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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule 22 as well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New Hampshire, One Charles Doe Drive, Concord, New Hampshire 03301, of any editorial errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes to press. Errors may be reported by E-mail at the following address: reporter@courts.state.nh.us. Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00 a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court's home page is: http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme. THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE ___________________________ Hillsborough-northern judicial district No. 2007-253 THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE v. RUSSELL BROWN Argued: April 3, 2008 Opinion Issued: July 31, 2008 Kelly A. Ayotte, attorney general (Susan G. Morrell, senior assistant attorney general, on the brief and orally), for the State. David M. Rothstein, deputy chief appellate defender, of Concord, on the brief and orally, for the defendant. DUGGAN, J. The defendant, Russell Brown, appeals his conviction in Superior Court (McGuire, J.) for conspiracy to sell controlled drugs, see RSA 318-B:2 (2004), :26 (Supp. 2007), arguing that the trial court erred by ruling that his speedy trial right under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act (IAD) had not been violated. See RSA ch. 606-A (2001). Because the defendant was not brought to trial within 180 days after the State received his request for final disposition of his charges, see RSA 606-A:1, art. III(a), we reverse and remand. The defendant was incarcerated in Arizona when he was indicted on the charges at issue here. The State lodged a detainer against him. The

defendant, pursuant to the IAD, promptly requested a speedy trial in New Hampshire. The State received the defendant's request on September 12, 2005. The defendant's charges were not resolved until October 27, 2006. Based upon this delay of approximately thirteen months, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in not ruling that the State violated his rights under the IAD by not bringing him to trial within 180 days after the State had received his request for final disposition of his charges. See id. "The denial of a defendant's motion to dismiss an indictment under the [IAD] is a question of law reviewed de novo. The factual findings underlying the decision are reviewed on a clearly erroneous standard." United States v. Hall, 974 F.2d 1201, 1204 (9th Cir. 1992); see also United States v. Dent, 149 F.3d 180, 183 (3d Cir. 1998); cf. State v. Sprague, 146 N.H. 334, 336 (2001). The IAD "is a compact entered into by 48 States, the United States, and the District of Columbia to establish procedures for resolution of one State's outstanding charges against a prisoner of another State." New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 111 (2000) (citations omitted); see RSA ch. 606-A; 18 U.S.C.A. App.

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