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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule 22 as well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New Hampshire, One Charles Doe Drive, Concord, New Hampshire 03301, of any editorial errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes to press. Errors may be reported by E-mail at the following address: reporter@courts.state.nh.us. Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00 a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court's home page is: http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme. THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE ___________________________ Compensation Appeals Board Nos. 2010-233 2010-234 APPEAL OF THE HARTFORD INSURANCE COMPANY (New Hampshire Compensation Appeals Board) Argued: February 17, 2011 Opinion Issued: May 26, 2011 Sulloway & Hollis, P.L.L.C., of Concord (James Owers and Timothy A. Gudas on the brief, and Mr. Owers orally), for the petitioner. Michael A. Delaney, attorney general (Evan J. Mulholland, assistant attorney general, on the brief and orally), for the State. HICKS, J. The petitioner in these consolidated cases, The Hartford Insurance Company (Hartford), appeals orders of the Compensation Appeals Board (CAB) denying recovery from the State Special Fund for Second Injuries, see RSA 281-A:54, :55 (2010), for injuries to Claire Hamel and John Rygiel. We vacate and remand. The following facts were found by the CAB or are supported in the record. Hamel was employed by EAD Motors or its predecessor from 1973 through July 17, 2006. Her job involved small motor subassembly and assembly.

In 1995, Hamel was temporarily disabled for psychiatric reasons and was diagnosed with bipolar disorder. EAD Motors continued to employ her with notice of her disability. In 2005, EAD was notified that Hamel could not use a respirator because of her severe claustrophobia. Hamel continued to work for EAD until July 17, 2006, the date of her second injury. The second injury fund certification by her attending physician listed her diagnosis as "[c]ervical degenerative disc disease and left cubital tunnel syndrome." The New Hampshire Department of Labor (DOL) denied Hartford's request, as the employer's insurance carrier, for second injury reimbursement in July 2009. On de novo appeal of that decision, the CAB also denied reimbursement from the fund. Rygiel began employment with Mobilemed Support Services, LLC (Mobilemed) in 1994. His job involved driving a large truck to transport a mobile MRI unit, setting up the unit and breaking it down. Since 1994, Rygiel has had Type II diabetes requiring the use of medication. As part of a commercial vehicle driver examination in 2001, it was noted that Rygiel had liver disease. On March 5, 2003, Rygiel had the fifth toe on his right foot amputated due to a burn from a heating pad. According to his doctor, Rygiel could not feel the heating pad as a result of his diabetic neuropathy. Following the amputation of Rygiel's toe, Mobilemed obtained legal advice prior to his return to work. On December 11, 2006, Rygiel sustained an employment-related injury to his wrist. On July 14, 2009, the DOL denied Hartford's request, as the employer's insurance carrier, for reimbursement from the second injury fund. A de novo appeal to the CAB also resulted in the denial of second injury fund reimbursement. Hartford appeals both the Hamel and Rygiel decisions by the CAB. Our standard of review is established by statute. Appeal of Jenks, 158 N.H. 174, 177 (2008). [A]ll findings of the [CAB] upon all questions of fact properly before it shall be deemed to be prima facie lawful and reasonable; and the order or decision appealed from shall not be set aside or vacated except for errors of law, unless the court is satisfied, by a clear preponderance of the evidence before it, that such order is unjust or unreasonable. RSA 541:13 (2007). Accordingly, our review of the CAB's factual findings is deferential. Jenks, 158 N.H. at 177. We review its interpretations of statutes, however, de novo. Id. 2

On questions of statutory interpretation, this court is the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of a statute considered as a whole. . . . We interpret legislative intent from the statute as written and will not consider what the legislature might have said or add language that the legislature did not see fit to include. We construe liberally the Workers' Compensation Law in order to give the broadest reasonable effect to its remedial purpose. Thus, when construing the statute, we resolve all reasonable doubts in favor of the injured worker. Appeal of Gamas, 158 N.H. 646, 648 (2009) (citations omitted). "The second injury fund was created to encourage employers to hire or retain employees with permanent physical or mental impairments of any origin by reducing the employer's liability for workers' compensation claims." Appeal of CNA Ins. Cos., 143 N.H. 270, 272-73 (1998). The statutes at issue here are RSA 281

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