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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule 22 as well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New Hampshire, One Charles Doe Drive, Concord, New Hampshire 03301, of any editorial errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes to press. Errors may be reported by E-mail at the following address: reporter@courts.state.nh.us. Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00 a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court's home page is: http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme. THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE ___________________________ Belknap Nos. 2007-566 2007-685 DOUGLAS LAMBERT & a v. BELKNAP COUNTY CONVENTION THOMAS A. TARDIF & a v. STEPHEN H. NEDEAU, CHAIRPERSON & a. Argued: March 20, 2008 Opinion Issued: June 13, 2008 Douglas Lambert, pro se; and Thomas A. Tardif, pro se (Mr. Lambert and Mr. Tardif on the brief, and Mr. Tardif orally). Ransmeier & Spellman, Professional Corporation, of Concord (Daniel J. Mullen on the brief and orally), for the defendants.

DUGGAN, J. In these consolidated appeals, the petitioners, Douglas Lambert and Thomas A. Tardif, challenge: (1) the failure of the Trial Court (Mohl, J.) to invalidate the appointment of Craig Wiggin to the office of Belknap County sheriff by respondent Belknap County Convention (Convention); and (2) the trial court's denial of their request for documents from respondents Stephen H. Nedeau, the Convention's chairperson, and Angela A. Bell, the Convention's record keeper. See RSA ch. 91-A (2001 & Supp. 2007). We hold that the appointment of Wiggin must be invalidated because the Convention was required to fill the vacancy in public session rather than by secret ballot. See RSA 91-A:2, II, :8, II (Supp. 2007). We further hold that the petitioners must be afforded access to the documents relating to the candidates' applications for the vacancy, see RSA 91-A:4, I (Supp. 2007), but remand for consideration of whether certain personal information that may be in those documents requires redaction. Accordingly, we reverse and remand. I The following facts are undisputed. The Convention consists of the state representatives of Belknap County's representative districts, RSA 24:1 (2000), and has the power, among other things, to fill a vacancy for the unexpired term of an elected county office, including that of the Belknap County sheriff, RSA 661:9, I (Supp. 2007). See also N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 71 ("The county . . . sheriffs . . . shall be elected . . . ."); RSA 653:1, V (Supp. 2007) (mandating that one sheriff be elected for a two-year term at every state general election). On May 29, 2007, the Convention convened to discuss the mid-term vacancy created by the resignation of Sheriff Dan Collis. To discuss the process for filling the vacancy, the Convention voted to enter nonpublic session. See generally RSA 91-A:3 (Supp. 2007). The minutes of that session note, in pertinent part: Chair[person] Nedeau announced that the applications for seven candidates have been sent to each . . . member, and that letters of recommendation are on file in Angela Bell's office, and will also be sent out. The [Convention] agreed that all seven should be interviewed, and asked specific questions. Each [member] will have a score sheet for each candidate. On June 11, 2007, the Convention again voted to enter nonpublic session. During the nonpublic session, the Convention interviewed the seven candidates and ultimately selected two finalists for the vacancy. The Convention publicly announced the names of the two finalists, but did not disclose the full list of applicants.

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On June 23, 2007, the petitioners submitted a written request to Bell to review the seven applications, all letters of recommendation, and all score sheets (documents). After speaking with Nedeau, Bell refused to disclose the documents. Alleging a violation of RSA chapter 91-A, the Right-to-Know Law, the petitioners filed a petition for declaratory judgment against Nedeau and Bell, seeking disclosure of the documents. See RSA 91-A:4. The trial court denied the petitioners' request because it found that the privacy interests of the seven applicants outweighed the public's interest in disclosure of "otherwise personal information." On June 25, 2007, the Convention interviewed the two finalists in public session. After deciding to use a secret paper ballot to vote, the Convention, by a vote of ten-to-four with one abstention, selected Wiggin as sheriff. Before Wiggin commenced his official duties as sheriff, the petitioners filed a declaratory judgment action against the Convention. They alleged that the Convention violated the Right-to-Know Law by using a secret ballot to fill the vacancy, see RSA 91-A:2, II, and requested that the trial court invalidate the selection of Wiggin as sheriff, see RSA 91-A:8, II. The trial court agreed that the Convention violated the Right-to-Know Law by using a secret ballot. However, the court found that, pursuant to RSA 91-A:3, II(b), the Convention could have "conduct[ed] the entire process of selecting the Sheriff in nonpublic sessions," and, because "the Convention went further than the Right-to-Know law required [by] conducting interviews with the two final candidates in public and voting at the public session, albeit by secret ballot," there was "no reason to believe that the Convention would reach a different result if the matter were to be revisited by the Convention." Thus, the court declined to invalidate the selection of Wiggin as sheriff. On appeal, the petitioners contend that the trial court erred in: (1) finding that the Convention could have conducted the entire appointment process in nonpublic sessions; (2) failing to invalidate the selection of Wiggin as sheriff; and (3) failing to provide them access to the documents. II Resolution of this case requires us to interpret several statutory provisions, including certain provisions of the Right-to-Know Law. The ordinary rules of statutory construction apply to our review of the Right-toKnow Law. Lamy v. N.H. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 152 N.H. 106, 108 (2005). Thus, we are the final arbiter of the legislature's intent as expressed in the words of the statute considered as a whole. In the Matter of Carr & Edmunds, 156 N.H. 498, 503-04 (2007). When examining the language of a statute, we ascribe the plain and ordinary meaning to the words used. Id. at 504. We interpret legislative intent from the statute as written and will not consider what the

