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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule 22 as well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New Hampshire, One Charles Doe Drive, Concord, New Hampshire 03301, of any editorial errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes to press. Errors may be reported by E-mail at the following address: reporter@courts.state.nh.us. Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00 a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court's home page is: http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme. THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE ___________________________ Concord District Court No. 2006-033 REBECCA MILLER v. BRIAN BLACKDEN Submitted: October 18, 2006 Opinion Issued: November 30, 2006 Rebecca Miller, pro se, filed no brief. Penny S. Dean, of Concord, by brief, for the defendant. DALIANIS, J. The defendant, Brian Blackden, appeals the entry of a final protective order by the Concord District Court (Sullivan, J.) based upon the court's finding that the defendant stalked the plaintiff, Rebecca Miller. See RSA 633:3-a (Supp. 2006). We affirm. The plaintiff filed a stalking petition against the defendant. See RSA 633:3-a, III-a. At the final hearing, the plaintiff testified to the following. The defendant was a friend of, and had been hired by, her former boyfriend, Eric Raymond. Raymond had ended their relationship approximately six months earlier, and the defendant began stalking her after she had had Raymond arrested for breaking into her home. On November 1, 2005, she received a phone call from the police telling her that the defendant was in his vehicle, parked near her home, "with his

lights off." The officer told her "to be precautious [sic] and make sure all my doors and my windows were locked[ ] because [the defendant] was watching me." The plaintiff felt "nervous" after receiving this call and went with her children to spend the night with her mother. The following day, when she pulled into the parking lot of her son's school, she saw the defendant drive by her. She testified that "he . . . stared me down." After she had retrieved her son from school, she saw the defendant drive up the street and stare at her again. When she then drove to the courthouse to file the stalking petition, she saw the defendant traveling in the opposite direction. He made a U-turn and followed her to a traffic light. When she returned to her home after filing the petition, she saw the defendant waiting for her near her home. The plaintiff testified that before the stalking began, the defendant removed some belongings of her former boyfriend from her parked car without her knowledge or consent. She informed a nearby police officer, who confronted the defendant and told him to leave the plaintiff alone. The defendant admitted that he followed the plaintiff on six occasions on November 1, 2005. He testified that Raymond had hired him to conduct surveillance of the plaintiff in his capacity as a licensed private detective. When asked, he asserted that he could not disclose what Raymond wanted him to learn about the plaintiff because of "client privilege." Following the hearing, the trial court entered a final protective order. The court found that the defendant engaged in stalking within the meaning of RSA 633:3-a, and that he was not immune from the stalking statute because he is a licensed private detective. The defendant moved for reconsideration, which the trial court denied. The defendant's business partner, Robert Miller, attempted to intervene in the action, but his request to do so was denied. Miller has not appealed the denial of his motion to intervene. On appeal, the defendant first argues that the stalking statute, RSA 633:3-a, is vague on its face and as applied, in violation of his state and federal constitutional rights to due process. See N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 15; U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. Second, he asserts that the trial court erred when it failed to find that, as a licensed private detective, he was exempt from the provisions of the stalking statute. Third, he contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court's order. Finally, he argues that the trial judge erred by not recusing himself. We address each argument in turn. I. Constitutionality of Stalking Statute

RSA 633:3-a provides, in pertinent part, that a person commits the offense of stalking if he or she "[p]urposely, knowingly, or recklessly engages in

