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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule 22 as well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New Hampshire, One Charles Doe Drive, Concord, New Hampshire 03301, of any editorial errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes to press. Errors may be reported by E-mail at the following address: reporter@courts.state.nh.us. Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00 a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court's home page is: http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme. THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE ___________________________ Merrimack No. 2009-091 MEGAN SMITH v. CITY OF FRANKLIN Argued: September 24, 2009 Opinion Issued: January 14, 2010 New Hampshire Legal Assistance, of Concord (Daniel Feltes & a. on the brief, and Mr. Feltes orally), for the plaintiff. Wescott, Dyer, Fitzgerald & Nichols, P.A., of Laconia (Paul T. Fitzgerald on the brief and orally), for the defendant. CONBOY, J. The plaintiff, Megan Smith, appeals an order of the Superior Court (Mangones, J.) upholding the denial of her request for financial assistance by the defendant, City of Franklin (City). The trial court ruled that the City correctly interpreted RSA 167:27 (2002) to preclude the plaintiff's eligibility for local financial assistance because she receives Medicaid through the Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled (Medicaid-APTD) program. We reverse and remand.

The following facts are undisputed. The plaintiff is a resident of Franklin. In July 2007, the plaintiff's monthly household income consisted of federal Social Security Disability Insurance benefits of $777, and federal Supplemental Security Income totaling $177, comprised of $88.50 for the plaintiff and $88.50 for her husband. Throughout July of 2007, she also received medical assistance through the Medicaid-APTD program, pursuant to RSA 167:6, VII. She did not, however, receive direct financial assistance payments from the State. On July 2, 2007, the plaintiff applied to the City for financial assistance with her electric and gas utility bills under the general assistance provisions of RSA chapter 165. The City denied the application on July 13, stating that the plaintiff was ineligible for general assistance under RSA 167:27. The plaintiff reapplied for financial assistance with her electric and gas utility bills on July 26. On July 30, 2007, the City again denied her application on the same ground. The plaintiff requested a "Fair Hearing" concerning the City's July 30 decision. Following a hearing, the hearings officer upheld the City's July 30 decision. The plaintiff sought review in the superior court, where she argued that RSA 167:27 does not preclude her eligibility for local assistance because the aid she receives through the Medicaid-APTD program constitutes "medical assistance," and not "aid to the permanently and totally disabled" as it is defined under New Hampshire law. She distinguished the Medicaid benefits she receives from the "cash assistance" programs that RSA 167:27 declares incompatible with local general assistance. The City asserted that RSA 167:27 makes no distinction between "medically needy" and "categorically needy" recipients of "aid to the permanently and totally disabled," and that the plaintiff, whom it acknowledged is medically needy, receives "aid to the permanently and totally disabled" and is therefore precluded from local assistance under the plain language of the statute. The trial court adopted the City's position. This appeal followed. "We review the trial court's statutory interpretation de novo." Petition of State of N.H. (State v. Milner), 159 N.H. ___, ___ (decided Dec. 4, 2009). "In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiters of the legislature's intent as expressed in the words of the statute considered as a whole." Id. "We interpret legislative intent from the statute as written and will not consider what the legislature might have said or add language that the legislature did not see fit to include." Id. We begin by examining the language of the statute and ascribing the plain and ordinary meanings to the words the legislature used.

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Although we look to the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language to determine legislative intent, we will not read words or phrases in isolation, but in the context of the entire statute. When the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, we do not look beyond it for further indications of legislative intent. We review legislative history to aid our analysis where the statutory language is ambiguous or subject to more than one reasonable interpretation. We construe all parts of a statute together to effectuate its overall purpose and avoid an absurd or unjust result. Franklin v. Town of Newport, 151 N.H. 508, 509-10 (2004) (citations omitted). RSA 167:27 provides, in relevant part: No person receiving old age assistance or aid to the permanently and totally disabled under this chapter or RSA 161 shall at the same time receive any other relief from the state, or from any political subdivision thereof, except for medical and surgical assistance, and the acceptance of such relief shall operate as a revocation of old age assistance or aid to the permanently and totally disabled. (Emphasis added.) RSA 167:5, I (2002) defines the relevant terms: "assistance granted to the needy permanently and totally disabled shall be designated as aid to the permanently and totally disabled" (NH-APTD), while "[m]edical care and services provided to eligible individuals shall be designated as medical assistance." We must give effect to all words in a statute, and presume that the legislature did not enact legislation with superfluous or redundant words. Winnacunnet Coop. Sch. Dist. v. Town of Seabrook, 148 N.H. 519, 525-26 (2002). Giving effect to all words in the statutes, RSA 167:27 and RSA 167:5 read together establish that NH-APTD and "medical assistance" are two separate and distinct programs. NH-APTD and "medical assistance" also have different standards of eligibility under RSA 167:6, VI (delimiting eligibility for NH-APTD, in large part by reference to the Social Security Act), and under RSA 167:6, VII (setting eligibility standards for "medical assistance"). Moreover, RSA 167:27 specifically permits "medical and surgical assistance" as the only type of relief that may be received in conjunction with NH-APTD. Thus, while NH-APTD is not compatible with local financial assistance, medical assistance is compatible. We must therefore determine whether the plaintiff's coverage under the Medicaid-APTD program constitutes "medical assistance" under New Hampshire law, or is subsumed under NH-APTD.

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In analyzing this issue, we recognize the potential confusion engendered by the use of the phrase "aid to the permanently and totally disabled" in both federal and state law. However, the phrase has different meanings under the two statutory schemes. Medicaid is the program that "offers federal financial assistance to states that opt to reimburse certain costs of medical treatment for needy persons." Appeal of Huff, 154 N.H. 414, 416 (2006); see also Wisc. Dep't of Health & Family Servs. v. Blumer, 534 U.S. 473, 479 (2002) ("Each participating State develops a plan containing reasonable standards . . . for determining eligibility for and the extent of medical assistance within boundaries set by the Medicaid statute and the Secretary of Health and Human Services." (quotation omitted)); Bel Air Assocs. v. N.H. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 158 N.H. 104, 106 (2008) ("DHHS establishes rates of reimbursement for providers of services to Medicaid-eligible persons through the state medical assistance program."). Within the federal statute itself, Medicaid is often referred to interchangeably with "medical assistance." See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.

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