1 (the School) summary judgment. From this judgment, Plaintiff Donna
Richardson (Donna) appeals. We affirm.

The only issue raised on appeal is whether the District Court erred in granting
summary judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On the morning of December 17, 1992, Dan Rochester (Donna's boyfriend) drove
Donna and her son, Lance Richardson, to the Corvallis High School. After parking
their

car, Donna walked with Lance into the School to explain his tardiness. Taking the
straightest route from their parked car to the school building, Donna uneventfully
walked
over a path in the snow which crossed a grass area in front of the School. After
remaining in the School for approximately five minutes, Donna returned by way of the
same route toward her car. However, part way across the path in the snow which

crossed the grass area, Donna slipped, fell and sustained injuries. Donna testified
in her
deposition that it was a cold morning, that the path consisted of packed, but not

slippery
snow, and that the path appeared to be safe.
On May 1, 1995, Donna filed a complaint against the School in the Twenty-First
Judicial District Court, Ravalli County. On January 8, 1996, the School filed a

motion
for summary judgment. The District Court heard oral argument on the School's motion
on May 21, 1996, and, thereafter, granted summary judgment on June 20, 1996. From
this judgment, Donna appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
In Wiley v. City of Glendive (1995), 272 Mont. 213, 216, 900 P.2d 310, 312, we
set forth the standard of review concerning a district court's grant of summary
judgment:
Under Rule 56(c), M.R.Civ.P., summary judgment is proper only

when no genuine issue of material fact exists and when the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The moving party has the initial
burden to establish that there are no genuine issues of material fact. Once
that burden has been met, the burden then shifts to the party opposing the
motion to establish otherwise. Our review of a grant of summary judgment
is de novo; we use the same criteria as the district court.

Ordinarily, negligence actions involve questions of fact and are not

susceptible to summary judgment. However, when reasonable minds
cannot differ, questions of fact can be determined as a matter of law. For
example, if the moving party establishes that one element of a cause of
action lacks any genuine issue of material fact and the non-moving party
does not come forward with proof that a genuine issue does exist, summary
judgment is proper. [Citations omitted.]

Furthermore, if the district court reaches the correct result, we will uphold
the

court's judgment regardless of the reasons supporting its decision. Singleton v. L.

P.
Anderson Supply Co. (Mont. 1997), 943 P.2d 968, 970, 54 St.Rep. 738, 739 (citation
omitted).
DISCUSSION
Did the District Court err in granting summary judgment?
Relying on Donna's undisputed version of the facts, the District Court granted
the
School summary judgment as a matter of law. The District Court ruled that the School
had no duty to warn because the path where Donna fell contained no hidden or lurking
dangers. Rather, the District Court concluded that the condition of the path was
open and
obvious. Citing Cereck v. Albertson's Inc. (1981), 195 Mont. 409, 637 P.2d 509, the
District Court held that even assuming that the School took affirmative action to
plow or
maintain the path, such action did not create or increase the hazard. Additionally,
the
District Court concluded that nothing in the record indicated that the School should
have
anticipated injury to Donna. Accordingly, the District Court held that the School
used
ordinary care to keep the premises reasonably safe.
Donna argues that the District Court erred in granting the School summary
judgment. Based on the evidence in the record which consists of Donna's deposition
testimony, pictures of the area where she fell and the affidavits of Lance
Richardson and
Dan Rochester, Donna asserts that material questions of fact exist. Specifically,
relying
on Cereck, 637 P.2d 509, and Willis v. St. Peter's Hospital (1971), 157 Mont. 417,
486
P.2d 593, Donna contends that material questions of fact exist concerning whether the
School altered the normal condition of the area where she fell by designating and
maintaining a walkway over natural ground; whether the School affirmatively allowed
the
appearance of a walkway over uneven natural ground, thus creating a new or increased
hazard; whether the School created a hidden dangerous condition; and, consequently,
whether the School had an obligation either to provide a sign warning of the altered
conditions or to block off the area. The School responds that the District Court
correctly
granted summary judgment because Donna failed to present evidence sufficient to raise
any genuine issues of material fact. We agree.
To prove negligence, a plaintiff must establish four elements: (1) duty; (2)
breach
of duty; (3) causation; and (4) damages. Wiley, 900 P.2d at 312 (citation omitted).
"[A]ctionable negligence arises only from breach of a legal duty. Therefore, in
order for

there to be a genuine issue of material fact in a negligence case there must be a
duty

imposed upon the defendant and allegations which, if proven, would support a finding

a breach of the duty." Rennick v. Hoover (1980), 186 Mont. 167, 170, 606 P.2d 1079,

1081 (citations omitted).

