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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule 22 as well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New Hampshire, One Charles Doe Drive, Concord, New Hampshire 03301, of any editorial errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes to press. Errors may be reported by E-mail at the following address: reporter@courts.state.nh.us. Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00 a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court's home page is: http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme. THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE ___________________________ Attorney Discipline Office No. LD-2006-004 GREW'S CASE Argued: September 13, 2007 Opinion Issued: October 30, 2007 Landya B. McCafferty, of Concord, on the brief and orally, for the Attorney Discipline Office. Upton & Hatfield, LLP, of Portsmouth (Russell F. Hilliard on the brief and orally), for the respondent. DUGGAN, J. This is an appeal by the Attorney Discipline Office (ADO) of the decision of the Supreme Court Professional Conduct Committee (PCC) to suspend the respondent, James T. Grew, from the practice of law in New Hampshire for six months. The ADO argues that the respondent should be disbarred. We disagree and order the respondent suspended for two years effective from the date of our original order of suspension. I The parties stipulated to the following facts. The respondent was admitted to practice law in New Hampshire on October 26, 2004. On November 26, 2004, while backing out of the Hampton Plaza in his Ford Econoline Van (Econoline Van), the respondent hit the bumper of a parked car. The owner, Jonathan Labrie, was in his car at the time of the accident.

At the scene, the respondent gave Labrie his telephone number, current home address, and the information from his driver's license. The respondent also told Labrie that he was unsure whether his Econoline Van was currently insured, and requested that Labrie contact him later to get the vehicle's identification information. Labrie, however, wrote down the license plate number and a description of the Econoline Van. On November 27, 2004, the respondent contacted Progressive Insurance Company and falsely reported that at the time of the accident he had been driving his green Ford Windstar Van (Ford Windstar). The respondent made this false claim because, at the time, he was carrying insurance on his Ford Windstar but not on his Econoline Van. Progressive issued a claim number, and informed the respondent that a claims adjuster would contact him at a later date. The following day, the respondent left Labrie a voicemail which stated, in pertinent part: Hi John, it's James Grew, the gentleman who unfortunately backed into you the other day. I just wanted to let you know the insurance company is Progressive . . . . I'll call Progressive today, and I will let them know that I backed into you, um, and there's some damage to your car and that I was driving the green Ford Windstar, and, um, I will give you a call back after I talk to them, thank you. A few minutes later, the respondent again phoned Labrie and left a voicemail which, in relevant part, stated: Hi John, it's James Grew again, I just want to follow up with you, um, I just called Progressive . . . . I, uh, opened up a claim so that you can get your car repaired, quickly, I hope . . . . I explained to the agency . . . that I backed into you in the parking lot off of Lafayette . . . and that, um, my van hit your front bumper, and I explained that I was driving the Ford Windstar van, which is a dark green, you may want to note that it's a dark green van . . . and again, I apologize, if you want to give me a call today, just so we can [sic] the facts straight it will help out . . . . On November 29, 2004, a Progressive claims adjuster called the respondent who, once again, falsely reported that he had been driving the Ford Windstar at the time of the accident. The claims adjuster then called Labrie, who informed him that not only had the respondent been driving the Econoline Van, but that the respondent had also been calling Labrie in an attempt to persuade him to falsely report that the Ford Windstar had been the vehicle involved in the accident. The next day, the respondent called Labrie yet again

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and left a voicemail requesting a return call so that he and Labrie could "get [their] facts straight." On December 14, 2004, Labrie's insurance provider, Geico Indemnity Company, sent the respondent a formal demand letter in an attempt to recover $1,802.11 for repairing Labrie's car. On December 16, 2004, Ralph D. Gault, a Progressive claims investigator, sent the respondent a letter requesting a conference in order to discuss "issues which have surfaced regarding this loss." Receiving no response, Gault followed up on his letter by leaving his business card with the respondent on December 21, 2004. The following day, the respondent wrote a check to Geico for $1,802.11 and sent the following email to Gault: Thank you for leaving your card yesterday. Email is a good way to communicate, for December and January are always very busy months. I wanted to inform you that I have paid for [Labrie's] repair out of my own pocket. His damage was minimal. Progressive is not responsible for his claim. Thank you for your assistance. The respondent was subsequently indicted by the Rockingham County Grand Jury for one count of insurance fraud, a class B felony. However, on April 7, 2006, the respondent entered into a plea bargain that reduced the felony to a class A misdemeanor. The Superior Court (Morrill, J.) sentenced the respondent, in accordance with the plea agreement, as follows: (1) twelve months in the House of Corrections, all suspended for one year on good behavior and compliance with the terms of the sentencing order; (2) $1,000 fine; (3) $284 in restitution to Progressive; and (4) 100 hours of community service. On May 31, 2006, we issued an order ruling that the respondent's conviction for class A misdemeanor insurance fraud constituted a "serious crime" under Supreme Court Rule 37(9)(b). Accordingly, we ordered the respondent immediately suspended from the practice of law, see Sup. Ct. R. 37(9)(a), and referred the matter to the PCC on the issue of sanction, see Sup Ct. R. 37(9)(d). The PCC imposed a six-month suspension, emphasizing the respondent's lack of a prior disciplinary record, his cooperation with the disciplinary process, his sincere remorse, and the fact that the incident "was an isolated one in [the respondent's] personal and professional history." The PCC also found a letter submitted by the respondent to be "particularly significant." In the letter, the respondent explained how, at the time of the accident, he was under extreme financial and emotional duress because: (1) he had grown up poor and incurred substantial debt in obtaining

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his law degree; (2) he had not been earning enough to provide for his family from his practice representing low-income clients; (3) his wife's salary had recently been reduced because of employment restructuring; (4) his wife had also required an extended stay in the hospital due to complications during birth; (5) one of his three children had been in and out of the hospital for severe allergies; and (6) his father had recently moved in with the family because he was suffering from Alzheimer's disease. At the same time, the PCC found, the respondent's "professional life, until this incident, reflect[ed] his integrity, commitment to serving the public, and commitment to the legal profession." The ADO has appealed the PCC's order, arguing that the respondent should instead be disbarred. II "[W]e retain ultimate authority to determine whether, on the facts found, a violation of the rules governing attorney conduct has occurred and, if so, the appropriate sanction." Coddington's Case, 155 N.H. 66, 68 (2007) (quotation omitted). In exercising this authority, we remain "mindful that the purpose of attorney discipline is not to inflict punishment, but rather to protect the public, maintain public confidence in the bar, preserve the integrity of the legal profession, and prevent similar conduct in the future." Id. (quotation omitted). Accordingly, each attorney discipline case is judged upon "its own facts and circumstances, taking into account the severity of the misconduct and any mitigating circumstances appearing in the record." Id. Ultimately, the attorney's behavior, and not just the number of rules broken, is determinative of the gravity of the unprofessional conduct. Id. In assessing the propriety of a particular sanction, we look to the American Bar Association's Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (2005) (Standards) for guidance. Bosse's Case, 155 N.H. 128, 131 (2007). The Standards provide four factors to consider when imposing a sanction: (1) the duty violated by the lawyer; (2) the lawyer's mental state; (3) the actual or potential injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct; and (4) the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors. Standards, supra

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