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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule 22 as well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New Hampshire, One Charles Doe Drive, Concord, New Hampshire 03301, of any editorial errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes to press. Errors may be reported by E-mail at the following address: reporter@courts.state.nh.us. Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00 a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court's home page is: http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme. THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE ___________________________ Hillsborough-northern judicial district No. 2006-463 BRUCE BUCHHOLZ & a. v. WATERVILLE ESTATES ASSOCIATION Submitted: April 5, 2007 Opinion Issued: September 20, 2007 Walker & Buchholz, P.A., of Manchester (Kevin E. Buchholz on the brief), for the plaintiffs. Law Office of Joshua L. Gordon, of Concord (Joshua L. Gordon on the brief), and Scott D. McGuffin, of Laconia, on the brief, for the defendant. HICKS, J. The plaintiffs, Bruce Buchholz and Erin O'Neill Buchholz, appeal an order of the Superior Court (Abramson, J.) granting summary judgment to the defendant, Waterville Estates Association. We affirm. The following appears in the record: On January 28, 2002, the town of Campton acquired, by tax deed, a large number of properties located in a condominium development called Waterville Estates. By auction the plaintiffs purchased an unimproved lot within the development. Title passed by a deed entitled "Quitclaim Deed with No Covenants," which described the land as

being recorded in the town's warrant book as "Homesite F-14" with a corresponding map and lot number. After the plaintiffs acquired the property, the defendant sought to collect association dues and assessments that had been assessed after the town acquired the property by tax deed. The plaintiffs denied any obligation to pay the fees and filed a petition to remove the "cloud" of the declarations from their title to the condominium unit. They also filed a claim under the Consumer Protection Act alleging that the defendant's efforts to collect the fees and the subsequent placement of a lien on their property were unfair or deceptive acts. See RSA 358-A:2 (Supp. 2006). The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that the plaintiffs were bound by the restrictions, easements and covenants contained in the governing documents of the association as well as by the Condominium Act, RSA chapter 356-B (1995 & Supp. 2006). The defendant also filed a counterclaim to collect the fees due, asserting a lien on the plaintiffs' property. The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment and denied the plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration. This appeal followed. In acting upon a motion for summary judgment, the trial court is required to construe the pleadings, discovery and affidavits in the light most favorable to the non-moving party to determine whether the proponent has established the absence of a dispute over any material fact and the right to judgment as a matter of law. Porter v. City of Manchester, 155 N.H. __, __, 921 A.2d 393, 398 (2007). "An issue of fact is material if it affects the outcome of the litigation." Id. "In reviewing a denial of summary judgment, we consider the affidavits and other evidence, and all inferences properly drawn from them, in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." Id. This case implicates the interplay among the Condominium Act, RSA 80:61 (2003) (governing real estate tax liens), and the holding in First NH Bank v. Town of Windham, 138 N.H. 319, 323 (1994). "We are the final arbiter of the meaning of a statute as expressed in the words of the statute itself." Greene v. Town of Deering, 151 N.H. 795, 798 (2005). "When construing the meaning of a statute, we first examine its language and, where possible, ascribe the plain and ordinary meanings to words used. When the language used in the statute is clear and unambiguous, its meaning is not subject to modification by judicial construction." Corcoran v. Harmon, 154 N.H. 411, 412-13 (2006) (citation omitted).

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I. Condominium Fees Surviving a Tax Lien On appeal, the plaintiffs first argue that pursuant to First NH Bank, 138 N.H at 323, when they took title to the land, they took a "100 percent common and undivided interest in the property," RSA 80:61, thereby stripping away all encumbrances upon it, including condominium assessments and fees. We disagree. RSA 80:61, upon which the court in First NH Bank relied, reads in pertinent part: An affidavit of the execution of the tax lien to the municipality, county or state shall be delivered to the municipality by the tax collector on the day following the last date for payment of taxes . . . . The collector shall execute to the municipality, county or state only a 100 percent common and undivided interest in the property and no portion thereof shall be executed in severalty by metes and bounds; provided, however, that where distinct interests in the property have been separately assessed pursuant to RSA 75:2, the tax lien executed to the municipality, county, or state shall be for 100 percent of the separate distinct interest upon which the taxes have not been fully paid. In First NH Bank, we held that mortgages did not have priority over tax liens and that such encumbrances are divested at the issuance of the tax lien when the right of redemption expires. Id. at 324. It is true that "a new and independent title to one hundred percent of the land . . . is the ultimate product of the tax lien procedure." Id. This case, however, does not deal with a mortgage interest; it concerns condominium covenants. "Condominium declarations are covenants running with the land." 15A Am. Jur. 2d Condominiums and Cooperative Apartments

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