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Toyota. Harsh told the police that the car was not his and that he "borrowed it from a guy," but he was unable to provide the guy's name or contact information. We conclude that a rational juror could reasonably infer from this evidence that Harsh committed the offense of possession of a stolen vehicle. See NRS 205.273(1)(b). It is for the jury to determine the weight and credibility to give conflicting testimony, and the jury's verdict will not be disturbed on appeal where, as here, substantial evidence supports the verdict. See Bolden v. State, 97 Nev. 71, 73, 624 P.2d 20, 20 (1981); see also Buchanan v. State, 119 Nev. 201, 217, 69 P.3d 694, 705 (2003) (circumstantial evidence alone may sustain a conviction). Second, Harsh contends that the district court abused its discretion by denying defense counsel's motion to withdraw because there was a breakdown in communications and defense counsel indicated that a conflict of interest might exist if he testified on his own behalf." A criminal defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to counsel who is reasonably competent and conflict-free. Daniels v. Woodford, 428 F.3d 1181, 1196 (9th Cir. 2005). To overcome the presumption that defense counsel is reasonably competent, a defendant must show that counsel's representation was unreasonable under the prevailing professional norms. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). To establish a violation of the right to conflict-free counsel, a defendant "must show that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance." U.S. v. Moore, 159 F.3d 1154, 1157 (9th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the record reveals that the district court made 'Defense counsel's motion was made on the first day of trial and did not purport to be a motion to substitute counsel. See generally Young v. State, 120 Nev. 963, 968-69, 102 P.3d 572, 576 (2004).
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