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THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
___________________________
Belknap
No. 97-589
THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
v.
WARREN GOODALE
October 20, 1999
Philip T. McLaughlin, attorney general (Mark D. Attorri, senior assistant attorney general, on the brief, and Malinda R. Lawrence, assistant attorney general, orally), for the State.
Gary Apfel, assistant appellate defender, of Orford, by brief and orally, for the defendant.
BROCK, C.J. The defendant, Warren Goodale, was convicted after a jury trial in Superior Court (Perkins, J.) of second degree assault. See RSA 631:2 (1996). We affirm.
Based upon the evidence at trial viewed most favorably to the State, see State v. Smart, 136 N.H. 639, 643, 622 A.2d 1197, 1200, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 917 (1993), the jury was entitled to find the following facts. In September 1996, after an evening of drinking, the defendant and his girlfriend returned to the girlfriend's apartment. The two had been arguing, and while walking toward the apartment, the defendant began to punch her and to pull her hair. Once inside the apartment, the defendant kicked her several times, causing a displaced fracture to her right femur. The defendant then sat down in the living room, drank a beer, and refused to call an ambulance.
The defendant was charged with first degree assault. See RSA 631:1 (1996). He took the position at trial that the victim had assaulted him, and in attempting to protect his groin from being kicked, he had raised his leg. As a result, the victim's femur struck his knee, causing the fracture. The jury acquitted the defendant of first degree assault, but convicted him of second degree assault.
On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred by: (1) denying his motion to depose the State's expert witnesses; (2) allowing the State to obtain criminal records of potential jurors while denying him equal access to such records during jury selection; and (3) prohibiting him from cross-examining the victim about a prior false statement and from introducing extrinsic evidence of her untruthful conduct. We address each argument in turn.
I. Motion to Depose the State's Expert Witnesses
Prior to trial, the State indicated that it intended to call three physicians and an emergency room nurse as witnesses. The defendant moved to depose those witnesses pursuant to RSA 517:13 (1997). Citing State v. Rhoades, 139 N.H. 432, 655 A.2d 414 (1995), the defendant asserted that he had shown necessity for depositions based on the facts and circumstances of his case. After a hearing, the Superior Court (Smukler, J.) denied the motion without prejudice because he had not attempted to attain the information through alternative methods. See RSA 517:13, II(b) (in determining necessity to depose State's non-expert witness, trial court considers other opportunities to discover information).
On appeal, the defendant argues that the witnesses he sought to depose were expert witnesses, and thus the trial court had no discretion to deny the motion. See RSA 517:13, III; State v. Martin, 142 N.H. 63, 64-65, 694 A.2d 999, 1000 (1997). The State argues that any error was invited. We agree.
Under the "invited error" doctrine, "[a] party may not avail himself of error into which he has led the trial court, intentionally or unintentionally." 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error