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legislature might have said or add language that the legislature did not see fit to include. Id. We also interpret a statute in the context of the overall statutory scheme and not in isolation. Id. Where, as here, the facts are undisputed, we review the trial court's rulings de novo. Murray v. N.H. Div. of State Police, 154 N.H. 579, 581 (2006). "The purpose of the Right-to-Know Law is to ensure both the greatest possible public access to the actions, discussions and records of all public bodies, and their accountability to the people." Id. (quotation omitted). The law "helps further our state constitutional requirement that the public's right of access to governmental proceedings and records shall not be unreasonably restricted." Id. (quotation omitted); see also N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 8. Although the statute does not provide for unrestricted access to public records and proceedings, to best effectuate the statutory and constitutional objective of facilitating access to all public documents and proceedings, we resolve questions regarding the Right-to-Know Law with a view to providing the utmost information. Id.; Herron v. Northwood, 111 N.H. 324, 326 (1971). Thus, we construe provisions favoring disclosure broadly, while construing exemptions narrowly. Murray, 154 N.H. at 581 (citation omitted). "We also look to the decisions of other jurisdictions, since other similar acts, because they are in pari materia, are interpretively helpful, especially in understanding the necessary accommodation of the competing interests involved." Union Leader Corp. v. N.H. Housing Fin. Auth., 142 N.H. 540, 546 (1997) (quotation omitted); see also Lamy, 152 N.H. at 108. "[W]hen a public entity seeks to avoid disclosure of material under the Right-to-Know Law, that entity bears a heavy burden to shift the balance toward nondisclosure." Murray, 154 N.H. at 581 (citation omitted). III RSA 661:9 provides, in relevant part: "If a vacancy occurs in the office of county sheriff . . . , the members of the county convention shall fill the vacancy for the unexpired term by majority vote." RSA 91-A:2, II states, in pertinent part: "All public proceedings shall be open to the public, and all persons shall be permitted to attend any meetings of those bodies or agencies. Except for town meetings, school district meetings and elections, no vote while in open session may be taken by secret ballot." (Emphasis added.) Pursuant to RSA 91-A:3, I, "[b]odies or agencies shall not meet in nonpublic session, except for one of the purposes set out in paragraph II," and "[n]o body or agency may enter nonpublic session, except pursuant to motion properly made and seconded" that "state[s] on its face the specific exemption under paragraph II . . . relied upon as foundation for the nonpublic session."

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The respondents assert, and the trial court found, that the Convention could have filled the vacancy in the office of the sheriff in nonpublic session pursuant to the exemption in paragraph II(b). We disagree. Paragraph II(b) permits a body or agency to "consider[] or act[] upon . . . [t]he hiring of any person as a public employee" in nonpublic session. RSA 91A:3, II(b). "Filling" a "vacancy . . . in the office of the county sheriff," RSA 661:9, I, is not equivalent to "hiring" a "person as a public employee," RSA 91A:3, II(b). In common understanding, public officers are elected or appointed, not hired. See Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1836 (unabridged ed. 2002) (defining "public officer" as "a person holding a post to which he has been legally elected or appointed and exercising governmental functions" (emphases added)). Consistent with that understanding, a person is normally "elected" to the office of the county sheriff for a specified term. See N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 71; RSA 653:1, V. However, when the office becomes vacant during that term, the Convention may "fill the vacancy"; that is, "furnish ([the] vacancy or office) with an occupant or incumbent." Random House Dictionary of the English Language 531 (1966) (defining "fill"); see also Webster's Third New International Dictionary 849 (unabridged ed. 2002) (defining "fill" as, inter alia, "to provide with incumbents[, e.g., fill] vacancies left by retirements"). In so doing, the Convention is not "hiring" or "engag[ing] the personal services of" that occupant or incumbent "for a fixed sum." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1072 (unabridged ed. 2002) (defining "hire"). Notably, the superior court, not the Convention, has the authority to remove a sheriff for official misconduct, see RSA 661:9, IV, and, otherwise, the interim sheriff is accountable only to the people. Thus, the Convention is not "hiring" the occupant for the office of the sheriff, but is instead designating an occupant for, or placing an occupant in, the vacant office in lieu of an election, and as such is essentially "appointing" a person to the office. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 105 (unabridged ed. 2002) (defining "appoint" as "to assign, designate, or set apart by authority . . . [or] to place in an office or post"); cf. Board of Educ. v. Freedom of Inf. Comm'n, 566 A.2d 1380, 1381 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1988) (interpreting the term "filling a vacancy" as constituting an "appointment"). The respondents agree that the Convention's selection of Wiggin as sheriff constituted an appointment, but contend that we should construe the term "hiring" broadly to include "appointments." To do so would be contrary to our well-established practice of construing exemptions under the Right-toKnow Law narrowly, in order to further the primary purpose of the statute to permit freedom of access to public records and proceedings. Lamy, 152 N.H. at 108; Herron, 111 N.H. at 326. Thus, we decline to hold that "[t]he hiring of . . . a public employee" includes the appointment of an interim sheriff.

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While it could have used language specifically exempting appointments from the open meeting requirement, as other states have done, see, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.

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