Preview:

No. 12491
I N THE SUPREME COURT O THE STATE O MONTANA F F

1973

STONEWALL INSURANCE COMPANY, a corporation, P l a i n t i f f and A p p e l l a n t ,

JOHN L. WEST, STATE F R M T A AM UU L AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, FREDERICK W. BERGER and RAYMOND EISENZIMER,

Defendants and Respondents.

Appeal from:

D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eighth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Paul G . H a t f i e l d , Judge p r e s i d i n g .

Counsel of Record : For A p p e l l a n t : Cure and Borer, G r e a t F a l l s , Montana John F. Lynch argued, Great F a l l s , Montana For Respondents: D z i v i , Conklin, Johnson and Nybo, Great F a l l s , Montana Dennis McCaff e r t y argued, Great Fa 11s , Montana

Submitted: Decided :
Filed:

September 1 0 , 1973

SEP 2 7 1973

S P 2 7 1973 E

M r . J u s t i c e Frank I . Haswell d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court, T h i s i s a d e c l a r a t o r y judgment a c t i o n t o determine coverage under an automobile l i a b i l i t y i n s u r a n c e p o l i c y brought i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t of Cascade County, b e f o r e t h e Hon. Paul G . Hatfield. The c a s e was submitted on an agreed s t a t e m e n t of f a c t s .

The d i s t r i c t c o u r t g r a n t e d summary judgment f o r a l l d e f e n d a n t s , h o l d i n g t h a t t h e p o l i c y provided coverage. from t h a t judgment. The accident- i n q u e s t i o n occurred about one and one-half m i l e s s o u t h of Great F a l l s , Montana, on October 6 , 1968, when a v e h i c l e d r i v e n by defendant John L. West c o l l i d e d headon w i t h a c a r d r i v e n by defendant F r e d e r i c k W. Berger i n which defendant Raymond Eisenzimer was a passenger. k t t h e time of t h e a c c i d e n t defendant West had an automobile l i a b i l i t y i n s u r a n c e p o l i c y w i t h p l a i n t i f f Stonewall I n s u r a n c e Company p r o v i d i n g b o d i l y i n j u r y and p r o p e r t y damage coverage; defendant Berger had an automobile i n s u r a n c e p o l i c y w i t h defendant S t a t e Farm Mutual Automobile I n s u r a n c e Company. Following t h e P l a i n t i f f appeals

a c c i d e n t S t a t e Farm p a i d f o r damages s u f f e r e d by Berger and all Eisenzimer ancl/made c l a i m s f o r reimbursement from defendant West. P l a i n t i f f Stonewall d e c l i n e d t o provide coverage f o r defendant West w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e a c c i d e n t . The v e h i c l e defendant West was d r i v i n g a t t h e time of t h e a c c i d e n t belonged t o Ralph Ward, a l i c e n s e d used c a r d e a l e r , who o p e r a t e d an automobile s a l e s agency and r e p a i r shop. Ward

had given defendant West permission t o d r i v e i t on a demonstrat i o n r i d e w i t h a view toward i n t e r e s t i n g him i n purchasing i t . Defendant West's i n s u r a n c e p o l i c y w i t h p l a i n t i f f Stonewall cont a i n s t h e f o l l o w i n g coverage e x c l u s i o n :

"c ()

This insuring agreement does not apply:

"* 9~ (2) to any action arising out of the operation of an automobile sales agen2, repair shop, service station, storage garage or public parking place". (Emphasis added)
p.----

*

.

The single issue presented for review is:

Does this policy

exclusion preclude coverage for the accident in question? Stonewall's contention is that the actual reason the car was being driven by West was for demonstration purposes incident to the sale and purchase of an automobile. Demonstrating

automobiles is a function of an automobile sales agency, and therefore within the exclusionary provisions of Stonewall's insuring agreement. Stonewall further contends it is not necessary that the automobile sales agency be that of insured. Stonewall argues

that because West was using the automobile for demonstration purposes for the ultimate benefit of Ward, the car salesman and owner, policy reasons dictate that Ward should provide insurance coverage for accidents which arise our of the operation of his automobile sales agency. Stonewall's position is a minority view. State Farm

Automobile Insurance Co. v. Sampson, 305 F.Supp. 50, aff'd 428 F.2d 475. Such interpretation, excluding a "test drive"

situation, would create a gap in the insured's personal coverage. To permit such an exclusion would be a strained construction of the phrase "operation of an automobile sales agency". The

majority rule, limiting the exclusionary clause to situations where the insured was using the non-owned automobile in an automobile business of his own, is the better reasoned rule. Helmich v. Northwestern Mutual Insurance Co., 376 F.2d 420; United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Dixie Auto Ins. Co., 292 F,Supp. 554, aff'd 403 F.2d 717; Caster v. Motors Insurance Corporation, 28 Ill.App.2d 363, 171 W.E.2d 425. In interpreting policies of insurance the courts resolve uncertainties and ambiguities in the policy against the insurer,

s i n c e i t i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e language i n t h e c o n t r a c t . S e c t i o n 13-720, R.C.M. 1947; S t . Paul F i r e & Marine I n s . Co.

v. Thompson, 150 Mont. 182, 433 P.2d 795; Johnson v. C o n t i n e n t a l Cas.Co., 127 Mont. 281, 263 P.2d 551. Here, a r e a d i n g of t h e

excl.usion i n q u e s t i o n p r e s e n t s an u n c e r t a i n t y c r e a t e d by t h e language used when a p p l i e d t o t h e f a c t s i n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e . The e x c l u s i o n a r y p r o v i s i o n i s ambiguous a s t o whose s a l e s agency" t h e p o l i c y p r o v i s i o n s r e f e r . The g e n e r a l r u l e i s t h a t e x c l u s i o n a r y c l a u s e s r e l a t i n g t o t h e b u s i n e s s u s e o f non-owned v e h i c l e s a r e designed t o r e q u i r e an i n s u r e d who u s e s non-owned v e h i c l e s i n f u r t h e r a n c e of h i s
11

automobile

b u s i n e s s t o seek a d d i t i o n a l coverage f o r t h e added r i s k s i n c i d e n t t o such u s e . The p e r t i n e n t i n q u i r y i n i n t e r p r e t i n g a u t o -

mobile b u s i n e s s e x c l u s i o n c l a u s e s i n harmony w i t h t h e i r g e n e r a l purpose i s determing t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p , i f any, between t h e i n s u r e d ' s u s e of a non-owned automobile and some b u s i n e s s o r o c c u p a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t of t h e i n s u r e d .

7 Cum.Supp., Appleman-

I n s u r a n c e Law and P r a c t i c e - 44455, pp. 510,513 (1972). I n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e t h e i n s u r e d had no b u s i n e s s i n t e r e s t i n
t h e p a r t i c u l a r automobile s a l e s agency.

The i n s u r e d was merely

d r i v i n g a v e h i c l e owned by i t .

Such p r o v i s i o n should n o t b e

c o n s t r u e d t o c r e a t e an u n a n t i c i p a t e d gap i n t h e i n s u r e d ' s lj-ab i l i t y coverage by r e q u i r i n g t h e i n s u r e d t o t e s t d r i v e automobiles a t his peril. W hold t h a t t h e p o l i c y e x c l u s i o n a p p l i e s only where t h e e i n s u r e d o p e r a t e s an automobile s a l e s agency o r t h e o t h e r e n t e r p r i s e s named i n t h e e x c l u s i o n a r y c l a u s e . The summary judgment of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t i s a f f i r m e d .

Justice,.



Download f04bfa74-f4e9-4587-b5bd-ca5998627627.pdf

Montana Law