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a course of conduct targeted at a specific person which would cause a reasonable person to fear for his or her personal safety or the safety of a member of that person's immediate family, and the person is actually placed in such fear." RSA 633:3-a, I(a). RSA 633:3-a, II(a) defines "course of conduct" as "2 or more acts over a period of time, however short, which evidences a continuity of purpose." Pursuant to RSA 633:3-a, II(a), "[a] course of conduct shall not include constitutionally protected activity, nor shall it include conduct that was necessary to accomplish a legitimate purpose independent of making contact with the targeted person." A "course of conduct" may include following, approaching or confronting the targeted person or a member of that person's immediate family. RSA 633:3-a, II(a)(2). The defendant argues that the term "legitimate purpose" is unconstitutionally vague under the State and Federal Constitutions because it is undefined and does not sufficiently limit the trial court's discretion. We first analyze the defendant's claim under the State Constitution, State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 231 (1983), citing federal authority for guidance only, id. at 233. The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law, which we review de novo. State v. Burke, 153 N.H. 361, 364 (2006). "A statute may be impermissibly vague because it fails to establish standards for the police and public that are sufficient to guard against the arbitrary deprivation of liberty interests." Id. (quotation omitted); Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 52 (1999). Vagueness may invalidate a criminal law for either of two independent reasons. Burke, 153 N.H. at 364. "First, if it fails to provide people of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to understand what conduct it prohibits," and "[s]econd, if it authorizes or even encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." Burke, 153 N.H. at 364 (quotations omitted); Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732 (2000). We addressed a similar challenge in State v. Porelle, 149 N.H. 420 (2003), where we construed an earlier version of the stalking statute, RSA 633:3-a (1996 & Supp. 1999). The earlier version of the statute defined stalking, in part, as appearing "on more than one occasion for no legitimate purpose in proximity to the residence, place of employment, or other place where another person is found under circumstances that would cause a reasonable person to fear for his personal safety." RSA 633:3-a, I(d)(4) (Supp. 1999); Porelle, 149 N.H. at 422. The defendant argued, among other things, that the phrase "for no legitimate purpose" was unconstitutionally vague on its face and as applied. Porelle, 149 N.H. at 422, 425. In rejecting this contention, we defined a "legitimate purpose" as one that "is genuine or accordant with law." Id. at 425 (quotations omitted). We ruled that the phrase "no legitimate purpose," read in the context of the entire statute, which measures the offending conduct by an objective standard, did

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not give too much discretion to police officers. Id. As the presence or absence of a genuine or lawful purpose for appearing in proximity to another can readily be determined, we concluded that the phrase "no legitimate purpose" did not render the statute unconstitutionally vague, either on its face or as applied to the defendant. Id. For similar reasons, we hold that the phrase "legitimate purpose" as used in RSA 633:3-a, II(a), does not render the current version of the statute unconstitutionally vague, either on its face or as applied to the defendant. Like the defendant in Porelle, the defendant here takes the phrase out of context. As we explained in Porelle, "By taking this phrase out of context, the defendant ignores the fact that the statute measures a defendant's actions by an objective standard, in that the offending conduct is only prohibited under circumstances that would cause a reasonable person to fear for his or her safety." Id. The phrase "legitimate purpose" read in the context of the entire statute, coupled with an objective standard, does not give too much discretion to the trial court. See id. This phrase, read in conjunction with the rest of the statute, does not require a person of common intelligence to guess at its meaning. See id. at 425-26. Like the defendant in Porelle, the defendant in this case argues that "RSA 633:3-a is similar to loitering statutes that the United States Supreme Court has found unconstitutionally vague." Id. at 425; see Morales, 527 U.S. at 47, 64. We disagree for the same reasons that we set forth in Porelle. See Porelle, 149 N.H. at 425-26. As the Federal Constitution offers the defendant no greater protection than does the State Constitution under these circumstances, see id. at 423, we reach the same result under the Federal Constitution as we do under the State Constitution. II. Exemption for Private Detectives

The defendant next asserts that, as a licensed private detective, his "clandestine surveillance" of the plaintiff was exempt from the stalking statute. See RSA 106-F:4, I-b(c) (2001) . He argues that, as a matter of law, his conduct was for a "legitimate purpose" because it was within the scope of his employment as a licensed private detective. RSA 633:3-a, II(a). Unlike the stalking statutes in some other states, New Hampshire's stalking statute does not specifically exempt licensed private detectives. Compare RSA 633:3-a, II(a) (stalking does not include constitutionally protected activity or "conduct that was necessary to accomplish a legitimate purpose independent of making contact with the targeted person"), with La. Rev. Stat. Ann.

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