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THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
___________________________
Grafton
No. 99-749
DAVID S. VAUTOUR & a.
v.
BODY MASTERS SPORTS INDUSTRIES, INC.
November 5, 2001
Coolidge, Mathieu, Barrington, Berube & Couture, of Somersworth (Gregory R. Couture on the brief and orally), and Robert K. Mekeel, P.A., of Concord (Mr. Mekeel on the brief), for the plaintiffs.
Downs Rachlin & Martin, PLLC, of Littleton (Gregory S. Clayton and Gregory M. Eaton on the brief, and Mr. Eaton orally), for the defendant.
Duggan, J. The plaintiffs in this products liability action, David S. Vautour and Susan Vautour, appeal an order of the Superior Court (Fitzgerald, J.) granting a motion for directed verdict to the defendant, Body Masters Sports Industries, Inc. We reverse and remand.
Mr. Vautour was injured while using a leg press machine manufactured by the defendant. The leg press is designed to strengthen a weightlifter’s leg muscles by allowing him or her to raise and lower a metal sled, which may be loaded with weights, along fixed carriage tracks. A manually engaged safety system allows weightlifters to adjust safety stops and to operate the machine while sitting in a fixed, inclined position. In this position, a weightlifter may perform either deep leg presses or calf raise exercises. With legs extended along the carriage track and the balls of the weightlifter’s feet on the sled, a weightlifter performs calf raise exercises by rotating the ankles up and down so that the sled and weights move up and down.
The leg press has two sets of safety stops, the upper and the lower stops. The upper stops provide a place for the weightlifter to rest the weight after extending his or her legs and pushing up the sled. The lower stops prevent the sled and weights from landing in the weightlifter’s lap if he or she loses control of the machine. When the upper stops of the machine are disengaged the lower stops are engaged. The warning label on the machine states, "Caution. Handles must be in locked position when doing calf exercises," thereby instructing weightlifters to engage the upper stops when performing calf raises.
Mr. Vautour’s injury occurred while moving his feet down to do calf raises. Although he was aware of the machine’s warning label, Mr. Vautour did not have the upper stops engaged at the time of his accident. As a result, the sled and his knees fell rapidly toward his chest, injuring his feet. Mr. Vautour brought suit against the defendant under the theories of strict liability, negligence, and breach of warranty. Mr. Vautour contends that the location of the safety stops "exposed users to an unreasonable risk of harm and that this design defect" caused his injuries.
At trial, Barry Bates, the plaintiffs’ biomechanics expert, testified that the machine, as designed, is hazardous because it does not adapt well to a wide range of body sizes and weightlifters may perform calf raise exercises without the upper stops engaged. He testified that in his opinion the leg press was defective and dangerous to weightlifters "because of the location of the lower stops and the possibility that the weight carriage can drop onto the person, putting them beyond their normal performance range of motion." Bates proposed that the leg press should be designed with adjustable, rather than fixed stops. He testified that he had not designed a machine with adjustable stops and did not know of any manufacturer in the industry who made a machine using adjustable stops. He testified, however, that by using adjustable stops "anything that was used would be better" than the fixed stops to prevent injuries. Under cross-examination, Bates admitted that the adjustable stops would not reduce the risk of injury to a user if he or she failed to manually set the stops before operating the machine.
After the close of the plaintiffs’ case in chief, the defendant moved for a directed verdict, or, in the alternative, for dismissal, on the ground that the plaintiffs had failed to introduce evidence sufficient to make out a prima facie case. After the plaintiffs withdrew their claim for breach of warranty, the superior court granted the defendant’s motion for directed verdict on the strict liability and negligence claims, concluding that:
The point at which safety stops could be placed along the sled carriage without interfering with the muscle-strengthening function of the machine, the point at which stops must be placed to ensure that users are reasonably safe from physical injury, and the degree of risk to which users might reasonably be exposed when engaging in such leg strengthening exercises are each factual questions which appear, by their nature, to require specialized knowledge in the areas of design engineering, physiognomy, bio-mechanics, and safety standards in the field of athletic training.
Because the average juror could not be expected to know about these topics and because the plaintiffs’ expert failed to offer any testimony regarding the acceptable risk of injury, where the safety stops should be located, or how his proposed alternative design would prevent the type of injuries suffered by Mr. Vautour, the superior court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to introduce evidence sufficient to support their strict liability and negligence claims.
On appeal, the plaintiffs assert that they proved all of the essential elements of their strict liability claim and the superior court erred by requiring them to prove an alternative design as an additional element in the case.
"A trial court may grant a directed verdict only when the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom, construed most favorably to the party opposing the motion, would not enable a jury to find for that party." Laramie v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 142 N.H. 653, 656 (1998) (quotation omitted). "In conducting its analysis of the evidence, the trial court should not assess the weight to be given to testimony; rather, questions of weight are properly left to the jury." Blais v. Remillard, 138 N.H. 608, 611 (1994). The plaintiff may not avoid a directed verdict, however, by presenting evidence that is merely conjectural in nature. Id. Rather, the plaintiff must present sufficient evidence to satisfy the burden of proof such that a reasonable jury could find in her favor. Id. "If the evidence adduced at trial is conflicting, or if several reasonable inferences may be drawn, the motion should be denied." Thomas v. Finger, 144 N.H. 500, 502 (1999) (quotation omitted); LeBlanc v. American Honda Motor Co., 141 N.H. 579, 585 (1997) (applying same standard to motion for judgment notwithstanding verdict in strict liability, defective design claim). Our standard of review on this issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion. See Thomas, 144 N.H. at 502.
A product is defectively designed when it "is manufactured in conformity with the intended design but the design itself poses unreasonable dangers to consumers." Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 118 N.H. 802, 807 (1978). To prevail on a defective design products liability claim, a plaintiff must prove the following four elements: (1) the design of the product created a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user; (2) the condition existed when the product was sold by a seller in the business of selling such products; (3) the use of the product was reasonably foreseeable by the manufacturer; and (4) the condition caused injury to the user or the user’s property. Chellman v. Saab-Scania AB, 138 N.H. 73, 77 (1993).
To determine whether a product is unreasonably dangerous, we explained in Bellotte v. Zayre Corp., 116 N.H. 52, 54 (1976), that a product "must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics." Id. In Price v. BIC Corp., 142 N.H. 386, 389 (1997), we further explained that whether a product is unreasonably dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer is determined by the jury using a risk-utility balancing test.
Under a risk-utility approach, a product is defective as designed "if the magnitude of the danger outweighs the utility of the product." W. Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts