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THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
___________________________
Hillsborough-southern judicial district
No. 95-641
SANDRA J. BENOIT
v.
TEST SYSTEMS, INC.
May 28, 1997
Hall, Hess, Kenison, Stewart, Murphy & Keefe, P.A., of Manchester (Francis G. Murphy and Kathryn B. Johnston on the brief, and Mr. Murphy orally), for the plaintiff.
Devine, Millimet & Branch, P.A., of Manchester (Laurence W. Getman and Marjorie E. Lanier on the brief, and John E. Friberg, Jr. orally), for the defendant.
THAYER, J. The plaintiff, Sandra J. Benoit, appeals the Superior Court's (Hampsey, J.) entry of summary judgment in favor of the defendant, Test Systems, Inc. We affirm.
The parties stipulated to the following facts. The plaintiff, a New Hampshire resident, sustained an injury while she performed light assembly work at the defendant's place of business in New Hampshire. E.D. Associates, a Massachusetts temporary employment agency, had assigned the plaintiff to work at the defendant company. While working at the defendant's place of business, the plaintiff was under the defendant's exclusive control, and the defendant supplied her with the tools, instruments, and materials necessary for performing assembly work.
The defendant paid E.D. Associates for the hours the plaintiff worked based on weekly invoices E.D. Associates submitted to the defendant. E.D. Associates then compensated the plaintiff for the work she performed. Pursuant to the arrangement between the defendant and E.D. Associates, E.D. Associates also provided workers' compensation insurance for the plaintiff under a policy issued to E.D. Associates in Massachusetts by CNA Insurance Company (CNA). After her injury, the plaintiff received workers' compensation benefits from CNA pursuant to Massachusetts' workers' compensation statute.
The plaintiff commenced a negligence action against the defendant. The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that New Hampshire law applies, and that pursuant to New Hampshire law, which recognizes the "borrowed servant" rule in workers' compensation cases, the "exclusive remedy" provision of New Hampshire's workers' compensation statute barred the plaintiff's claim. See RSA 281-A:8 (Supp. 1988) (amended 1991, 1993). The superior court granted summary judgment to the defendant, and this appeal followed.
A trial court may grant summary judgment when a case presents no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See LaVallie v. Simplex Wire & Cable Co., 135 N.H. 692, 696, 609 A.2d 1216, 1218 (1992). There is no genuine issue of material fact in this case because the parties stipulated to the relevant facts for the purpose of resolving this choice of law question. Accordingly, we conduct a de novo review of the trial court's application of the law to the stipulated facts. Cf. Union Leader Corp. v. City of Nashua, 141 N.H. __, __, 686 A.2d 310, 312 (1996) (in the absence of disputed facts, court conducts a de novo review of trial court's balancing of interests).
The dispositive issue is which State's law governs: New Hampshire or Massachusetts. The parties agree that if New Hampshire law applies, the plaintiff's suit is barred. See LaVallie, 135 N.H. at 694, 609 A.2d at 1217. In comparison, Massachusetts law would allow the plaintiff to commence a suit against her borrowing employer because unlike New Hampshire, Massachusetts does not require a borrowing employer to obtain workers' compensation coverage for borrowed employees. See Lang v. Edward J. LaMothe Co., 479 N.E.2d 208, 209 (Mass. App. Ct.), review denied, 482 N.E.2d 328 (Mass. 1985). Consequently, Massachusetts declines to extend the benefit of the workers' compensation statute's exclusive remedy provision to borrowing employers. See Numberg v. GTE Transport, Inc., 607 N.E.2d 1, 2 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993); Lang, 479 N.E.2d at 209. Accordingly, this case presents a true conflict of laws. See Taylor v. Bullock, 111 N.H. 214, 215, 279 A.2d 585, 586 (1971); cf. Leflar, True "False Conflicts," Et Alia, 48 B.U. L. Rev. 164, 171 (1968). We conclude that New Hampshire law properly applies in this case, barring this action against the borrowing employer.
We begin by observing that this case does not implicate the constitutional concerns that arise in some choice of law cases. See Saharceski v. Marcure, 366 N.E.2d 1245, 1248 (Mass. 1977). Both New Hampshire and Massachusetts have significant contacts necessary to justify the application of that State's law to this dispute, and as such, we are free to apply either without running afoul of the full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution. See Dailey v. Dallas Carriers Corp., 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 48, 51-52 (Ct. App.) (explaining United States Supreme Court recognizes that State where injury occurred, State where employment relationship created, and State where injured employee resides have significant contacts), review denied (Cal. July 10, 1996) (unpublished disposition); see also Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408, 412-14 (1955).
A particular work-related injury may implicate more than one jurisdiction's workers' compensation statute. See LaBounty v. American Insurance Co., 122 N.H. 738, 742, 451 A.2d 161, 163 (1982). The workers' compensation statutes of either New Hampshire or Massachusetts could have potentially applied to the plaintiff's injury. Compare RSA 281-A:2, VI(a), VIII(a), :5 (Supp. 1996) with Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 152,