We have consistently held as a matter of law that "the owner of a premises has a
duty to use ordinary care in maintaining his premises in a reasonably safe condition

and
to warn of any hidden or lurking dangers." Brown v. Demaree (1995), 272 Mont. 479,
482, 901 P.2d 567, 569 (citing Limberhand v. Big Ditch Co. (1985), 218 Mont. 132,
144-45, 706 P.2d 491, 498; Davis v. Church of Jesus Christ of LDS (1990), 244 Mont.
61, 67, 796 P.2d 181, 184). However, while we have consistently held that a property
owner owes this general duty of care, we have not consistently articulated a
standard by
which the fact finder can determine whether a property owner has breached this duty.
That is, we have not articulated a standard to determine what constitutes a
"reasonably
safe condition." Rather, in Luebeck v. Safeway Stores, Inc. (1968), 152 Mont. 88,
446
P.2d 921; Cereck, 637 P.2d 509; Kronen v. Richter (1984), 211 Mont. 208, 683 P.2d
1315; and Limberhand, 706 P.2d 491, we have set forth conflicting standards.
Consequently, we take this opportunity to set forth one consistent standard.

In Luebeck v. Safeway Stores, Inc., Luebeck, a customer, sued Safeway Stores,
Inc. for damages after she slipped, fell and broke her ankle while walking back to
her car

across Safeway's parking lot which was covered with a natural accumulation of ice and
snow. Before a jury, Luebeck testified that she knew she had to walk carefully
because
the condition of the parking lot was bad. Additionally, the manager of Safeway
testified
that he also knew the condition of the parking lot was hazardous but had done nothing
about it. Thereafter, the district court entered judgment upon a jury verdict in
Luebeck's
favor and Safeway appealed. Luebeck, 446 P.2d at 922.

On appeal, we held that Safeway, as a property owner, had a duty to use ordinary
care to have the premises reasonably safe or to warn of any hidden or lurking
dangers.
Luebeck, 446 P.2d at 922-23. However, we also held that "where danger created by the
elements such as the forming of ice and the falling of snow are universally known,
or as
here, actually known, there is no liability." Luebeck, 446 P.2d at 924.

Accordingly, we
reversed the judgment of the district court and dismissed the cause of action against
Safeway. Luebeck, 446 P.2d at 924.

Subsequently, in Cereck, we again held that the defendant property owner had a

duty to use ordinary care to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition and to
warn
of any hidden or lurking dangers. Cereck, 637 P.2d at 511. Additionally, we also

stated
that "[this] duty is satisfied if the condition is obvious or actually known."

Cereck, 637
P.2d at 511 (citing Rennick, 606 P.2d 1079; Luebeck, 446 P.2d 921; and Regedahl v.
Safeway Stores, Inc. (1967), 149 Mont. 229, 425 P.2d 335). More specifically, we

pointed out that in prior cases involving injuries caused by icy conditions, we had

that "no liability [is] imposed upon the landowner where the danger created by the
elements such as the forming of ice and the falling of snow is universally known or
actually known." Cereck, 637 P.2d at 511 (citing Rennick, 606 P.2d 1079; Dunham v.
Southside National Bank (1976), 169 Mont. 466, 548 P.2d 1383; Luebeck, 446 P.2d
921). However, because the property owner in Cereck altered the natural
accumulation
of ice and snow, we did not apply the standard set forth in Luebeck. Rather, we
adopted
a new standard for determining property owner liability in situations where natural
accumulations of ice and snow had been altered. Cereck, 637 P.2d at 511.

Cereck, a customer, sued defendants, Albertson's grocery store and Holiday

Village Shopping Center, for damages after she slipped, fell and injured her left
leg and
hip while attempting to cross over a snow bank which was several feet high and

located
on the parking lot in front of Albertson's store entrance. Cereck, 637 P.2d at

510. The
evidence in the record revealed that while walking through a passageway that had been
shoveled through the snow bank, Cereck observed a water puddle and, believing she
could not step over it, tried unsuccessfully to cross over the snow bank. As a
result, she
slipped, fell and sustained injuries. Cereck, 637 P.2d at 510. The evidence in the
record
also revealed that Holiday Village Shopping Center was responsible for maintaining
the
parking lot and that its manager knew a snow bank existed in front of Albertson's
store
entrance. The shopping center had hired a janitorial service to keep store
entrances,
including Albertson's, free of ice and snow. Part of this job included shoveling
passageways through existing snow banks to provide customers access from the parking
lot to the store entrances. Cereck, 637 P.2d at 510. Based on this evidence, the
district
court granted the defendants summary judgment and Cereck appealed. Cereck, 637 P.2d
at 510.
On appeal, we distinguished Luebeck factually and adopted the following standard
to determine property owner liability in situations where a property owner has
affirmatively altered the natural accumulation of ice and snow:
A property owner may be held liable for falls on accumulations of
ice and snow where the hazard created by the natural accumulation is
increased or a new hazard is created by an affirmative act of the property
owner; even where such a condition is actually known or obvious, a
property owner may be held liable if he should have anticipated that injuries
would result from the dangerous condition.
Cereck, 637 P.2d at 511 (citing Rennick, 606 P.2d 1079; Restatement (Second) of Torts

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