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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule 22 as well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New Hampshire, One Charles Doe Drive, Concord, New Hampshire 03301, of any editorial errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes to press. Errors may be reported by E-mail at the following address: reporter@courts.state.nh.us. Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00 a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court's home page is: http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme. THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE ___________________________ Hillsborough-northern judicial district No. 2006-651 GEORGE NICOLAOU v. VERMONT MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY Argued: May 23, 2007 Opinion Issued: July 19, 2007 Cronin & Bisson, P.C., of Manchester (John G. Cronin on the brief and orally), for the plaintiff. Aten Clayton & Eaton PLLC, of Littleton (Gregory S. Clayton on the brief and orally), for the defendant. BRODERICK, C.J. The plaintiff, George Nicolaou, appeals an order of the Superior Court (Conboy, J.) granting a motion in limine of the defendant, Vermont Mutual Insurance Company (Vermont Mutual), which barred him from recovering the full replacement cost of his fire-damaged home and garage because he never undertook to repair or replace them. We affirm. I The record supports the following. While covered by a homeowners policy issued by Vermont Mutual, Nicolaou's home suffered extensive fire damage. Under "Coverage A," Nicolaou's policy has a stated liability limit of

$223,000 for the dwelling. The policy also includes an endorsement titled "Additional Limits of Liability for Coverages A, B, C, and D" (additional coverage endorsement), which pertains to replacement cost coverage. The additional coverage endorsement provides, in pertinent part: A. If you have: 1. Allowed us to adjust the Coverage A limit of liability and the premium in accordance with: a. b. 2. The property evaluations we make; and Any increases in inflation; and

Notified us, within 30 days of completion, of any improvements, alterations or additions to the dwelling building which increase the replacement cost of the dwelling building by 5% or more;

the provisions of this endorsement will apply after a loss, provided you elect to repair or replace the damaged or destroyed dwelling building. B. If there is a loss to the dwelling building that exceeds the Coverage A limit of liability shown in the Declarations: 1. We will increase the Coverage A limit of liability to equal the current replacement cost of the dwelling building.

.... 4. For the purpose of settling that loss only, Section I Condition 3. Loss Settlement paragraph b. is deleted and replaced by paragraphs b., c., and d. as follows: b. Buildings under Coverage A or B at replacement cost without deduction for depreciation. We will pay no more than the smallest of the following amounts for like construction and use on the same premises: (1) The replacement cost of that part of the building damaged or destroyed;

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(2)

The necessary amount actually spent to repair or replace the damaged or destroyed building; or The limit of liability under this policy that applies to the building, increased in accordance with paragraphs B.1. and B.2. of this endorsement.

(3)

c.

We will pay no more than the actual cash value of the damage until actual repair or replacement is complete. You may disregard the replacement cost loss settlement provisions and make claim under this policy for loss or damage to buildings on an actual cash value basis. You may then make claim within 180 days after loss for any additional liability on a replacement cost basis.

d.

(Emphases added.) After the fire, Nicolaou made a claim on his policy, and Vermont Mutual paid him $223,000, the policy's stated limit of liability on the dwelling. Nicolaou sought additional payments to cover, among other things, the replacement cost of his dwelling, notwithstanding that he had not undertaken to repair or replace it. When Vermont Mutual refused to provide payment beyond the stated limit of liability, Nicolaou filed suit against both Vermont Mutual and his insurance agent. In the trial court, Vermont Mutual moved in limine for a ruling that under the terms of his homeowners policy, Nicolaou was not entitled to seek replacement costs unless he: (1) actually repaired or replaced the building and incurred replacement costs in excess of the settlement he received; and (2) complied with the relevant policy conditions. The trial court granted Vermont Mutual's motion. This appeal followed. II The question before us is whether the trial court erred by ruling that under Nicolaou's Vermont Mutual policy, he was obligated to repair or replace his dwelling before he was entitled to replacement costs. Nicolaou makes two principal arguments: (1) that he is entitled to full replacement costs under RSA

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407:11 (2006); and (2) the policy contains ambiguities that should be construed in his favor to provide replacement cost coverage. We disagree. The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, which we review de novo. In the Matter of Liquidation of Home Ins. Co., 154 N.H. 472, 479 (2006). We are the final arbiters of the legislature's intent as expressed in the words of the statute considered as a whole. Id. The interpretation of insurance policy language is a also question of law for this court to decide. Tech-Built 153 v. Va. Surety Co., 153 N.H. 371, 373 (2006). We construe the language of an insurance policy as would a reasonable person in the position of the insured based upon a more than casual reading of the policy as a whole. Merchants Mut. Ins. Co. v. Laighton Homes, 153 N.H. 485, 487 (2006). Policy terms are construed objectively, and where the terms of a policy are clear and unambiguous, we accord the language its natural and ordinary meaning. Banfield v. Allstate Ins. Co., 152 N.H. 491, 494 (2005). However, if more than one reasonable interpretation is possible, and an interpretation provides coverage, the policy contains an ambiguity and will be construed against the insurer. Merchants, 153 N.H. at 487. III Nicolaou's first argument relies upon RSA 407:11 (policy value statute), which contains the following relevant language: "If a building insured for a specified amount . . . is totally destroyed by fire or lightning without criminal fault on the part of the insured or his assignee, the sum for which such building is insured shall be taken to be the value of the insured's interest therein . . . ." Moreover, "[e]very provision and stipulation in a contract to which [RSA] chapter [407] is applicable in conflict with [that] chapter shall be void and no waiver of any part thereof shall be set up by the insurer." RSA 407:21 (2006). Presumably in recognition of RSA 407:11, Nicolaou's policy contains a "valuation clause" that provides: "If a building insured for a specified amount . . . is totally destroyed by fire or lightning without criminal fault on the part of [the policyholder or his or her] assignee, the total amount for which the building is insured shall be taken to be the value of [the policyholder's] interest in the building." According to Nicolaou, the "specified amount" for which his dwelling was insured was its replacement cost and, as a consequence, Vermont Mutual was obligated to pay that cost, regardless of whether he actually repaired or rebuilt the house. In other words, the premise of Nicolaou's argument is that there is a conflict between the policy value statute and the repair or replacement requirement of the additional coverage endorsement that voids the repair or replacement requirement.

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Initially, we note that it has never been determined as a factual matter that Nicolaou's house was totally destroyed by fire, which is a necessary prerequisite to the applicability of the policy value statute. However, because Vermont Mutual did, in fact, pay out the stated limit of liability, we assume without deciding that RSA 407:11 applies. That said, there is no conflict between RSA 407:11 and the additional coverage endorsement in Nicolaou's policy. In a case upon which Nicolaou relies, the Arkansas Supreme Court explained: Statutes [such as RSA 407:11] are passed for the purpose of avoiding the uncertainty of determining the value after the fire. The manifest policy of the statute is to guard against overinsurance of the property. The agents of the company have the opportunity to inspect the property fully before taking the insurance and fixing the amount of the premiums. It is the valuation fixed in advance by the parties by way of liquidated damages in a case of a total loss by fire of the property insured without the fault of the insurer. St. Paul Reinsurance Co., Inc. v. Irons, 45 S.W.3d 366, 369 (Ark. 2001) (quotation omitted). We are persuaded by St. Paul, and the conclusion that necessarily flows from it, i.e., that the term "specified amount" in RSA 407:11 cannot refer to a covered structure's replacement cost

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