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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule 22 as well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New Hampshire, One Charles Doe Drive, Concord, New Hampshire 03301, of any editorial errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes to press. Errors may be reported by E-mail at the following address: reporter@courts.state.nh.us. Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00 a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court's home page is: http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme. THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE ___________________________ Rockingham No. 2008-520 SARA REALTY, LLC v. COUNTRY POND FISH AND GAME CLUB, INC. Argued: February 18, 2009 Opinion Issued: April 9, 2009 Casassa and Ryan, of Hampton (John J. Ryan on the brief and orally), for the petitioner. Sumner F. Kalman, Attorney at Law, P.C., of Plaistow (Thea S. Valvanis and Sumner F. Kalman on the brief, and Mr. Kalman orally), for the respondent. Kelly A. Ayotte, attorney general (Lisa S. Walker, attorney, on the brief), for the State of New Hampshire, as amicus curiae. HICKS, J. The petitioner, Sara Realty, LLC (Sara Realty), appeals an order of the Superior Court (Lewis, J.) granting summary judgment to the respondent, Country Pond Fish and Game Club, Inc. (Country Pond), based

upon its conclusion that RSA chapter 159-B (Supp. 2008) barred the petitioner's action and was not unconstitutional. We affirm. The trial court found or the record supports the following relevant facts. Country Pond owns and operates a "[s]hooting range," RSA 159-B:8, II, on 10.75 acres in Newton. It began operation in 1962, well before Newton adopted its first zoning ordinance in 1973 and specific noise ordinances in 2005 and 2006. Sara Realty purchased a campground west of the shooting range in 1999. In 2001, Country Pond purchased a forty-acre, forested lot between its shooting range and the campground. After receiving approval from the board of selectmen, it undertook to excavate and clear the lot in order to build, among other things, additional parking. The selectmen later revoked this approval pending site plan review because they decided that planning board approval was necessary before proceeding further. Sara Realty participated in the planning board proceedings as an interested abutter due to its concern over the loss of sound buffering trees and earth between its property and Country Pond's shooting range. The planning board retained a sound specialist to help develop a noise mitigation plan. It later approved the excavation and site plan in 2003 on the condition that Country Pond integrate certain noise mitigation measures. It ultimately determined that Country Pond had met the noise mitigation condition. The superior court affirmed this decision. In April 2007, Sara Realty petitioned the superior court for declaratory and injunctive relief. In September 2007, it amended its petition. The petition, as amended, alleges that Country Pond engaged in a common law private nuisance due to the level of firearm-related noise reaching Sara Realty's property following the excavation and tree-clearing activities. It also asserted that Country Pond had failed to adequately comply with the planning board's noise mitigation requirements and thus sought injunctive relief pursuant to RSA 676:15 (2008). Country Pond moved to dismiss, citing RSA chapter 159-B. Sara Realty objected, claiming that RSA chapter 159-B is inapplicable and unconstitutional. The superior court treated Country Pond's motion as one for summary judgment and ruled in its favor. On appeal, Sara Realty argues that RSA chapter 159-B does not apply to its action and violates its State Constitutional right to a remedy, see N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 14. In reviewing the trial court's summary judgment ruling, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and, if no genuine issue of material fact exists, we determine whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. N.H. Assoc. of Counties v. State of N.H., 158 N.H. ___, ___ (decided January 16, 2009).

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We begin by putting RSA chapter 159-B in context. Residential expansion into rural countryside increases the prospect of litigation involving outdoor shooting ranges. See N.H.S. Jour. 1080 (1987) (recommending that House Bill 229 ought to pass because "in some places the construction of new housing units close to [shooting ranges] cause[s] a surge of noise pollution"); Ray TP. v. B & BS Gun Club, 575 N.W.2d 63, 65 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997); Annotation, Gun Club, or Shooting Gallery or Range, as Nuisance, 26 A.L.R.3d 661 (1969). In response, approximately twenty-nine states, including New Hampshire, have enacted legislation specifically protecting shooting ranges from actions based upon firearm-related noise. See Miller v. Hill, 785 N.E.2d 532, 544 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 803 N.E.2d 484 (Ill. 2003). Originally enacted in 1987, RSA chapter 159-B generally protects a shooting range from civil liability or criminal prosecution if the range complies with noise regulations applicable when it first came into operation. See Laws 1987, ch. 175. The statutory scheme was repealed and reenacted in 2004. See Laws 2004, 83:2. I. Applicability of RSA chapter 159-B

The trial court ruled that RSA chapter 159-B was "plainly implicated" in this dispute because the alleged noise arose "from a combination of" excavation, tree-cutting and protected shooting activity, and Sara Realty sought to terminate the shooting range activity as relief. Sara Realty argues that RSA chapter 159-B affords no protection to Country Pond because the excavation and tree-cutting, and not solely the protected shooting range activities, caused the alleged noise nuisance by allowing the sound of admittedly protected shooting range activities to reach its property. It argues that RSA chapter 159-B does not contemplate any such scenario and, thus, we "should not read into the statute language which exempts activity . . . exacerbat[ing] the gun shooting noise level . . . where that increase . . . is directly attributable to non gun shooting activities." In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of a statute considered as a whole. Residents Defending Their Homes v. Lone Pine Hunter's Club, 155 N.H. 486, 488 (2007). We construe all parts of a statute together to effectuate its overall purpose and avoid an absurd or unjust result. Id. RSA chapter 159-B affords protection to shooting ranges from noiserelated regulation at the state and local levels. Eligible shooting ranges are exempt from state agency noise level limitations, see RSA 159-B:6, and retroactive application of local and state regulations, see RSA 159-B:4. Notably, unlike the approach taken by several other states that withdraw the statutory protections when shooting ranges undertake a substantial change in

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use, see, e.g., Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17,

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